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i i 
The thesis examines the doctrines of freedom and immortality as they 
are found i n the works of Ian Thomas Ramsey and Austin Marsden Farrer. 
Chapters I and IV provide the background' to the work of Dr .Ramsey and 
Dr.Ferrer respectively.The background i s examined i n both i t s h i s t o r i c a l 
and philosophical perspectives i n order not only to trace the influences 
behind the works of these two sholars but also to set t he i r work i n the 
wider i n t e l l e c t u a l scene.Chapters I I and I I I trace the development 
of the wr i t ings of I.T.Ramsey on these subjects up to the delivery of 
his Forwood lectures on Freedom and Immortality i n 1957iwhile chapter 
I I I examines h is work from 1957 x m t i l h is death i n 1972. Chapters V and 
V I repeat the process f o r the works of A.M.Farrer,chapter V examining h i s 
work up t o the de l ivery of his G i f f o r d Lectures on the Freedom of the W i l l 
i n 19571 while chapter VI examines h i s work from 1957 u n t i l his death 
i n 1968.Thus,not only are we enabled to see the contr ibut ion of each of 
the ee scholars i n r e l a t i o n to each other and to the wider contemporary 
i n t e l l e c t u a l scene but we are enabled also to trace the development of 
t h e i r thoughts on these subjects wi th r e ^ r d t o the i r own i n t e l l e c t u a l 
development. 
The thesis traces t h e i r reactions to the restatement i n the mid-years 
of t h i s century of the two hundred year old challege of David Hume to 
theology and metaphysics.Such an examination of d i f f e r3nt approaches 
of Christ ian, apologetic to a common problem may therefore suggest a way 
forward f o r a renewed; apologetic i n the face of a r ad ica l ly secularised 
society,which takes account of both the methods and resul ts of s c i en t i f i c : 
enquiry but which nevertheless does not compromise the fundamental tenets 
of the Chris t ian f a i t h and which provides a s i gn i f i can t place f o r theology 
and metaphysics i n the i n t e l l e c t u a l schema. 
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The f u l l references to which the abbreviations used i n the tex t of 
the thesis r e f e r are t o be found e i t h e r , i n the cases of abbreviations 
used widely throughout the work,in the l i s t of abbreviations a t the 
f r o n t of the thesis or , i n the case of those references which, are more 
l o c a l i s e d , i n the notes to chapters a t the end of the thesis where 
they are l i s t e d according to chapter and page.Subsequent references 
t o these works are l i s t e d by reference to the page on which they 
f i r s t occur.For example, Part of liy L i fe ,A.J .Ayer ,Col l ins 1977,is 
f i r s t c i t ed on page 7 of the thesis and the f u l l reference to the 
work i s to be found.on. the corresponding page i n the notes to chapters, 
i . e . Chapter I page 7 .Subsequent references then fo l low under chapter 
and page as, Part of My L i f e see above p . 7 . Ind iv idual secondary 
works-are c i t ed i n the t ex t i t s e l f and a f u l l bibliography of the 
works of both I.T.Ramsey and A.M.Farrer i s included at the end of the 
thesis along with a select bibliography of secondary works. Thus the 
f low of the t ex t remains as uninterrupted as possible. Ihe bibliography 
of the published works of I.T.Ramsey i s published separately and i s 
enclosed a t the end of the thes is . 
The f o l l o w i n g abbreviations are used throughout t h i s work.Other 
abbreviat ions, less f requent ly used,are to be found i n the notes 
t o chapters at the back of the book: 
F&I P^eedom and Immortality(The Forwood Lectures i n the University 
of Liverpool 1957) I.T.Ramsey,SCM PressiLondon I96O. 
RL Religious Language;An Empirical Placing of Theological Phrases, 
Library of Philosophy and Theology, I.T.Ramsey,SCM PressiLondon 1957. 
P f o r M Prospect f o r Metaphysics;E3says i n Metaphysical Exploration, 
ed.I.T.Ramsey, George Allen and Unwin : London I96I. 
OBSinR On Being Sure i n Religion (F.D.Haurice Lectures I96I), 
I.T.Ramsey, Athlone Press:London I963. 
Relig.and Sc i . Religion and Science:Conflict and Synthesis ( f i r s t given 
i n 1960 as the fou r th i n the series of Annual Theological 
Lectures arranged by the Church of Ireland i n the Queen's 
Un ive r s i ty ,Be l fa s t ) I.T.Ramsey, SPCK:London 196 .^ 
B4P Biology and Personali ty, ed.I.T.Ramsey, Bas i l BlackwelljOxford I965. 
SEofI 'The Systematic Elusiveness of ' I , P h i l o s o p h i c a l Quarterly, 
vol.5,no.20,July I955,pp.l93-20'f. (reprinted i n Christ ian Emp-
i r i c ism, pp. 17-32.) 
CE Chris t ian Empiricism, I.T.Ramsey, edited by Jerry H.Gill,SheIdon Press 1 
London 1974. 
Edwards Ian Ramsey.Bishop o f Durham - A Memoir, D.L.Edwards, OUPjLondon 1973. 
G i l l Ian Ramsey>To Speak Responsibly of God, J . H . G i l l , George Allen and Unwin. 
Londlon I976. 
PI F i n i t e and I n f i n i t e l A Philosophical Essay, A.M.Parrer, Dacre Press: 
Westminster 19^ +3. 
GV The Glass of Vision (The Bampton Lectures 19^8), A .M. f^ r re r , Dacre Press: 
Westminster 19^ +8. 
FW The Freedom of the W i l l (The Gif f o r d Lectures 1957), A.M.Farrer, 
k&O Black:London 1958. 
SB Saving B e l i e f :A discussion of Essentials, A.M.Faxrer, Hodder and S tou^ ton : 
London I964. 
VI 
SofG A Science of God?, A.M.Farrer, G.BlesjLondon I966. 
FS Fai th and Speculation (containing the Deems Lectures 1964), 
A.M.Farrer, A&G Black:London I967. 
RF Ref lec t ive FaithtEssays i n Philosophical Theology, A.M.Parrer, edited 
by C.G.Gonti, SPCKiLondon 1972 
Hebblethwaite "Austin Farrer ' s Concept of Divine Providence", B.Hebblethwaite, 
Theology, vol .LmiI ,no.6o6,I!ec.l970,pp .5 '^l-51. 
P-H)A "Providence and Divine Actirai" , B.Hebblethwaite, Religious Studies, 
vol.14,no.2,June 1978,pp.223-36. 
Curt is "The Ra t iwia l Iheology of Dr.Farrer", P.Curt is , Theology.vol.LXXIII, 
no.600,June 1970,pp.249-^6. 
Henderson Introductory notes on Austin Farrer 's The Prior Actua l i ty of God, 
E.H.Henderson,Philosophy Dept.,Louisiana State Univ.,Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana, (duplicated sheets) . 
JTS. Journal of Theological Studies . 
CQP. Chiurch Quarterly Review 
Theol. Theolopy 
P h i l . Q t l y . Philosophical Quarterly 
Hod.Chman. Modem Churchman 
Rel lg .Stud. Religious Studies 
Complete bibl iographies of the works of I.T.Ramsey and A.M.Farrer 
can be found i n j 
A Bibliography of the Published Works; Ian Thomas Ramsey, J.H.Pye, 
ed.A,L.Loades, Abbey House PublicationsjDurham 1979. (copy appended). 
Ref lec t ive Fai th .'Essays in Philosophical Theology, A.M.Farrer, 
ed.C.G.Conti, SPCKiLondon 1972. 
CHAPTER I 
Ian Thomas Ramsey,as the Nolloth Professor of the Christ ian Religion 
a t Oxford and Fellow of Or ie l College,was inv i t ed i n 1957 to give the 
Forwood Lectures i n the Universi ty of Liverpool.The subject on which 
he chose t o lecture was Freedom and Immorta l i ty . In order to appreciate 
the lectures,one needs toi pay attention,however b r i e f l y , t o the problems 
f ac ing the Church of England i n the I950's ,not least amongst which was 
the loss of the influence which i t had held i n the Victor ian era and 
even up to the end of the Second World War.As David Edwards remarks, 
"On the whole the nat ion insofar as i t thougjit about the Church at a l l , 
probably assumed that most of the Church's problems could not be solved." 
(Edwards p . l ) . 
The problems which i t faced included not only the loss of the 'working 
c l a s ses ' , d i s i l lu s ioned by years of war and the contonporary social and 
economic conditions and motivated by the r i s e of the Marxist d i a l ec t i c 
(cf.The Reith Lectures 1979tChrist ianity and the World Order,E.R.Norman, 
Co l l ins 1979)»but also the ' a l i ena t i on ' of the s c i e n t i f i c a l l y minded 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s . l t had to be recognised that England was f a s t becoming 
what has been cal led "a secularised democracy which r e l i e d on a science 
based technology". 
Professor Dorothy Emmet has remarked of Ian Ramsey that 
"under his imperturbable demeanour he had a f e e l i n g 
of desperation about the need to rethink tte problem 
of r e l i g ious t r u t h i n a world where our s c i e n t i f i c 
understanding of man and indeed the understanding of 
science and philosophy themselves,were changing in 
ways of vdiich most people i n the Churches were unaware." 
(Edwjirds p.6). 
, Ramsey throughout h i s career was,however,to urge that a new renaissance 
and a new reformation were not only desirable but even a t the door and 
he would speak of a world i n which science and humanity would be com-
bined and stand hand i n hand.Indeed h i s last, words i n the House of 
Lords (on 22nd March 1972) were about "this search fo r a new culture 
and t h i s pilgrimage towards a be t t e r humanity." 
I t was stated above that the point of drawing a t tent ion to cer ta in 
features of Ramsey's career was to enable us to appreciate the Forwood 
Lectures,Freedom and Immortal i ty,but the question is,why these two ad-
mi t ted ly "not obviously s imi l a r themes" were chosen as the subject matter 
• and why they were approached i n qui te the way tha t they were.Probably the 
best s t a r t i n g point would be the introduct ion to the book i t s e l f where 
Ramsey suggests tha t the t i t l e might " s t i r memories of Immanuel Kant f o r 
whom immortality,freedom and the existence of God,were (as he called them) 
postulates of p i a c t i c a l reason." (F&I p . l l ) . 
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Though he purports to say l i t t l e more about Kant,perhaps taking 
t h i s as a cue from Kant himself,he asks Kant's questions of 'What 
can I Icnow,what o u ^ t I to do and what may I hope?'.questions which 
had a pervading influence not only i n th i s book but i h r o u ^ o u t the 
l i f e o f t h i s remarkable man as well.V/hat he hoped to show was that 
the two topics o f "freedom" and "immortal i ty" were»in fac t ,proper ly 
united because each made a s imi la r claim or sort of claim {because 
each appealed to a s imi la r kind of s i tua t ion ,a s i tua t ion which f o r 
Ramsey was not r e s t r i c t e d to the "observable" factors of sense ex-
perience. 
Ramsey's i n i t i a l ind ica t ion of what he understands by"freedom" 
reads as fol lows: 
"We make a f ree decision when we are not jus t t h i s or ^ 
tha t behaviour pattern but when we are 'men'^when each 
of us i s d i s t i n c t i v e l y ' I ' . A t such moments of decision, 
when a l l of us cha rac te r i s t i ca l ly use of ourselves the 
word ' I ' t h i s word covers more than a l l language about 
objects or a l l s c i e n t i f i c language talks about.The wink 
on the promenaxie at New Brighton d i f f e r s s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
from; the f a l l of the l i d to clean the eye t h o u ^ t h i s 
i n part i t i s . " (F&I.p^6). 
Ee continues to say that a f ree decision 
" i s not j u s t a react ion to s t i m u l i ;but involves a l l that 
and something more besides,something which makes i t a l l 
the more appropriate to speak of i t as a response to a 
challenge,a challenge which i s the challenge of objects 
and more." (F&I p .6l ). 
Likewise concerning immortal i ty he remarks that "We are immortal 
insofar as we know a s i t ua t ion which transcends space emd time."(F&I p.89). 
Ramsey's own b e l i e f i n posthumous immortali ty arose out of his re l ig ious 
experience which was s trongly the i s t i c , a s he himself noted ; i t was 
through Chris t ian worship that the disclosure came most powerfully 
and i t was t h i s which led him to declare,"To the a l l powerfulness 
of God,as to tYe ob l iga t ion of Duty we respond f r e e l y - our response has 
our personal backing.In both cases we are never more ourselves than 
we are then." (F&I p.59 ) . 
He re la tes the two subjects o f "freedom" and "immortal i ty" together 
i n h i s comment that 
"Just as wi th every convict ion o f freedom there goes an 
awareness o f some o b l i g a t i o n , j u s t as freedom i s a response 
t o o b l i ^ t i o n , s o wi th our convictions about our own immort-
a l i t y , t h e r e goes an awareness of something Other which - l i k e 
ourselves - i s not r e s t r i c t e d t o the spatio-temporal," (F&I p.99)« 
The merits and demerits,the advantages and disadvantages of such a point 
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o f view w i l l be discussed later; Let us r a the r , fo r the moment,content 
ourselves wi th drawing together some kind o f p ic ture of the philosophical 
climate i n which Ian Ramsey was working and to vAiich ha was addressing 
h i s ideas and to picture some of the f igures who influenced and shaped 
h i s p a r t i c u l a r modua operandi.Vfhether or not we may agree wi th Ramsey 
that on h is c r i t e r i a "everyone.Christian or not,can reasonably believe 
i n immor ta l i ty . " ( F & I p.1^3 ) he,at least,can mutter with Spinoza "We 
discern and discover tha t we are e te rna l . " (F&I.p .83 ) . 
John MacQ^uarrie (God Talk, 1967) connects Ramsey's pos i t ion 
wi th that o f John Locke who allowed the experience of inner sense to 
stand alongside the data o f the senses o f sight,hearing,touch,while 
David Edwards remarks ," . . . .not f o r nothing d id Ramsey introduce Locke's 
The Reasonableness of Chr i s t i an i ty i n a new edi t ion i n I958." (Edwards p.48 )» 
Here we see Ramsey's r e l a t i o n to the Empir ic is t t r a d i t i o n , i n his connection 
w i t h Locke,and his r e l a t i o n to the Idea l i s t t r a d i t i o n i n h is connection 
w i t h Kant. 
The invocation to Kant i n the introduction,however,who looked to 
moral experience to remedy the def ic iencies of s t r i c t l y s c i e n t i f i c 
knowledge based on sense experience gives a f i r m indica t ion at 
the s t a r t o f the book o f the proceedure which i s to be followed .He 
is : f u r t h e r led to r e f l e c t tha t 
"perhaps indeed K^'^ h^s ^ importance and a relevance f o r 
us f o r which he is: not always given credit .While Kant may 
hav^een inadequate when he argued in Religion Within the 
Limi ts of Reason Alone,that a l l Chris t ian Doctrine had to 
be understood' i n r e l a t i o n to our experience of Duty,yet 
I t h i n k that Kant was abundantly r i g h t insofar as he sugg-
ested that even Chris t ian doctrines only receive an adequate 
l o g i c a l placing when they are given i n r e l a t i on to s i tuat ions 
which, in some very important respects,13) s imilar to that i n ^ 
which we discern d u t y . I t i s wi th s i tuat ions of t h i s kind that 
I havE been spec ia l ly concerned throughout the book." (F&I.p.lW-7 ) . 
One wonders, however, whether Ramsey's comments on Kant are not a l i t t l e 
naive. There i s a tendency i n Ramsey to use the work of wr i ters and 
thinkers l i k e J&nt as source raateinal providing g r i s t f o r his own 
p a r t i c u l a r m i l l ra ther than l e t t i n g them stand: i n the i r own r i ^ t . 
I t i s i n r e l a t i o n to Duty,and especially conscience as the 
discernment of ob l iga t ion , tha t we may discern the influence of a 
former bishop of Durham,Joseph But ler (1692 - 1752) as also wi th 
the notions of probability,commitment and discernment .Butler maintained 
that an estimate of " p r o b a b i l i t y " remains far from ce r t a in ,bu t , " i n 
matters o f p r a c t i c e , w i l l lay us under an absolute and formal o b l i g -
- S t -
a t ion ";he i l l u s t r a t e d th i s point wi th the example of the obl igat ion 
which a man feels, t o jump in to a r i v e r to save a drowning c h i l d though 
there may be no ce r ta in ty of e i the r rescue or su rv iva l . In such cases, 
very 
said B u t l e r , p r o b a b i l i t y i s the/guide of l i f e . ( I n t r o . t o Analogy,ed.Bemard, U>-\ia 
p.2).The other theme which appears i n Bu t l e r ' s wri t ings which Ian Ramsey 
also developed concerns what he c a l l s the "human condition "."When we th ink , 
we know ourselves to be more than gross:bodies,and we can be led by reason-
able r e f l e c t i o n to consider t h i s l i t t l e scene of human l i f e , i n which we 
are so b u s i l y engeiged as having a reference of some sort or another 
to a much larger plan of th ings . " (Butler) .That i s t o aay tha t a moral 
commitment t o an act ion i s based upon the discernment that a person 
- e.g. a drowning c h i l d - i s u l t imate ly more than the de ta i l s of our bodi ly 
behaviour - more t r u l y personal,and e ternal ly more s i g n i f i c a n t i n the 
universe and i t i s only when t h i s f a c t breaks i n upon us that we can be 
considered as being t r u l y f r e e and making a f r e e and responsible decision, 
(c f .Dr .Wi l l i ams Lib^ lect.23 ) . In t h i s way,then,God was to be approached 
through a moral commitment t o a s i tua t ion .Ramsey,says Edwards "had a sense 
of the d iv ine glory which went beyond the s t em imperative of duty."(Edwards 
p . 9 ) . Ian Ramsey,it i s t rue to say.believed that the usual approach to 
freedom was very much mistaken i n tha t i t was seen as a c o n f l i c t between 
Determinism on the one hand and Indeterminism on the other.The Determin-
i s t s would say tha t we only have an impression of freedom because we can 
never be cer ta in that a l l the factors relevant to some par t icu la r case 
have been noted.The Libertar ians (i.e.the Indeterminists;),however,would 
say that as there are many matters unknown to us,we can never show con-
c l u s i v e l y tha t any event i s inevitable.H.D.Lewis i s not convinced though, 
tha t "the t r a d i t i o n a l debate between determinists and indeterminists has 
i n f a c t spun as much on t h i s pa r t i cu la r merry-go-round as Professor Ramsey 
supposes." (Lewis,R.). The point i s .however,that i n , f o r example,the 
parable of the good Samaritan (F&I p.30-1 ) , whatever i t s f a u l t s .where"man 
meets man"and "the s i t ua t ion takes on depth'* (ie,because i t becomes obser-
vables and more),the Samaritan i s "moved inwardly" - there i s a response 
t o a moral obl igat ion ''which cannot be netted i n the language of observ-
ables"",we can discern the background influence of Butler and of Kant along-
side the modem E x i s t e n t i a l i s t s . 
Another profound influence on Ian Ramsey was the I r i s h bishop of 
Cioyne,George Berkeley (I685-I753).Berkeley,as summarised by Ramsey said, 
"We see God as we see persons.Hair , fece,skin,a l l these are v i s ib l e .bu t to 
'see' a person i s to see these and more besides." Already the pa ra l l e l s 
betweoi the ideas of Ian Ramsey and those of George Berkeley become app-
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arent,but he continues* 
"Likewise God.We look on the universe,fraQ galaxies to mesons, 
-from blood sugar to in su l in , f rom points t o entropy,from acetic 
acid t o Vitamin. B,from Hydrogen to whatever element at the mo-
ment closes the periodic: table,and by them a l l we see God as we 
see a person,through his hair and face and skin - a person who 
i s a l l these and more.The world as Berkeley taught us to look 
upon i t i s d i v i n e , v i s u a l language,and a l l we need to add some 
two hundred years l a t e r i s that what the sc ien t i s t does and 
what the theologian does,each i n his own way i s to disecver the 
l o g i c a l patterns o f the d iv ine ,v i sua l language as best he can." 
(Relig.and Sci . p.86~7)« 
I t i s w i th almost surpr i s ing confidence that Ian Ramsey placed himself so 
squarely i n the t r ad i t i ons of bishops But ler and Berkeley because,certainly 
i n Ramsey's l i f e t i m e , i t was more usual to regard man as a mere animal 
thrown up by the processes of evolut ion and h is freedom was more usually 
seen as a f u t i l e defiance of a r e s t r i c t i n g social code and of a hos t i l e , 
or at least i n d i f f e r e n t environment.Perhaps a common assumption was to 
t h i n k of the universe not as the language of God but rather as tending to 
greater and greater disorder . 
Ian Ramsey ce r ta in ly prefeixed to give an unemotional expreasion to 
h is fai th,perhaps as b e f i t t e d the mathematician turned philosopher,but t h i s 
may be the reason why during h i s l i f e - t i m e he d i d got usually succeed i n 
convincing the sceptics. 
I t i s u n f a i r and i n many ways fa l se to t r y to divide those who i n -
fluenced the w r i t i n g of Freedom and Immortality i n to two camps labelled 
" h i s t o r i c a l " and "contemporary",50 f o r t h i s reason,after t h i s more general 
h i s t o r i c a l in t roduct ion the references which fo l low w i l l be more closely 
integrated j though perhaps as we move on in to the next stage of the discuss-
ion we may use some words of David Hume as a l i n k . 
I n -1748 David Hume had w r i t t e n j 
"When we run over l i b r a r i e s What havoc must we maJce? I f we 
take i n one hand any volume - of d i v i n i t y or school metaphysics, 
f o r instance - l e t us ask,Does i t contain any abstract reason-
ing concerning quant i ty or number? No.Does i t contain any exper-
imental reasoning concerning matter of f a c t or existence? No. 
Commit i t then t o the f la j i i es , fo r i t can contain nothing but soph-
i s t r y and i l l u s i o n . " (Enquiry,sec.12,pt.3,ed.P.D.Nidditch.) 
Two hundred years l a t e r , t h i s challenge was at i t s he i^ t .The emphasis on 
mathematics and the experimental reasoning of science was to r e su l t i n a 
contemptuous dismissal of both theology and metaphysics i n the l i ^ t of the 
p 
ascent of the more ' s c i e n t i f i c ' approach offered by ccntenijprary empiricism. 
Professor C.H.Dodd r eca l l s how 
"Ramsey considered that the challenge that r e l ig ious propositions 
were nonsense should be taken up.His., hope was that,by working him-
s e l f i n the new philosophy,he would be able to construct a new 
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apologetic f o r C h r i s t i a n i t y . t a k i n g account of a l l that they 
were saying,employing t h e i r methods but showing the i r prop-
os i t ions up as a r b i t r a r y - a notable example of a man se t t ing 
himself to prepare the role he was to f u l f i l . " 
(The context of t h i s i s a conversation i n I938 when Ian Ramsey t o l d C.H. 
Dodd how he wanted a spe l l , i n Oxford "because the new kind of antimeta-
physical philosophy f lour i shed there ." ) 
I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t how he concludes h i s Freedom and Immortality with 
"a protest against two popular misconceptionsrthat those with 
an intense a f f e c t i o n f o r ordinary language must necessarily 
deny metaphysics,or that those who wish to defend metaphysics 
must necessarily trade i n occult and shadowy worlds.Which means ^ 
t h a t . t h i s book has been f i g h t i n g on two bat t lefrents ;and i t i s 
a sobering f«V\ecVvo(\ that not many wars have been won under such 
a necessity." (F&I p.152 ) . 
I t seems to be the opinion of the vast majori ty of philosophers who are 
acquainted wi th h i s work that i n f a c t Ramsey did not win,he f a i l e d u l t i m -
a t e l y , i n h is task of r e s t a t ing metaphysics and theology i n an age of emp-
i r i c i s m . I t was not however that he dismissed empiricism outright.He acc-
epted tha t there was much v a l i d i t y i n David Hume's challenge,as there was 
. i n the challenge of h is twentieth century successors,for example A.J.Ayer 
or Anthony Flew.(cf.A.Flew,God and Philosophy,Hutchinson,I966) He accepted 
the fo rce of G.D3road's inaugural lecture a t Cambridge i n 1934 (C.D.Broad, 
Determinism,Indeterminism and Libertarianfem,CUP 1934,pp.27-34 ) against the 
attempt t o base the freedom of the w i l l on the idea of a timeless s e l f 
ac t ing and,with the other empir ic i s t s , he questioned whether such an idea 
was "even i n t e l l i g i b l e , l e t alone true or ft-lse." (F&I p . 2 0 . ) . I t was nec-
essary t o show,however,just where and how empiricism was inadequate and 
- j u s t where and how metaphysics was more than jus t "sophistry and i l l u s i o n " , 
more than j u s t mere nonsense.He f i r m l y believed that both Kant ,for example, 
anA Spinoza before him,had been t a l k i n g something, more than sophistry and 
i l l u s i o n ; and had t r i e d , t h e r e f o r e . t o argue that metaphysics had i n f a c t 
got a f u t u r e . 
I t w i l l perhaps be o f use to r e c a l l at t h i s point some words of 
Lady Helen Oppenheimer on the philosophical climate i n the early 1950's. 
She wri tes ! 
"The philosophical world of Oxford i n the early I950's was a 
strenuous and e x c i t i n g world,a curious mixture of the l i b e r -
a t i n g and the circumscribing.One seemed to be l e t out of a 
large but s t u f f y roan onto a f resh and ent ic ing but narrow 
I)ath which one could explore wi th del ight .so long as one d id 
not stray in to metaphysics.The door had been opened by W i t t -
genstein,but a t that stage t h i s was s t i l l something of a secret 
door.The blue and brovoi books,the lecture notes which had been 
the key,were s t i l l c i rcu la t ing .ha l f ,under cover, in typescr ipt . 
A more accesible way out had been opened in 1949 i n the shape 
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of Gi lber t Ryle's The Concept of Hind.Now one was set f ree in to 
an, outdocr world.People were vjhole things,not mysterious comb-
inat ions of body and mind.Worries about the r e a l i t y of the mat-
e r i a l world or whether anybody else existed could be put behind 
one,but at the cost of discovery that there were some ideas which 
could never be formulated,some things which there was no point i n 
t r y i n g to say.Most of one's fel lows seaned to pay t h i s price glad-
ly ,and philosophers seemed to be charac te r i s t i ca l ly watchdogs rather 
than explorers ." (Edwards,p.52), 
I t was to t h i s rather n e ^ t i v e stance which condemned a l l metaphysics and 
theology as nonsense that Ramsey was to address himself i n works which 
included i n t h e i r number the Forwood Lectures.The state of things sugg-
ested by Lady Helen Oppenheimer i s borne out by A.J.Ayer,who studied i n 
f a c t under Gi lber t Ryle,who agrees, that "the dominant tone of Oxford p h i l -
osophy a t the time was surly and unadyenturous" (Part of my L i f e p.23) t h o u ^ 
i t was t o change somewhat wi th H.H.Price and R.G.Collingwood.Of the three 
professors of philosophy i n Oxford at that time,J.A.Smith,Harold Joachim 
and H.A.Pritchard,Ayer suggests that of the three,H.A.Pritchard was the 
most g i f t e d but "narrow and dogmatic" and "disapproved strongly of the 
new tendencies i n pihilosophy which had been inaugurated at Cambridge by 
Bertrand Russell and G.E.Moore." 
In the Oxford of the 1900's the Hegelian synthesis of science,phi l -
osophy and r e l i g i o n had prevailed.Wallace of Merton,for example,could 
comend Hegel's insistence that r e l i g i o n and philosophy coincide: i n f ac t 
he sees philosophy i t s e l f as a divine service,indeed a rel igion,The 
react ion of philosophers i n the early years of the twentieth century 
came as a reaction p r i n c i p a l l y against a lack of c l a r i t y i n the phrase-
ology which was bandied about.This reaction i s associated most d i s t i n c t -
i v e l y i n t h i s country wi th the names of Bertrand Russell and G.E.Moore. 
Their common aim was one of c l a r i f i c a t i o n . l t was Moore who f i r s t ruthless ly 
pressed the question, "What do you mean by so-and-so....?" while Russell 
t r i e d more systematically t o out l ine a meaningful language, 
A l t h o u ^ neither Russell nor Moore e x p l i c i t l y attacked theological 
statements i t i s p la in tha t theology,just l i k e metaphysics,was being 
bo ld ly challenged t o prove, that i t was meaningful and i t i s i n the l i ^ t 
of t h i s post Russell-^ioore philosophical system,principally, that Freedom 
and Immortal i ty came t o b i r th ,Since he had begun teaching i n Cambridge, 
Ramsey had accepted the challenge of the great modem Cambridge f igures 
and especially of Russell,Moore and Wittgenstein (to whom we sha l l short-
l y t u r n ) t o th ink more clearly.He saw i n Russell the attempt to demonst-
ra te that, the task of philosophy i s that of analysing language so as; to 
l ay bare the t r u t h about the way things are,and in Moore a concern to keep 
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philosophers, from "soaring t o l o f t y metaphysical heists by means of 
the abuse of language" ( G i l l p . 18). He ins is ted on making sure 
tha t phi losophical terminology had. a f i r m grounding i n common sense, 
60,as Ramsey himself s ays , i t was G.E.Moore who "challenged the meta-
physical ventures i n Hegelianism with the question,'What does i t mean?' " 
(Contempt Emp. - X i a n Sch.p.4-5) and Bertrand Russell who "gave a much 
more systematic account of meaningful and r e l i ab le language." (ibid.p.4-5)» 
Indeed he says tha t "o f a l l the. features of recent empiricism undoubt-
edly the most constant and important has been a primary interest i n 
meaning,in meaning rather than the t r u t h as such." ( ib id .p .3 ),This 
is i n t e r e s t ing ly shown i n the vay i n which Ramsey i s concerned to show 
the l o g i c a l and experimental re la t ionship which exists between d isc los-
ures; and t a l k about moral duty on the one hand and disclosures and t a l k 
o f God on the other .His purpose i s to display the ftict that decisive and 
moral experiences may have a r e l ig ious signif icance,an argument which 
he develops, i n the context of the contemporary debate between Bertrand 
Russel l and A.J.Ayer over the r e l a t i o n of t a l k about God to t a l k about 
notions of Absolute Duty. (This debate i s contained i n l e t t e r s wr i t t en 
by Lord Russell and Prof.Ayer i n The Observer.on 13th.and 20th.Oct,1957). 
The controversy centred, round the claim that the existence of 'Absolute 
values ' does not at a l l necessitate b e l i e f in God and has i n f a c t no 
bearing on such a bel ief ,Such a notion led Lord Russell to remark that 
" I cannot believe tha t a d i s l i k e of wanton crue l ty i s merely a matter of 
taste l i k e a d i s l i k e of oysters.". Nevertheless he agreed with Prof-
essor Ayer i n th ink ing tha t the question whether e th ica l values are abso-
lu t e had no bearing whatever on the question of the existence of God, 
tha t i s t o say,he denied any r e l a t i o n betweenjthe humanistic, and the 
t h e i s t i c points of view. 
Ayer,however,wished to go f u r t h e r and to urge that the humanist's 
i n t e rp re t a t ion excludes that of the the i s t and to maintain,therefore, that 
it i s inconsistent to hold both that e t h i c a l values are absolute and yet 
t h a t they are validated' by au tho r i ty . I an Ramsey suggests tha t "For Russell , 
s tor ies of wanton crue l ty evoke a s i tua t ion transcending but including 
observables t o whose challenge he responds by r e s i s t i ng crue l ty or work-
i n g f o r the destruct ion of whateveryor whoever,is c rue l . " (F&I p.44 )• 
This response i s unlike h i s response to oysters which i s merely a response 
to the spatio-temporal (i.e. t a s t e , smel l , f ee l e t c . ) but i s rather a response 
t o a moral challenge t o which he then makes an appropriate moral response. 
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" I t i s i n r e l a t i o n to situations such as these,which include, 
but are not l i m i t e d to,observable features,that the phrase 
'absolute values' finds i t s j u s t i f i c a t i o n and empirical anch-
orage.It i s i n such a s i t u a t i o n that the phrase 'absolute values' 
i s pegged dovm." (F&I p.45). 
I n his reply to H.D.Lewis' c r i t i c i s m of Freedom and Lnmortality (Lewis R.) 
Ian Ramsey wrote i n the Hibbert Journal (FRFI) that the purpose of the 
lectures was to make clear, what he believed to be the empirical anchor-
age of discourse about free w i l l and to say j u s t what sort of situations 
j u s t i f y t a l k about free w i l l , t o t a l k about the freedom which belongs to 
responsible moral decision; and so on. 
"Wittgenstein's point of view (at any rate at one stage of his 
development) was: that a s i g n i f i c a n t and unambiguous languaga 
would confine i t s e l f t o the empirical propositions of sense 
. experience.. I t s exact formulation would y i e l d no cut and dried 
system but was rather a matter f o r experiment and testing and 
towards t h i s end the so-called 'Verification Principle'might 
be a useful guide." (GCrcp.256). 
A.J.Ayer (Part of my L i f e p. 115) points out that t h o u ^ the English 
tr a n s l a t i o n of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,for which 
Russell,having suggested i t s t i t l e , w r o t e the introduction,had been 
published i n 1922 and he himself had been working i n Cambridge since 
1929 h i s ideas had hardly penetrated to Oxford well i n t o the I930's. 
The Tractatus maintained that s i g n i f i c a n t propositions f e l l into two 
classes: either they were tautologies,.like the propositions of logic 
and pure mathematics, or they were empirically v e r i f i a b l e .Everything 
else,including metaphysics and theology,was l i t e r a l l y nonsensical, 
which t i e s i n very well with Hume's i n v i t a t i o n to commit to the flames 
any volume of d i v i n i t y or school metaphysics i f i t didn't contain any 
abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number- or any experimental 
reasoning concerning matters of f a c t or existence,on the basis that 
i t could contain nothing but "sophistry and i l l u s i o n " . I t i s interesting 
t o note that Ayer remarks that i n the I930's one approached the theory 
of knowledge from a s t a r t i n g point of sense data which he suggests was, 
"unorthodox by Oxford standards,but not by those of Cambridge",He sugg-
ests, too, that by the raid-thirties V/ittgenstein had already 
"moved away from the position which he held i n the Tractatus, 
but h i s current views were imparted only to the narrow c i r c l e 
of his Cambridge pupils.He was at pains to keep any report of 
them out of general c i r c u l a t i o n from a mcrbid fear of t h e i r 
being misrepresented or plagjarized.lt was not u n t i l the late 
1930*s that one or two copies of notes taken from his lectures, 
the celebrated Blue and Brown books,somehow managed to f i n d 
t h e i r way to Oxford." (Part of my Life p.120 ) . 
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Wittgenstein was,at t h i s time,in T r i n i t y College,with Richard Braith-
waite,to whom, we s h a l l refer later,next door at King's with G.E.Moore 
and Maynard Keynes,the economist, 
Wittgenstein saw the function and purpose of philosophy as the 
analysis of language.V?e would understand and communicate our own ex-
periences and the experiences of others better i f we paid more a t t -
ention to the ways i n v;hich we t a l k about such experiences... ."the 
uses and functions of language are the beginning points f o r under-
standing - conceived of as 'the given' or 'forms of l i f e ' . " (Wittgenstein -
Phil.Investig. p.226.).He conceived of the philosopher's problems 
i n terras of what he called psychological "disease" or 'mental cramps" 
and recognised two primary mistakes i n the contemporary philosophy of 
language.One i s that "one narrowsone's thinking with only one kind of 
example" (ibid.para.593). The second i s the insistence that a l l sentences 
of the same form (^g.the car i s red,the man i s good) must have the same logic. 
This i s as naive as t o i n s i s t that a l l currency of the same denomination 
has the same international value,hence the famous Wittgenstinian maxim -
"Don't look f o r meaning,look f o r use".So also VJittgenstein's insistence 
thjat words are l i k e chess pieces i n that each i s defined i n terms of 
• i t s function and thus the question, 'What i s a word reall y ? ' i s analog-
ous t o "What i s a piece i n chess?" (ibid.para. 108^). That i s to say, 
one explains how a par t i c u l a r word functions, just as one explains how 
a p a r t i c u l a r chess piece functions,by explaining the ways in which i t 
may or may not be moved."Essence",then,"is expressed by grammar" (ibid.para. 
371), and meaning i s determined by the rules of the various language 
''games". "In many ways",writes Jerry G i l l , " t h e views of Ian Ramsey,the 
l a t e bishop of Durham,are based on the insights of Wittgenstein.In other 
words,bishop Ramsey makes use of Wittgenstein's method by way of meeting 
the challenge of l o g i c a l empiricism." ( G i l l p.31 ). 
Ian Ramsey,it i s true t o say,was extremely f o r t h r i ^ t i n his app-
r e c i a t i o n of the contribution of lo g i c a l empiricism.Indeed he i n s i s t s 
that i f r e l i g i o u s language i s not anchored i n empirical experience then 
i t can be neither philosophically nor r e l i g i o u s l y adequate.He was,however, 
concerned to make some important modifications i n connection with the 
logical-empirical concept of "empirical".It was important to him that 
the term "empirical" should be f:iven a f a r broader base i n order t o 
include re l i g i o u s disclosure. He maintained that 
"Wittgensten would not allow other areas of 
disclosure t o be dismissed as'meaningless'- language was so 
r i c h i n i t s l o g i c a l variety,and a major task of philosophy 
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. was to display and present t h i s variety against a l l who held 
that evidence and c r i t e r i a , i f they be not s c i e n t i f i c evidence 
and c r i t e r i a , a r e worthless;and against a l l reductionists who 
would argue that 'x is• nothing but y',that 'x i s r e a l l y only 
y'." (CE p.6:t 
Jerry G i l l , i n his book. Ian Ramsey - To Speak Responsibly of God writest 
"He sees i n mature empiricism,or l i n g u i s t i c analysis,both 
the tolerant s p i r i t and analytic methodology necessary 
f o r the construction of a balanced,reasonable and theol-
ogically adequate account of the meaning of religious 
language.lt i s i n t h i s sense that Ramsey can be said to 
accept the basic thrust of the challenge set f o r t h by 
l o g i c a l empiricism.He i s impressed with the concern fo r 
meaning and v e r i f i c a t i o n expressed by the movement and 
witH^ts desire t o develop r e l i a b l e , i f f l e x i b l e , c r i t e r i a 
with'regard to the various usages of language.Moreover, 
he i s convinced that the language philosophers,following 
the l a t e r Wittgenstein,are much more tolerant and sensitive 
towards language than were t h e i r p o s i t i v i s t i c forerunners. 
Ramsey believes 'that contemporary empiricism may r e v i t a l i s e 
our f a i t h and our doctrine and make what seems so often 
t o be the dry bones of theological discourse live'(Alden T u t h i l l 
lects .1963 - CE.p.59 ) . " (op.cit.p .50-1 ) . 
• G i l l ' s views are endorsed by Ramsey himself who writes:" We associate 
. Wittgenstein - at least the l a t e r Wittgenstein - with a much newer concept 
of meaning than we f i n d either i n the lo g i c a l p o s i t i v i s t s or i n the early 
Russell." ( CE.p.6-7 ). Wittgenstein can therefore be seen as leading away 
from any narrow,hard and circumscribed account of/meaning such as the 
V e r i f i c a t i o n Principle expressed.For Wittgenstein,the Verification Prin-
ciple (being i t s e l f obviously nonsense for i t could neither be ve r i f i e d 
by sense experience nor taken as a tautology) was merely a mnemonic,enabl-
ing us t o formulate the clearest and most precise,and least ambiguous of 
languages,,and i t was valuable insofar as i t s t a l k about " v e r i f i c a t i o n " 
and " c r i t e r i a " implied that we would only vmderstand a word when we had 
elaborated a context f o r i t s use.-
"The highest aim of philosophy" Ramsey maintained)"must be to 
generalise about the l o g i c a l pattern of the most complex d i s -
course,not excluding metaphysical and theological discourse,, 
and t o give clues to i t s l o g i c a l structure,to search f o r i l l -
uminating paradigm cases,such as the Verification principle 
provides i n a simple and elementary,even i f important,case, 
v i z . s c i e n t i f i c , discourse." (CE.p.6-7 ), 
One of the principle aims of the Vienna Circle was to rebuild the bridge 
between philosophy and science which had' been largely broken by the 
Romantic Movement and the accompanying r i s e of Id e a l i s t metaphysics 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century.Its members saw what they 
3t see over. 
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called the "logic of science" as constituting the future of philosophy, 
once the f i g h t a ^ i n s t metaphysics had been won and the physical world 
had been reduced to the elements of sense experience.lt i s with good 
reason that the twentieth century has been characterised as the of 
analysis.The mood of discontent with the t r a d i t i o n a l approaches to p h i l -
osophy i n general and with the absolute Idealism of the nineteenth cent-
ury in. particular,which had found i t s expression with the early analytic 
concern of Bertrand Russell and G.E.Moore i n England,found i t s European 
expression with, the Vienna circle,whose primary concern,as we have seen, 
was t o enable, the same sort of progress as had been made by the natural 
sciences t o be made by philosophy.In the English speaking world,the closest 
and most i n f l u e n t i a l expression of t h i s approach to philosophy i s to be 
found i n A.J.Ayer's,Language,Truth and Logic whose lo g i c a l posit-
. ivism may be seen as,in some ways at least,a reaction against pseudo-
s c i e n t i f i c metaphysics.He operated on the assumption that there are only 
two types of language which can be said to admit knowledge and t r u t h and 
these are,as we have seen i n the works of his predecessors,logical disc-
ourse and empirical assertions.With Ayer the attack on theology becomes 
quite e x p l i c i t and i t , l i k e much else,is claimed to be absolutely devoid 
of meaning except i n so f a r as i t can be given an analysis i n terms of 
propositions about sense experience.To such an attack as this. Ian Ramsey 
re p l i e d : 
"The argument i s that theology i s 'meaningless' unless- i t 
r e fers merely to some personal ' t h r i l l ' or 'satisfaction' • 
or .'pleasure' or ' u p l i f t ' . F o r , i n the f i r s t place,it is clear 
that theological words l i k e 'God' or 'soul' have no di r e c t 
empirical reference like,(on a common-sense view) the words 
'table','sun','tree','book',,' Nor,in the second place, 
have theological words such indirect empirical relevence as 
belongs to s c i e n t i f i c words like,'field','electron','potent-
i a l ', 'entropy ', 'force' ... .The conclusion i s that the propos-
i t i o n s of theology cannot be 'v e r i f i e d ' i n terms of sense 
• experience except i n so f a r as they are about our 'feelings' 
and bodily sensations.Theology on t h i s view could never be 
more than subjective." (CGFG p. 258). • 
* The Vienna Circle r e a l l y began in the 1920's with Merits Schlick 
who was professor at Ke i l and then, from 1922. ,in the chair of The 
Philosophy of Inductive Science at the University of Vienna.The 
c i r c l e published i t s ma.nifesto, '/jissenschaftliche Weltai.tffassung; 
Per Wiener Kreis ( S c i e n t i f i c View of the World; The Vienna C i r c l e ) 
i n 1929 and i n I930 took over, the journal,Annalen der Philosophie, 
renaming i t Erkenntnis,in which Wittgenstein's,Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus had f i r s t appeared under i t s German titl e , L o g i s c h -
Philosophische Abhandlung. 
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So,while Ramsey i s extremely f o r t h r i ^ t in his appreciation of the 
contribution of the l o g i c a l empiricists,insisting that a l l theolog-
i c a l and r e l i g i o u s discourse must have an empirical grounding to prove 
adequate,and pleading f o r a broadened concept of "empirical",he also 
endeavours to establish t h a t , a l t h o u ^ re l i g i o u s language has certain 
p e c u l i a r i t i e s , i t i s no more odd than much of the language of theoretical 
science and personal r e l a t i o n s h i p s . l t i s i n t h i s way that Ramsey can 
be seen as taking a view of the nature of theological language which 
distinguished him from many thinkers who are classifi e d as l i n g u i s t i c 
analysts.His understanding of the complexity and f l e x i b i l i t y of lang-
uage places Ramsey squarely i n the t r a d i t i o n of the l a t e r Wittgenstein. 
Moreover,tliere i s a marked s i m i l a r i t y between his view of language and 
that of such thinkers as J.L.Austin and Max Black, ( c f .especially the 
l a t t e r part of J.L.Austin's How to do Things with Words;and Max Black's 
analysis of metaphor i n his Models and Metaphors and his Lectures on 
. Religious B e l i e f . ) The work of J.L.Austin and his colleagues on the 
various, aspects of English verbal usage i n l i n g u i s t i c philosophy 
"has gone almost e n t i r e l y out of fashion,but i n i t s heyday 
i t aroused very strong feelings both among i t s ' p r a c t i t i o n -
ers and amongst those....who were sceptical of i t s import-
ance." (Part of my L i f e p.295).. 
G i l l remarks on Freedom: and Immortality that "the primary argument offered 
by Ramsey i n favour of the f r e e v d l l position i s an appeal t o the facets 
of ordinary language which aze portrayed i n talk, about decision and action."(j> 
Such Jfe-nguage not only has freedom of decision b u i l t i n t o i t but i t def-
ies a l l attempts t o eliminate i t without eliminating the vast majority / 
of ordinary language at the same time.From Ramsey's examples of free 
choice one can see that f o r him such an option i s unacceptable .This i s 
cle a r l y an example of what J.L.Austin termed " l i n g u i s t i c phenomenology", 
(j.L.Austin,Philosoph papers,p.120 ),The underlying conviction of such 
an appeal i s that ordinary language contains the majority of important 
d i s t i n c t i o n s that need to be made concerning empirical reality.Thus i n 
. attempting t o make a case f o r the v i a b i l i t y of a metaphysics that i s 
cogn i t i v e l y meaningful Ramsey lays the groundwork f o r an understanding 
of the function of the term "God".He r e l i e s to a great extent on the 
work of men l i k e Austin and P.F.Strawson (cf.P.F.Strawson,Introduction 
t o Logical Theory p .57-8), though the cornerstone upon which Ramsey's 
understanding of models i s based,however,is the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
' p i c t u r e " models and "analogue" models and for t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n as well 
as f o r several other ideas,Ramsey acknf-j1e<i3es the influence of the work 
of Max Black. 
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Ramsey was p a r t i c u l a r l y interested i n the work of four men who became 
his colleagues i n Oxford,namely,Stuart Hampshire,R.M.Hare,J.L.Austin 
and P.F.Strawson (lan Ramsey took P.F.Strawson's An Essay in Descriptive 
Metaphysics (1959) very seriously). I t seemed to him that 
t h r b u ^ the work of such broadened empiricists,some ground was won back 
f o r a descriptive,as opposed to a speculative,metaphysic,thou^ he was 
i n no doubt that there s t i l l remained a vast amount of work to be done 
especially because of his b e l i e f that personal existence,the " V o l i t i o n a l 
Unity" of his Bumey Prize essay i n I938 - the ' I ' as he now preferred to 
say - was even more mysterious than such men allowed.(Ramsey's main super-
visor i n philosophy was A.C.Ewing,whose interests are expressed i n his 
book,, Idealism ;A C r i t i c a l Survey (193^ +) - These views are reflected imm-
aturely i n Ramsey's Bumey Prize essay of I938 ).He believed,too,that mean-
i n g f u l person language,describing the person i n action,could be both s t r -
aightforwardly descriptive and evocatively more,which was,incidenially,one . 
reason why he was so interested i n J.L.Austin's category of the performative 
utterance ( f o r example,"I baptise thee") as being more than descriptive, 
and i t was t o his own vision of personality to which he was appealing when 
he spoke of ' I ' as an "inte g r a t o r " word and when he defended the poss-
i b i l i t y of metaphysical language about the ' I * . 
I n such passages Ramsey appears to stand closer to the t r a d i t i o n of 
the French and German e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s and especially to that of Kierkegaard 
than many might suspect,because l i k e many B r i t i s h philosophers of his- day 
he made l i t t l e actual reference to the continentals. 
The height of J.L.Austin's influence was not reached u n t i l the 1930's, 
The strongest philosophical influence i n Oxford i n the years immediately 
following the war was that of Gilbert Ryle.His dismissal of the t r a d i t -
ional view of the r e l a t i o n between mind and body (which he c a l l a the Cart-
esian myth),depicted i n his famous phrase as the idea of "the ghost i n 
the machine" (Concept of Mind) won him many adherents among young p h i l -
osophers of his day .Ramsey himself had learned from James V/ard and his 
p u p i l G.F.Stout,those pioneers of modern philosophical psychology,to 
r e j e c t any dualism of mind and body and to think instead of an embodied 
s e l f .He cajne to recognise the intimate nature of the union between the 
mental and the physical,thou^ s t i l l believing that there was i n some 
sense a t least a c i t a d e l of the ' I ' which made each personality personal. 
Ian Ramsey f e l t himself compelled t o go further than Ryle. Though Ryle was 
probably the most dominant philosopher i n Oxford at the time,.Ramsey f e l t him 
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t o be inadequate^ .In Tflbingen i n I967 he quoted Ryle's argument to the 
eff e c t t h a t "the s e l f elusiveness of 'I' i s only the eiusiveness of 
todajfe diary entry which, cannot be made u n t i l today i s past,but which 
can then be made without any kind of problem or dilemma ^ In his a r t i c l e 
i n Philosophical Quarterly i n 1955 I would suggest that Ramsey 
already f e l t t h i s way,but as a junior colleague of Ryle's i n Oxford f e l t 
i n h i b i t e d i n c r i t i c i s i n g him,even t h o u ^ the diary entry at any depth 
about 'I' would be,for Ramsey,far more mysterious than Ryle allowed. 
A f a r more t h o r o u ^ discussion of the r e l a t i o n of Ian Ramsey's thought 
to that of Ryle (and f o r that matter of Strawson)can be found i n Ramsey's 
Biology and Personality. For Ramsey then,although no-one ever has 
what would be called s t r a i ^ t f o r w a r d empirical experience of himself as 
a self,every person does,insofar as he i s a person at all,come to use 
the term 'I' and to t a c i t l y develop a concept of the s e l f .This i s evident 
even i n David Hume's ir o n i c conclusion to the effect that " I can have no 
experience of s e l f " . (D.Hume,Treatise on Human Nature,Part I I . ) 
The influence of Ryle,as that of Strawson and earlier,Wittgenstein 
helped Ramsey to base his case f o r the lo g i c a l address of God t a l k upon 
the inherent p e c u l i a r i t y of the l o g i c of 'I'.Jerry G i l l writesf 
" I t i s the commoness and importance of such talk,especially 
i n the case of the f i r s t person pronoun that Ramsey thinks 
provides the foundation f o r language about God.Ramsey begins 
his discussion of the 'Systematic Elusiveness- of I'by tracing 
the d i f f i c u l t i e s which David Hume encountered while t r y i n g to 
pin down the logic of s e l f awareness, and personal i d e n t i t y . 
Since the only epistemological objects Hume would accept were 
sense experience and since one could never obtain a sense im-
pression of one's self,Hume concluded that the concept of se-
. Ifhood and personal i d e n t i t y are bogus.However,since people 
(including Hume himself) found the concept indispensible both 
p r a c t i c a l l y and theoretically,he remained di s s a t i s f i e d with 
his analytic conclusion." ( G i l l p.83-84 ), 
The main objection which Ramsey raised against the view of Hume and Ryle 
i s aimed a t what he takes t o be t h e i r common basic assumption which i s , 
as he sees i t , t h a t they both consider that any situation which becomes 
the "object" of a h i ^ e r order action is- unchanged i n the process .The 
assumption that Ramsey i s i n effect challenging is that there i s no 
difference between the 'I' which i s unsaid i n the statement,'I am run-
ning',and the f i r s t ' I ' i n the statement, " I said,'I am running'." and 
he would maintain that an essential change has taken place when the 
"speaking'I"has been o b j e c t i f i e d by a higher order statement. 
I t i s absolutely essential to see the connection which Ian Ramsey 
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f i n d s between his understanding of religious/and his ta.lk about God, . 
or a t least his interpretation of such talk.The nature of religious 
discourse,involving as i t does both a perceptual and religious dim-
ension ( i , e . i t discusses that which i s spatio-temporal and more),is 
marked by a similar, structure i n the form which religious language 
takes by means of models and qualifiers.(cf.RL chap.II ),This juxta-
position,which provides a bridge between empirical experience and 
language on the one hand and re l i g i o u s experience on the other,points 
to a s i m i l a r i t y between the approach of Ramsey to theological language 
and that of St.Thomas Aquinas,and i t i s clear t h a t , i n a broad sense at 
least,Ramsey's position may be classed as one which follows the'middle 
-way" of. analogy,a method found,too, i n the works of 'Bishop Butler .The 
argument of Bishop Butler's Analogy i s indeed introduced i n the f i r s t 
chapter of Part I on "Immortality",which,Ramsey remarks,is not just 
"merely meant to establish i n a general sort of way the ' c r e d i b i l i t y 
of a future l i f e ' ".(RL p.14-15). 
Ramsey did not in f a c t see himself as offering an or i g i n a l theory 
of r e l i g i o u s language but rather,as he puts i t , " a generalisation of 
Thomism" (RL p.l85 ) f o r certainly,as we have noted,there i s a marked 
s i m i l a r i t y between his theory of models and q u a l i f i e r s and the Thomist 
doctrine of Analogy with i t s i t s accompanying d i s t i n c t i o n between the 
res s i g n i f i c a t a and the modus significandi,though he does offer such a 
wholly novel restatement of the doctrine as to render the connection 
a t t h i s point quite tenuous.Ian Ramsey does,however,combine the best i n 
both empiricism and existentialism.His theology i s empirical insofar as 
he shows how our symbols of God have roots i n f i n i t e experience... .and 
yet equally his theology is,as we have seen,existentialist insofar as 
he i n s i s t s that the disclosure of God occurs t h r o u ^ personal situations 
and that i t demands an appropriate commitment .At the same time he manages 
to avoid the i r r a t i o n a l i s n and obscurity by which much e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
theology i s marred as much as he avoids the tendency to equate t h e i s t i c 
statements with t h e i r empirical grounds or to assume that the l a t t e r 
constitutes v e r i f i c a t i o n of the former.(cf. Owen ), 
An important controversy was worked out between Ian Ramsey and 
Anthony Flew in the Hibbert Journal i n 195^  (Flew,Funerals),centering 
round the question whether or not a man could witness his ovm funeral. 
Ramsey summed up Flew as saying that,"after death we no longer walk,talk, 
joke,climb mountains or become buried under snow.All that remains is the 
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body...We may be more than bodies,but vrhat we are more,perishes at 
death." (P+F).The crux, of Ramsey's reply was to assert that personal 
behaviour was more than Flew had allowed.Ihe 'I' vas "more than the 
b i o l o g i c a l man,the social man,the economic man,thepsychological man." 
(P+F,p.337). 
"Ramsey's funeral",(he wrote)"does not cover a l l that of 
which Ramsey i s aivare when he i s aware of'myself' . I t i s 
t h i s 'more' for which on the day of my funeral,philos-
ophical f r i e n d s , i f i h e y f e e l so inclined,can spend t h e i r 
time choosing l o g i c a l l y appropriate phrases.I f o r my 
part w i l l be content to'enjoy 'it'.untouched then ( l hope) 
by the need to give i t a l o g i c a l mapping." (ibid,.p.337-8). 
Ramsey,then,appealed to his own awareness of self as a gateway to meta-
physics and r e l i g i o n - He t o l d Flew: 
"To t a l k of'free will'has been to claim that here was some-
.thing not reducible to p r e d i c t a b i l i t y stories,causal stor-
ies or any other of the technical tales which would profess 
t o reduce a 'person' to 'objects' - spatio-temporal events." (ibid.p.-^y^). 
The conviction from which Ramsey never deviated once he had made i t his 
own was expressed i n a contribution t o the Cambridge Review 
i n 1956,in an a r t i c l e which was a response to R.B.Braithviaite's Edding-
ton Memorial Lecture of November 1955 on"An Empiricist's View of the 
Nature of Religious Belief." .. 1 .-.Braithwaite argued that the 
"primary use" of Christian assertions was "to announce allegknce t o a 
set of moral pr i n c i p l e s " (Braithwaite p.82) and i n particular to dec-
lare the Christian's commitment to an "agapeistic" or loving way of 
l i f e connected with stories which encourage such behaviour .For Ian 
Ramsey,such an account was d r a s t i c a l l y inadequate because i t did not 
give a f u l l enough account of the believer's response to the discern-
ment of moral obligation.For him,the response came before any commit-
ment and the response to God's claim was a response to f a c t , t h o u ^ to 
be f a i r , h e does say that he sympathises with Professor Braithwaite's 
aim to do justice to both the empiricist demand that meaning must be 
t i e d to empirical use and to the religious man's claim f o r his r e l i g -
ious b e l i e f t o be taken seriously.To develop the argument a j l i t t l e more 
f u l l y ; Ian Ramsey finds d i f f i c u l t i e s which are broadly two-fold:on the 
one hand while he i s w i l l i n g "to admit as empirical,something f a r beyond 
what the f i r s t naive formulations of the Verification Principle would 
have allowed - has he gone f a r enough?"(R+E. (Camb.),p.4o4-5 ) and on 
the other,Ramsey questions whether the lecture "takes seriously enough 
a l l that the r e l i g i o u s man - and i n particular the Christian - claims 
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i n his r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f . " ( i b i d . ) Ramsey goes on to argue that comm-
itment to a way - of l i f e ,agapeistic or any other,must be more than a 
straightforwardly empirical claim,that i s to say,that the "x" pattern 
of l i v i n g could i n principle be given an exhaustive spatio-temporal 
d e s c r i p t i o n . I f such a way of l i f e involved only that which was des-
c r i p t i v e i n terms of spatio-temporal elements i t would lead to no 
more than what Ramsey c a l l s an "agapeistic idolatry ".Ramsey would 
see rather the notion of an agapeistic way of l i f e as a q u a l i f i e d 
model of "believing","hoping",qualified by " a l l things " whose purpose 
i s to evoke a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t situation - a situation 
where the penny drops and "we pursue the. story t i l l i n Bradley's sense 
we are s a t i s f i e d . " ( i b i d . ) Only at that point i s agape disclosed and 
we.respond with an agapeistic way of life.Braithwaite had,then,redef-
ined the nature of r e l i g i o u s language by likening i t to the language 
of morality and commendation,and t h i s , f o r Ramsey,was his major inadequacy. 
I t i s possible t o c l a s s i f y Ian Ramsey's position as i n one respect 
sim i l a r to the work,too,of men l i k e Basil Mitchell who i n his contrib-
ution to New Essays i n Philosophical Theology (NEPT,p.l03-6) and prob-
ably more importantly i n his contribution to Faith and Logic and 
in. his J u s t i f i c a t i o n of Religious Belief makes the attempt to 
r e l a t e r e l i g i o u s language to experience and to establish i t , i n theory 
at least,as cognitively meaningful.John Hick,who maintained that state-
ments that make predictions about experiences taking place a f t e r death 
are open to v e r i f i c a t i o n , o r a t least confirmation,says that religious 
t r u t h and thus r e l i g i o u s language i s unique i n that i t i s not l i m i t e d 
to prepositional assertions, though he does say that Christian language 
can be shown to be meaningful when i t i s viewed as an autonomous lang-
uage game which i s based on the experience of the Christian community, 
(cf.W.Zuurdeeg.An Analytical Philosophy of Religion^ Ian Ramsey was 
especially sensitive to the interrelatedness of the various functions 
of language which we f i n d i n the works of men l i k e Michael Foster,who 
maintained that revelation can be cognitively meaningful,that is,subject 
to the judgement true,without being reducible to either l o g i c a l or emp-
i r i c a l language.John Hutchison who i n his Language and Fkith PK;ia4e»fW;a-.Ue4Uuis\>.r 
maintains that since r e l i g i o n i s to be understood primarily as a means 
of comprehensive l i f e orientation,the language of r e l i g i o n i s to be 
understood as the expression and description of various orientations 
of l i f e , a n d Frederick Ferre,who suggests that much of r e l i g i o u s lang-
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uage i s an empirical-theoretical model.("Theological speech projects 
a model of immense responsive significance,drawn from 'the facts',as 
the key to i t s conceptual synthesis." F.Ferre.)*Such thinkers,like Ian 
Ramsey,are concerned to preserve the empirical c o g n l t i v i t y of r e l i g i -
ous discourse.The whole movement of contemporary philosophy indeed, 
m i ^ t be said to be characterised by a pre-occupation with language 
that has questioned i n many d i f f e r e n t ways the status of metaphysical 
words and also a concern t o give a l l propositions some empirical relevance, 
"TO' face the challege which contemporar;\^ philosophy makes 
on us",^ote Ian Ramsey)>"we must j u s t i f y a position f o r 
theological words on the language map and i n particular 
elucidate t h e i r empirical relevance."(CCPC,p.259 )• 
and he continues { 
"There is,as VJhitehead would put i t , a ' 'limitation','an ab-
ruptness.' about the world.We cannot t a l k about anything we 
j o l l y well like.We do not s t a r t our thinking from absolute 
zero,in ah u t t e r vacuum.The curious point I would l i k e to 
make i s t h i s , t h a t the l i m i t a t i o n i s r e a l l y l i n g u i s t i c -
that 'given f a c t ' and empirical ' l i m i t a t i o n ' express r a t h -
er a demand on language that describe features of the world. 
They are,I suggest,a demand that our overall i o t a l language . 
s h a l l be f i n i t e , t h a t our language hSirarchy s h a l l have some- i 
t h i n g l i k e what Whitehead would c a l l an apex."(^ibid,p.26l ). 
Yet i t i s important to keep always i n the fore that,as i n the notes 
preserved by Professor Peter Baelz when Ramsey was lecturing in 19^6, 
Ramsey's work shows an attempt to work towards a philosophical theology 
broadly on the l i n e of a personalised Idealism,but owing a great deal 
to the t o u r e r kinds of philosophy since the older Idealists.Ian Ram-
sey saw the world i n terms of relationships between personsjand persons 
as centres of experience,experience as volition,thought and perception 
which owes the continuity of i t s existence to being dependent on God. 
The main lines of t h i s are Berkeleian jour sensory experience i s the 
medium t h r o u ^ which we can become aware of the a c t i v i t y of the divine 
w i l l though he f e l t that r e l i g i o u s experience was unhelpful unless a 
philosophical theology based on sense experience and value appreciat-
ion was brought to i t .Ramsey's Idealism was, however, i n no way the Ab-
solute Idealism of men l i k e F.H.Bradley,for he saw that the Absolute 
"could only too easily be regarded as night i n which every cow - and 
everything else f o r that matter - was uniformly black." ( F i l p.98 ), 
and he thinks that i t i s one of the greatest mistakes of the Absolute 
I d e a l i s t s to suppose that when such situations as were offered i n 
Freedom and Immortality were evoked,they were,so t o say,structurally 
* F.P.Ferr6,Language,Logic and God,Eyre and SpottiswoodetLondon 1962,p.54. 
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homogenous,that i n such situations the d i s t i n c t i o n between subject and 
object disappeared. 
F.H.Bradley,incidently,gives an excellent account of such evocation 
i n his Essays on Truth and Reality (F.H.Bradley,Essays on Truth and Reality, 
OUP, 1914,chap.VI on'immediate Experience*" ) where he suggests that an 
awareness- of a person as public behaviour and more would be established 
by surveying t h i s and that feature of a person's behaviour u n t i l a disc-
losure s i t u a t i o n occured around such features as we had to date enumer-
ated .Bishop Berkeley makes a similar point with his charater Alciphron. 
(G.Berkeley,Dialogue,IV,5 ).For Ian Ramsey metaphysics could never deny 
the observations and experiments of science and common-sense,metaphysics, 
tha t is,as concerned t o organise common-sense assertions i n accordance 
with some perspective or another,a development of CD.Broad's description 
of metaphysics as " c r i t i c a l common-sense".Nor should metaphysical r e a l -
i t i e s be described as i f they were physical objects.Indeed he recalled 
the famous phrase of Bishop Butler's, "Everything i s what i t is,and not 
another thing".Ramsey,as Butler and Kant,grounded his metaphysics i n ethics 
because to him what was most self-disclosing was not walking, t a l k i n g , joking 
or climbing,pain or pleasure but responding to a moral claim.A moral action 
disclosed the "and more" that was not dreamed of i n Hume's philosophy - f o r 
i n that response, "the 'I' knew what i t was to be personal,free and more 
than spatio-temporal". 
"Metaphysics",^e wrote) " arises from man's desire to know, 
in a world of change and transitoriness, just where he i s 
journeying; i t arises whenever man seeksto map the univ-
erse and to p l o t his position i n i t , t o answer Kant's three 
quest ions, V/hat can I know?,V/hat ought I to do?, What may 
I hope?" (P f o r M p.153 ). 
Such may be the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r such a work as Freedom and Immortality 
rising,whether adequately or not,to meet the challenge posed by Hume and 
restated by the empirical philosophy of the twentieth century.As H.D.Lewis 
i n his review of Freedom and Immortality writes; 
"Above a l l , t h i s book takes us to the heart of the contro-
versies a'bout r e l i g i o n which arise from the course which 
philosophy has taken of late.Professor Ramsey i s thoroughly 
f a m i l i a r with the techniques of recent l i n g u i s t i c philos-
ophy and he has also wide theological knowledge and acute 
understanding of theological d i f f i c u l t i e s . " (Lewis R.). 
One of Ramsey's favourite quotations was from A.N.Whitehead's.Science and 
the Modern World; 
"Religion i s the vision of something which stands beyond, 
behind and w i t h i n the passing f l u x of immediate things, 
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something which i s r e a l and yet waiting t o be realised, 
something which i s a remote p o s s i b i l i t y and yet the 
greatest of present facts,something whose possession 
i s the f i n a l good and yet i s beyond reach,something 
which i s the ultimate ideal and the hopeless quest." 
Perhaps the f i n a l comment a t t h i s stage should be by Ian Ramsey himself. 
When Hugh Joseph asked him what he hoped t o do,he replied, " I think my 
ambition,Hugh,would be t h i s , t o b u i l d a bridge between theology and p h i l -
osophy".Thus fa r we have t r i e d to show,albeit i n brief.both the foundat-
ions on which that bridge was set and t o o f f e r a glimpse of the s w i r l i n g 
waters of contemporary philosophy which necessitated i t s building. 
CH^ P^^ ER I I . 
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I f we endeavour to trace the development i n Ian Ramsey's t h o u ^ t 
which led him to b r i n g together those "two not obviously similar 
themes" of freedom and imraortality f o r the Forwood lectures of the 
same name i n 1957 and to subsequently publish them i n l96o,ve are 
afforded surprisingly l i t t l e help i n our pursuit by those published 
works of his which appeared in the years p r i o r t o the lectures being 
given.What hints are afforded i n the published material amount,for the 
most part,to oblique references i n works t r e a t i n g on ivhat are,to a 
greater or lesser degree,different subjects,and vtiere they do appear, 
the themes are rarely t i e d together. 
In the Hulsean Sermon,preached i n Cambridge la t e i n I950 (reprinted 
i n the Cambridge Review,vol,LXII,no.1751»Nov.1950,pp.I94f> ) he states 
his b e l i e f t h a t "metaphysics should begin with caonatlve a c t i v i t y , 
not with cognition as a r e l a t i o n t o s t a t i c constituents"(o£^cit.p.194). 
So,conation rather than cogniticaa i s the ultimate characterisation of 
human self-understanding.He declares that.., ."personal a c t i v i t y always 
eludes our understanding of it",because,"we can never adequately under-
stand i t because our a c t i v i t y of understanding i s i t s e l f a new datum 
f o r understanding."(This basic datum f o r metaphysics is,te says,an 
a c t i v i t y of which we have a "notion",and which we try,necessarily i n 
vain,to describe adequately in. "ideas".) This suggsstion was developed 
f u r t h e r i n 1955 In ar a r t i c l e i n the Philosophical Quarterly e n t i t l e d , 
"The Systematic Elusiveness of 'I ' " . In t h i s a r t i c l e Ramsey 
distinguishes between two theories about "elusiveness" which he broadly 
categorises as,on the one hand,those akin to Hume and,on the other,those 
akin t o Ryle.The former i s t y p i f i e d by the phrase,"! can never catch 
ayself a t any time without a perception" and " I can never observe any-
thin g but perceptions" (i.e.any simple and continuing self eludes Hume's 
gaae (see the Treatise on Human Nature.Bk.l.pt.IV,sec.6) ), The l a t t e r i s 
developed in. regard t o Ryle's notion of h i ^ e r order actions,that i s t o 
say,irfiere certain sorts of actions are,in one way or another,concerned 
with or are operative upon,other actions,e.g. B h i t t i n g C ; A applauding 
(B h i t t i n g C). 
W.H.Poteat suggests that ' I ' functions i n a defi n i t e l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n 
t o empirical propositions about behaviour i n his; essay in New Essays i n 
Religious Language ("God and the 'Private 'I'",W.H.Poteat,NEinRL,ed.Dallas 
M.High,OUPJNY, 1969 ). " I i s a l o g i c a l l y extended concept since what i t 
names over and above what may be stated i n and hence known by means of reports 
upon behaviour or dispositions 
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t o behaviour systematically eludes,at any given level of reporting, 
incorporation into the reports of that l e v e l . " (op.cit.p.l30 0» 
I t was Ryle who suggested that i n f a c t self elusiveness i s syst-
ematic because with any of our own operations of any order there imm-
ediately arises the p o s s i b i l i t y of an operation of a h i ^ e r order so 
. tha t when we are faced with our own operations there then arises the 
(systematic) p o s s i b i l i t y of an i n f i n i t e series of operations which 
means that a t no given time we ever complete self description (ie.we 
can never completely describe ourselves ).This means,Ryle would say, 
that every time vje:. attempt self-description, we add a fac t to be des-
cribed.This does not mean jhowever,that there i s anything"mjisterious''. 
" I t i s an elusiveness only t a n t a l i z i n g t i l l we see what i s happening -
l i k e t r y i n g to count pennies i n a line,when,as I am enumerating the 
l a s t penny another i s always added The penny which eludes me for 
a moment I count the next moment." (ihe Concept of Hind.) 
(Ramsey l a t e r develops thi.s notion of mystery i n his Alden-Tuthill l e c t -
ures i n 1963.(The Alden-Tuthill lectures on Theological Literacy.No.l, 
."On Understanding Mystery'!chicago Theological Seminary Register,vol.LIII, 
no.5,May 1^3) ' to. which we sha l l refer later).Ramsey concludes how-
ever that,despite the differences,behind both the account of Hume: and • 
tha t of Ryle i s the same assumption,viz.that any situation which becomes 
the "object" of a higher order action i s unchanged i n the process.This 
notion i s expressed by Hume i n terms of perception,while Ryle,though 
never e x p l i c i t l y s t a t i n g i t , i m p l i e s i t throughout his work.What Ramsey 
saw as their^assumption,differently expressed,raises two d i f f i c u l t i e s 
f o r him.Firstly,granted the assumption,he questions what i s to be made 
of the subject-object d i s t i n c t i o n (developed by reference to Ryle) and, 
secondly,what account i s to be given of what Hume ca l l s "fersonal iden-
t i t y " ? About the first,Ramsey maintains that the o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of the 
subject i s to deny ourselves the p o s s i b i l i t y of ever t a l k i n g sense.About 
n 
the second he observes that Hume confesses t h a t , t r y as he will,he 
'never can observe anything but the perception'.This i s t o confess that, 
t r y as he w i l l , a l l terms within the bracket i n the example of " l describ-
ing ( I solving chess problem G),are always,in a l l attempts,'objective'." 
(CE.p.22 ). 
Self awareness is,then,logically problematicaljsince the self aware-
ness which characterises any highest order action as i t occurs i s in part 
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observationally elusive.But how can a fact which i s i n part observat- v 
i o n a l l y elusive be displayed and how can i t be talked about appropri-
ately? In answer to the f i r s t part,Ramsey remarks that "....we plainly 
cannot give a straightforward account of what i s observationally elus-
ive, i n observation language.All we can do is to evoke or induce by some 
tale or other,the sort of situ a t i o n f o r which part-elusiveness i s claim-
ed." ( i b i d . p . 23 .).In answer to the second he suggests that the problem 
of personal i d e n t i t y , s e l f elusiveness,and the systematic elusiveness of 
' I ' are a l l a l i k e to be related t o the inadequacy.of objective terms 
and relations,worked by the ordinary subject-predicate model,to account 
f o r a highest order action.Here we see i n Ramsey the denial of the Emp-
i r i c i s t claim t o be able to' give f u l l account of the matter i n observat-
ional terms only.We may see then how the systematic elusiveness of ' I ' 
relates to the f a c t that self-awareness,as characterising highest order 
"actions" or feelings of personal identity,cannot be adequately dealt 
with i n terms of those elements to which a highest order action object-
i v e l y r e f e r s . In Humean terms,we do indeed " f e e l " personal ide n t i t y now 
when r e f l e c t i n g on a t r a i n of past perceptions,but Hume's error,as Ian 
Ramsey points out,was "to suppose that i t s empirical anchorage could be 
no other than those 'past perceptions' alone.. ." ( i b i d .p. 30).So,from the 
point of view of language,the systematic elusiveness of 'I' makes the 
claim that ' I ' systematically eludes a l l observational language; i t i s 
a claim that 'I' has a l o g i c a l status a l l of i t s own and i s not a per-
ception word. 
I have f e l t i t important to thus elaborate Ramsey's position i n 
regard t o the s e l f i n such d e t a i l because,as I hope w i l l become clear, 
his understanding of the l o g i c a l status of 'I' i s of the greatest imp-
ortance t o his understanding of the notions of freedom and immortality 
and ultimately to the way i n which we may t a l k about God Himself .Vfe 
must therefore establish an understanding of t h i s as the background to 
his l a t e r work i f we are to follow the way in which he was to develop 
his arguments in r e l a t i o n to the topics which here interest us most 
closely. (The importance of the concept of the self and self-awareness 
to the work of Austin Farrer w i l l be discussed later,both i n i t s own 
r i ^ t and as a key i n the relationship between the respective approach-
es of Dr.Ramsey and Dr.Ferrer ). 
The issue i s pursued further by Ramsey i n his discussion:"Christ-
i a n i t y and Language"(Phil.Qutly.,vol.4,no.17,Oct.193^) where he asks: 
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"Vfhat of that which i s compassed by our t o t a l awareness 
at the time of what Ryle wojild c a l l a ' h i ^ e r order act-
i v i t y ' ? VJhat of the t o t a l experience which Berkeley called, 
perhaps misleadingly,'a r e f l e x act' or 'inward feeling',or . 
reflexion,or 'conscientia quaedam interna'? 
Whst of the facts compassed by the experience which 
m i ^ t be called not • self-awareness' but 'self-other-awar-
eness'insisting f o r example,that Bradley's 'positive whole 
of f e e l i n g ' - a fact commended empirically - must,as Vfhite-
headurges,be given a subject-object structure.Here i s an 
.'experience' not only subjective but objective,an experience 
to which no «mount of public language w i l l do justice.For 
f u l l treatment i t needs i n t e r a l i a the word ' I ' besides the 
word'me';which means that i t both demands and eludes public 
language." (op.cit.p.337 ). 
But,for Eamsey, the whole point of the matter i s that i n the end the con-
clusion must ( i n accordance with his reasoning) be that ....the word 
'God' would stand i n r e l a t i o n to a l l discursive knowledge (the sciences, 
history,'theology',and so on) as ' I * does to me" f o r i t i s at t h i s point 
that we become most t r u l y aware of ourselves and thus most t r u l y free. 
He elaborates further upon the status of person words (' I','me','my' 
etc.) i n an interesting a r t i c l e , w r i t t e n in 1955/6,"Persons and Funerals: 
What do Person Words Mean?" 
• Here we begin to see how the consideration of person words 
become closely linked with the metaphysical doctrines of freedom and 
immortality and a l l that those concepts involve. "To understand how the 
concept 'death' functions",wrote W.H.Poteat (Phil.Qutlv..IX. 1959.^.6-58). 
" i s t o understand more about how the concept self does." However,Ramsey's 
purpose i n t h i s paper i s to consider the issue the other way round.The 
paper arose fundamentally i n response to tkother paper written i n A p r i l 
1956 by Anthony Flew e n t i t l e d , "Can a man witness his own funeral" (Hibbert 
Journal,Apr.1956,2^2-250.).Flew's paper raised at least f i v e basic qu-
estions f o r Ramsey. Firstly.whether ' l i f e ' and 'personal behaviour' are 
no more than walking, t a l k i n g , joking and the like? Secondly, whether 
there i s i n fact anything which i s perceptually elusive about character-
i s t i c a l l y personal situations? Thirdly,whether.personal behaviour i s no 
more than behaviour which i s observable,or i n principle observable,inc-
luding i n the l a t t e r phrase a l l that psycho-somatic medicine,deep anal-
ysis and the l i k e might reveal? Fourthly ,vfhether a person is what we can 
point at without needing to do more to know what 'person' means? and 
fifthly,whether there are any situations which already give an empirical 
anchorage to the phrase, "invisible,intangible,disembodied s p i r i t " and 
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thus give us a sense f o r i t s "being there"? 
In reply to Flew's questions Ramsey c i t e s , f i r s t of all,"Bishop 
Butler's Analogy; ''It i s easy to conceive that we may exist out of 
bodies as i n them,that we might have animated bodies or any other 
organs and senses wholly d i f f e r e n t from those now given us,and that 
we may hereafter animate these same new bodies variously modified and 
organised - as to conceive how we can animate such bodies as our pre-
sent." (Analogjr c h . l ) , Butler,as Ramsey points out,does not suggest 
that i t i s easy to conceive that we may exist out of bodies or i n them 
nor that i t i s easy to know what we mean by "animate".For Butler noth-
ing - c e r t a i n l y not a doctrine of future l i f e - was easy.Butler's 
point is,he says, "that there i s .something puzzling and mysterious 
about human existence; that we know m i s t i l y l i t t l e about i t ; and that 
those who have attacked the p o s s i b i l i t y of a future l i f e have been tak-
ing too cut-and-dried a view of existence." (P+F,p.332 )» 
His reasons f o r thus c i t i n g Butler at t h i s point i s that he believes 
that Butler's positive contribution (from chapter 1 of the Analogy and 
the Dissertation Of Personal I d e n t i t y ) was that he maintained that we 
"ourselves" are not "gross bodies"; "systems of matter" are not "our-
selves**.The "elusive e n t i t y " i s not f o r Butler properly pictured as a 
soul which does some animating - what i s elusive i s "we" - the mystery 
and puzale i s about "ourselves". We are ,he says,"living beings",and 
part of ourselves i s a body. We are "the same l i v i n g agents" though 
the body changes,and t h i s i d e n t i t y we know by a "natural sense".No per-
son i n his wits can act on the assumption that he may not be the same 
person tomorrow. 
What i s being claimed i s that i n self avra,reness, ie,the awareness 
of oneself as a l i v i n g being,is something "peculiarly incorrigible and 
authentic",and that there breaks i n upon us at some point an awareness 
of that which i s more than spatio-temporal.It i s readily admitted that 
such a claim by i t s e l f "proves" nothing.What Butler i s doing i s drawing 
our at t e n t i o n to a s i t u a t i o n which cannot be reduced to observable be-
haviour, l e t alone to bodies. With t h i s Berkeley would agi*ee.We are each, 
he would say,aware of d i s t i n c t i v e situa;^ions which cannot s a t i s f a c t o r i l y 
be exhausted i n observable terms.Ramsey had certainly been saying t h i s 
kind of thing i n p r i n t since at least 19^8 when in a paper given by him 
at the Tenth International Congress of Philosophy ("Man and Religion: 
Individual and Community".Proceedings of the Tenth International Congress 
of Philosophy,August 1948,Amsterdam 1949,pp .308-l0) he had declared 
t h a t , " i t i s the sine qua non of a religious a t t i t u d e that man should 
not be e n t i r e l y reducible to spatio-temporal terms".The peculiarly e l -
usive situations which Butler describes are: given,Berkeley woud say,in 
our experience of a c t i v i t y : 
"An agent,an active mind or spirit,cannot be an idea,or l i k e 
an idea,whence i t should seem to follow that those words wh-
i c h denote an active principle,soul or s p i r i t do not in a 
s t r i c t and proper sense stand f o r ideas.And yet they are not 
i n s i g n i f i c a n t neither,since I understand what i s s i g n i f i e d 
by the term 'I' or 'myself',and know vfhat i t means,althougji 
i t be no idea....but that which....operates about them.Cert-
ainly, i t must be allowed that we have some notion that we 
understand or know what i s meant by the terms myself,will.. 
..love,hate,and so forth;although to speak exactly,these words 
do not suggest so many d i s t i n c t ideas." (Alciphron,Seventh Dia-
logue; cited .P-ff" p.333 ) . 
Our walking,talking,joking etc.,does not exhaust our behaviour which i s 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y more than anything which can be,as Ramsey says,"cash-
ed i n terms of such 'objects' though p l a i n l y i t includes reference to them". 
"Here"/says RamseyVis that experience of ' s e l f - a c t i v i t y ' which, 
when they have wished to emphasise i t s perceptual elusiveness, 
men have spoken of i n terras of 'free w i l l ' , a contorted phrase 
expressing the best of intentions with the worst of logic f o r 
the phrase t r i e s to claim that i n ' w i l l ' i s a situation which 
escapes,is 'free' from,the rest of 'object' language." 
He continues; 
"To t a l k of 'free w i l l ' has been to claim that here i s something 
not reducible to p r e d i c t a b i l i t y stories,causal stories or other 
technical tales and more importantly a 'perscHi' to 'objects' -
spatio-temporal events. " ( i b i d . P • 334). 
I n mentioning Hume i n t h i s context he refers us to his article,"The Syst-
ematic Elusiveness of 'I'" already mentioned. Hurae,he notes, 
i s puzzled because he has a'feeling'of 'personal i d e n t i t y ' when r e f l e c t i n g 
on,"the t r a i n of past percepticns that compose a mind**.Hume recognises 
that the ideas are ( f e l t t o be) connected together though we may never 
perceive t h i s connection - once again the situation i s seen to be per-
ceptually odd.In a l l of t h i s Ramsey is claiming, "that there are c e r t -
ain c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y personal situations t o be' evoked in certain ways 
which are not wholly tractable i n teims of (public) behaviour stories, 
even i f these are complex enou^ t o cover part,ie.the public part,of 
what i s meant by attitudes,emotions and the 1 ike"j(jbid'P«336), Among 
such stories by which suitable situations may be evoked are stories ab-
out death and funerals. "Death",for example,can mean many things or at 
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least can be perceived i n many d i f f e r e n t ways.It can be locked a t , 
fbr example,from a biochemical point of view which deals with dec-
omposition and the l i k e ; ( l draw these examples from Ramsey's a r t i c l e ) 
social, death,"that occasion af t e r which a man can no longer throw 
his darts or attend dinnerparties'';psychological death,the point be-
yond which we have no longer the appropriate behaviour response; s t -
a t i s t i c a l death and so on.The contemplation of death can often s u r e s t 
(Ramsey would say "reveal") to us that we are,however, mors than the 
b i o l o g i c a l man,the social man,the economic nan,the psychological man 
f o r as W.H.Poteat i n 1959("I w i l l die:an Analysis",Phil.Qtly.vol.IX. 
( l 9 5 9 ) » ' + 6 - 5 8 ) so penetratingly puts the matter, " I f 'death' is a con-
cept which simply correlates with or i s l o g i c a l l y assimilable to rep-
orts, or predictions of events,(biochemical,social,physiological,audit-
ory etc.) and 'acts' of behaviour - survival of death is a l o g i c a l 
contradiction." Is i t then the case that death ob-
l i t e r a t e s everything (except the body) that i s covered by the assertion, 
" I am alive"? Ian Ramsey's emphatic reply would be i n the negitive f o r 
though "death" may very well leave a body and' mark an end to a l l walking, 
t a l k i n g e t c . , i t does not,however,bring to an end,what we know now,in cer-
t a i n situations,as something "more than" the body and any and a l l spatio-
temporal elements that those situations contain.(A further example of t h i s 
occurs i n Religion and Science,Conflict and Synthesis,chap.2,p.40,in reg-
ard to the statement,"I am dancing") V/hen I use the expression,**I d i e " of 
myself what I am asserting i s not assimilable to "reports or predictions 
of events" i n the common sense world but i t i s nevertheless perfectly -
though,no doubt,strangely - meaningful. Like wise i n "'The Logical Character 
of Resurrection Belief"(Theology,vol.LX,no.443,May 1957,186-92,reprinted 
i n CE.from which i)age references w i l l be taken),which arose i n reply to 
H.J.Paton's Gifford Lectures - The Modern Predicament.| "belief i n the 
Resurrection",is seen as, "something more than b e l i e f in a matter of f a c t . " 
(CE.p.853).The article,appearing,like Religious Language,in 1957,poses the 
question whether Christians can argue that we are immortal because Jesus 
i s immortal when what i s so obvious i s that Jesus i s u t t e r l y d i f f e r e n t 
from us.thou^ i t does not go as f a r as to develop a ' f u l l answer to t h i s 
question,pointing merely to the l o g i c a l p e c u l i a r i t y of the resurrection 
of Jesus. 
The disciples on the Emraaus road lacked the v i t a l depth of discern 
-ment,"their eyes were holden'',they only Icnew Christ at the point of f u l l 
disclosure and then he "became i n v i s i b l e " . I t i s i n St.Thomas however that 
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we f i n d the clearest example of someone f o r whom Jesus;, became an 
object of sense and more.This plain down t o earth empiricist sees 
and believes as he puts his hand in Jesus' side and touches the im-
p r i n t s of the n a i l s i n h i s hands and feet but now at the moment of 
f u l l disclosure his resurrection b e l i e f i s more than j u s t a b e l i e f 
i n a matter of fact,objects of s i ^ t and touch - He goes beyond say-
ing, " I admit i t ' s Jesus a f t e r a l l " to make the confession, "My Lord 
and my God". - "Here i s a commitment which goes beyond what is seen 
.....Thomas sees- but only perceptual objects.He believes i n the 
Resurrection, as an object of sense and more." (CE.p.ltil), - The resu-
r r e c t i o n therefore cannot be netted i n the language of d e f i n i t e des-
c r i p t i o n s . Likewise f o r Mary Magdalene,the resurrection i s a matter 
of f a c t and more.Resurrection b e l i e f i s therefore "a t o t a l response 
to something that touches personally"(ibid.p. 182). 
So,Ramsey finds three stages of development.Firstly,the "natters 
of f a c t " which are "objects of sense" and about which empirical questr . 
ionscan be asked,that of which legal witnesses talk,on which h i s t o r -
i c a l discussion can be centered,for which v e r i f i c a t i o n can be sought. 
Then,the situation, which i s "matters of feet and more" - a situation 
which i s empirically odd,the clue to which comes i n personal situations. 
To know what resurrection mmns demands- a f u l l e r discernment and f i n a l l y 
such a f u l l e r discernment which embraces "objects of sense and more", 
evokes and i s f u l f i l l e d i n a response, which finds i t s expression i n 
commitment. 
Ramsey is only too ready , to recognise and admit that a l l of these 
are points which cannot be f u l l y argued.All ve can do,he says,is to, 
" t e l l t ales u n t i l the penny drops and the vision comes".Then i t i s that 
we begin to realize a l l that i s contained i n person words and likewise 
when vje observe,as i n the case of "Persons and Funerals",the peculiar 
behaviour of "death" i n the f i r s t person singular we are s-truck by the 
l o g i c a l p e c u l i a r i t y of ' I ' i t s e l f . 
"We have already "/says RamseyV'a-n intimation, of immortality 
and though I cannot -fcalk straightforwardly about witnessing 
my f u n e r a l ( l e t alone be r i g h t or wrong in so doing)none can 
assert that my body i s a l l that i s l e f t of me at death,if 
already they have known me (or a t any rate themselves )as more 
than a walker,a talker or a weigher of sausages." (P-fF.p.33y)• 
The following year (1957) saw the q u a l i f i c a t i o n of what i s probably one 
of the most read of Ian Ramsey's published v/orks - Religious Language 
(RL) which, while not t r e a t i n g of the subject of death or imm-
o r t a l i t y maintains that,the "exercise of free w i l l . . . . l i n k s closely 
- 30 -
both discernment and commitment features such as those which character-
ize a r e l i g i o u s situation".(RL p . 2 8 ) . Ramsey suggests that,"the claim 
of 'free w i l l ' i s that there are occasions of human a c t i v i t y which w i l l 
not be exhaustively unpacked i n s c i e n t i f i c language,however f a r those 
languages go.'(ibid.?.2 9 ) .It claims a "personal" situation which needs 
more than s c i e n t i f i c language to t a l k about it.Free w i l l does not deny 
Determinism any more than i t necessarily implies Indeterminism; rather 
i t claims a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y "personal" s i t u a t i o n which the language 
of causal connectedness never exhausts.(Austin Farrer discusses the 
determinist-indeterminist argument at length and especially i n his 
The Freedom of the W i l l which we s h a l l discuss later).With the 
discernment that taJies place i n what,for Ramsey,constitutes a character-
i s t i c a l l y r e l i g i o u s s i t u a t i o n goes a corresponding, personal commitment, 
"something which can be seen i n the contrasts between choosing to do x, 
and being t o l d o f f to do x; deciding to do y and being ordered to. do y." 
(ibid.p .29).To use Ian Ramsey's own words i n summing th i s up we may con-
clude that 
" i n a l l these situations of choosing and deciding in contrast 
to being t o l d o f f or being ordered,there is some p o s s i b i l i t y , 
some prospective s i t u a t i o n on which our discernment focuses, 
which we discern as having a claim on us.We 'exercise free 
will ' , V f h e n we respond to t h i s claim with a response which i n -
volves our whole personality.Here then,in 'free w i l l ' , i s the 
kind of discernment-commitment which we have argued i s a feat-
ure of r e l i g i o u s l i f e . " ( i b i d p . 2 9 ) . 
Again we may see the importance f o r Ian Ramsey of th a t vhich i s spatio-
temporal "and more",that which constitutes our'"whole personality", that 
which constitutes 'I',a notion which has,as we have seen, the greatest 
importance i n his consideration of both the themes under discus sion.As 
W.H.Poteat said, "To say ' I w i l l die' i s to 
&y something vfhich e n t a i l s that certain empirical propositions about the 
experiencable world will at a certain time be true.But i t i s to say some-
thing more than and d i f f e r e n t from j u s t this.Death,in certain circumstan-
ces, i s a concept which applies to the experienca^le world,but also extends 
beyond i t . " ( l w i l l diejan Analysis p.203). 
Ian Ramsey postulates that we may expect rel i g i o u s language to con-
t a i n what he c a l l s ' s i g n i f i c a n t tautologies' the function of which are to 
commend key words which arise i n connection with religious language and 
therefore with i t s character as commitment .Under t h i s heading i s the not-
ion of exercising free w i l l . 
"Suppose someone asks us,with regard to a certain action x,where 
we would say we acted 'freely';'Why did you do x ?' I t is true 
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t h a t we might as a f i r s t move give -various reasons of a s t r -
aightforward kind,specifying one causal antecedent or another. 
But coming nearer and nearer t o the event,the ultimate reason 
would always be: 'Because I chose to do x.' I f Vfe were further 
questioned: 'VJhy did'you choose to do x ?',the only possible 
move,apart from yet another retrospective sequence of causal 
antecedents would be t o say.....'Because I'm I ' . . . " ( i b i d .p.40)« 
In the analysis of a f r e e response therefore,we eventually reach a pos-
i t i o n in the question-answer scheme beyond which no further move i s poss-
i b l e along the same lines .This a ^ i n points to the idea that the freedom 
of the w i l l comes at the moment of true and f u l l s e lf awareness - the 
point at which I realize what 'I'm I ' r e a l l y means and I respond t o i t 
with an appropriate conmitment. 
Though the evidence f o r the developnent of Ian Ramsey's t h o u ^ t on 
the subjects of freedom and immor-tality,whether taken together or i n iso-
lation,.is limited,there i s some suggestion from unpublished notes and from 
lectures given during his time at Christ's College i n Cambridge i n the 
early -^forties that even as early as th i s Ian Ramsey was at least t e n t -
a t i v e l y bringing together these two "not obviously similar- themes",which 
i n Freedom and Immortality would be combined i n one b r i e f book.(see Appendix 
(A).) 
CHAPTER I I I 
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The year 1957 marked not only the publication of Religious 
Language, probably about the most f a r reaching of Ian 
Ramsey's books and his f i r s t major publication,and the giving of 
the Forwood Lectures on Freedo.T. and Immortality i n the University 
of Liverpool,but i t marked a turning point i n the i n t e l l e c t u a l l i f e 
of Ramsey himself.Though his move to the see of Durham,the pressures 
of which would no doubt l i m i t considerably the time available f o r 
academic pursuit,was s t i l l nine years o f f , i t seems that by t h i s time 
he had already reached the point beyond which he has l i t t l e more to 
say on, the subjects of freedom and immortality.Indeed,many of his 
theories of the s e l f had i n some form or other been aired before. 
He was well aware of the i n t e l l e c t u a l c r i s i s vrhich prevailed in Eng-
land and recognised the need f o r careful t h o u ^ t and perhaps the 
more careful expression of that thought. "We are",he said at the 
beginning of his F.D.Maurice lectures,On Being Sure in Religion, 
"in a most serious i n t e l l e c t u a l c r i s i s that requires a major operation, 
which w i l l t e st both the sympathetic sensitiveness of the surgeons and 
t h e i r i n t e l l e c t u a l s k i l l s and techniques,if we are to come out of i t 
alive"(aBSinR,p . 2 . ) . 
Both Religious Language and Freedom and Imniortality are apol-
ogetic i n nature.In Religious Language he hoped "to show how the 
contemporary philosophical interest i n language,far from being soul 
destroying,can be so developed as to provide a novel inroad i n t o 
the problems and controversies of theology,illuminating i t s claims 
and reforming i t s apologetic." (RL.p.11) ,while the purpose of Free-
dom and Immortality was "to register a protest against two popular 
misconceptions: that those with an intense affe c t i o n f o r ordinary 
language must necessarily deny metaphysics or that those who defend 
metaphysics must necessarily trade i n oc:ult realms and shadowy worlds." 
( F & I p.152 ). As David Edwards notes i n his biography of Ian Ramsey; 
."Ramsey had a sophisticated awareness of the problems 
involved i n the emphasis on e t h i c a l i n t u i t i o n when i t 
was more usual to regard a l l m o r a l i t i e s , d i f f e r i n g gr-
eatly between themselves,as the products of i n d o c t r i -
C. ... 'nation by families and societies.He knew also that the 
emphasis on personality,freedom and immortality needed 
to be defended vfhen so many of the observations of s c i -
ence seemed to .point the other way.To demonstrate that 
he was not a babe in these r e l a t i v i s t and reductionist 
woods,it i s enough to point to the one and a half thou-
sand -pages of the f i v e symposia which he edited between • 
1961 and 1971 : Prospect f o r Metaphysics, Biolo/ry and 
Personality, Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy 
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Science and Personality and Words about God." (Edwards p.36). 
The range of Ian Ramseyfe writings extends,of course,much further 
and from them we can see t l m t he meets the challenge of empiricism 
with a great deal of natural optimism. " I believe", he said, "that 
contemporary empiricism may r e v i t a l i s e our f a i t h and doctrine and 
make what seem so often to be the dry bones of theological discourse 
l i v e , " (Theol.Literacy I:On Understanding Mystery - cited CE.p.59;» 
In his review of J.Hartland Swann's, An Analysis of Morals (CQP,vol. 
l62,Apr-Jn 1961,228-9) he writes: 
" I t i s a well knovm fa c t that contemporary empiricism 
has by t h i s time gone far beyond that narrow and c i r c -
umscribed view of mea.ning associated with the name of 
logica .1 positivism - Nowhere has t h i s progress been more 
evident than i n Moral Philosophy,where the broader empirr. .. 
icism has yielded many valuable insights into the log i c a l 
complexity of language," (op.cit.p . 228 ) . 
As he said i n his review of John Wilson's,Philosophy and Religion; 
The Logic of Religious Belief,(Frontier.vol.5,no,3,Aug.1962,528-9) 
"By t h i s time ( I 9 6 2 ) and i n the best traditions of emp-
i r i c i s t s such as Wittgenstein and Wisdom,there i s a dec-
ided reluctance to dub any discourse 'nonsense',There 
is,on the contrary,a ready recognition of the log i c a l 
variegation of language; and a constant willingness to 
accept,for what i t proves to be worth,any discourse 
with i t s appropriate context - verbal and social - and 
to examine i t with a view to seeing how that p a r t i c u l a r 
brand of language works,and what i s i t s empirical anch-
orage." (op.Git.p .528 ) , 
I t was indeed Ramsey's continuing plea that we should recognise t h i s 
" l o g i c a l A-a-riegation'of language" and to use i t as a base f o r i n t e r -
d i s c i p l i n a r y discussion which he f e l t t o be the only way forward f o r 
theology .Indeed i n his a r t i c l e on "A New Prospect f o r Theological 
Studies" (Theol,vol,LXVII ,no534,Dec.1964,527-33) he e x p l i c i t l y states 
t h i s . 
"The new prospect f o r theology arises as and vfhen theology 
expresses i t s continuing concern with problems which are 
of significance to everyone,believer and unbeliever a l i k e ; 
when i t arranges f o r such dialogue between the d i f f e r e n t 
d i s c i p l i n e s as can provide helpful and informative inroads 
i n t o a particular problem; and when as i t li s t e n s rather 
than speaks,and learns rather than teaches,it starts to con-
st r u c t theological discourse with a new relevance.P\irther 
as t h i s discourse i s the currency f o r a common moment of 
vision,to that extent w i l l i t be legitimate to speak of 
.  a l l d i sciplines providing t h e i r 'own characteristic under-
standing of a mystery which confronts them a l l ' (Models and 
Mystery p.70) and f i n d i n g t h e i r union in a wonder and i n -
sight and worship." (op.cit.p . 5 3 1 ) . 
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Ramsey thus argues that we should "no longer see theology as a subject 
quite apart" (ibid.p.530 ), - On the contrary,we should 
see, i t "en^ging i n dialogue with other disciplines and making possible 
t h e i r c r o s s - f e r t i l i z a t i o n , a n d a l l that by bringing them to bear,with 
i t s e l f , o n teasing and stubborn problems of contemporar}-^ t h o u ^ t and 
behaviour." (ibid.p.530 ), . The "most stubborn of the 
problems",as he calls them,are those which he sees as occuring on the 
f r o n t i e r s between d i f f e r e n t disciplines.We see here an indication of 
how,for Ian Ramsey, the world,indeed the cosmos,was to be seen as an 
i n t e g r a l unit.He introduces here f o r example the problems that arise 
i n an a f f l u e n t society at a time of rapid social change - problems f o r 
example of labour and management which p l a i n l y need fo r t h e i r solution 
a l l the help that can be g^-ined from economists,engineers,sociologists 
and psychologists but on which presumably theology i f i t has any view 
of man and his place i n the universe,might be expected to have some-
thi n g t o say. 
"A general manager who i s -taunted by the t a n t a l i z i n g prospect 
of a production target of I965 being no sooner reached before 
i t i s replaced by an even higher target f o r I966, may be ex-
pressing a d i s a t i s f a c t i o n l i k e that which theological doctrines 
of the End were designed to meet.V/hether these doctrines in 
faxjt any longer meet such a need,and the conditions under which 
they m i ^ t be sucessful,if they are not now can be discovered 
only by frank,penetrating dialogue with no holds barred and no 
privileges expected or asked f o r on either side." (ibid,p.531 ) . 
The range of such f r o n t i e r problems i s vast, extending across- the whole 
spectrum of our lives,corporate and i n d i v i d u a l . I hope I may be forgiven 
f o r extending my quotation from "A New Prospect for Theology" a consid-
erable degree f u r t h e r , f o r i t r e f l e c t s not only that vAiich i s relevant 
to Ramsey's treatment of the r e l a t i o n between me-taphysics and contemp-
orary empiricism but also r e f l e c t s Ramsey's concern f o r the freedom 
and r i g h t s of the i n d i v i d u a l , the person as he most f u l l y i s or might 
most f u l l y be. 
"There are topics"^says Ramsey)"like that of the population 
explosion around which cluster problems l i k e that of ster-
i l i z a t i o n on which help w i l l be needed from gynaewcologists, 
lawyers,sociologists,and I dare add,moral philosophers,for 
whatever i s t h o u ^ t about the point and purpose of moral 
philosophy,or of the function of moral philosophers in soc-
iet y ,everyone would agree that the discussion of moral pro-
• blems can benefit from the c r i t i c a l analysis which one would 
expect moral philosophers to bring to it.Other f r o n t i e r pro-
blems arise around such topics as the alleged erosion by 
developments i n the social and bi o l o g i c a l sciences of the 
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concept of personal re s p o n s i b i l i t y - problems whose 
discussion would bring together,for example.scientists, 
sociologists,lawyers,psychiatrists to work with the 
theologian.There are also problems r e l a t i n g to crime : • 
and to the social i n s t i t u t i o n of punishment,that need 
examination i n the l i g h t of developments i n the social 
sciences and i n psychology,as well as developments in 
theological understanding of sin,law and the state. 
Present insight into evolution,investigation into the 
molecular basis of life,developments in cybernetics and 
neuro-surgery - a l l these must as inevitably influence 
our a t t i t u d e to persons and socially as they appear to 
challenge t r a d i t i o n a l Christian views of man's origin 
.and purpose,Yet another f r o n t i e r area i s that of health 
and healing which needs and deserves j o i n t thinking by 
doctors,psychiatrists,theologians and others; and again 
i t may be that educational problems are precisely those 
which need a c r o s s - f e r t i l i z e d study,It i s i n wrestling 
with such problems i n a co-operative venture of scholar-
ship with other academic disciplines that theology may 
f i n d a new prospect and a new relevance," (ibid,p,531-2 ) , 
But t h o u ^ he saw empiricism as no longer ^delding the "nonsense veto", 
as he c a l l s i t in On Being Sure in Religion,which i t did. i n 
the ' t h i r t i e s he s t i l l saw i t as presenting us with a challenge -
a challenge to r e l i g i o u s people to elucidate '*the empirical anch-
orage of t h e i r religious assertions" (0BSinR.p ,3).It was precisely 
t h i s challenge that was to be met by such interdisciplinary discussion 
as he was to advocate in "A New Prospect f o r Theology ".Two years before, 
i n 1 9 6 2 ,in his lecture i n Oxford on Logical-Empiricism and P a t r i s t i c s , 
(Studia P a t r i s t i c a v o l . 5 . p . i i i . B e r l i n I962,pp54l-7(Texte und untersuch-
uhgen 80),) he had maintained that to condemn and dismiss the empiricism 
which prevailed in Great Britain,the United Sties and Scandinavia as 
"mere positivism or antimetaphysical" was a fundamental error,'"Here i t 
might seem",he wrote, " i s no possible kind of f r i e n d ; nothing disguised 
about the enmity,Here i s something which could be of no possible help to 
Christian Philosophy," His purpose i n t h i s paper was to suggest that t h i s 
kind of condemnatory judgement was mistaken; and that on the contrary, "we 
may have from contempprary empiric ism, a l b e i t a mellov.'ed and chastened 
empiricism,insights and techniques which can be of very positive help 
t o us." ( op.cit.p ,541 ), But why might we not dismiss contemporary 
empiricism as "no possible kind of f r i e n d " ? For Ramsey,then.the answer 
was that Christian philosophy had a two-fold lesson to learn from the 
insights and techniques of t h i s empiricism,Firstly i t would teach us 
that before rushing to facts we ought t o linger over our language.giving 
i t the oddness.the non-descriptive character,it must have in order to be 
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suitable currency f o r what i t t a l k s about.It was no longer good 
enou^ to suppose th a t a l l language i s basically descriptive -
"the tomato i s red" and. "the soul i s immortal" only d i f f e r i n g i n 
so f a r as souls d i f f e r from tomatoes and immor-tality from, redness. 
I t was no longer plausible t o say that what i s not i n t h i s world,is 
i n some other "world",for t o make theology descriptive of another-
separate - counterpart world i s to raise d i f f i c u l t i e s not only about 
the meaning and v e r i f l a b i l i t y of theological language,but also 
about the r e l a t i o n of any such "other" world to t h i s one. 
What Ramsey saw contemporary empiricism as s ^ i n g to us was 
that rather than looking f o r an ontological diversity of d i f f e r e n t 
worlds,we oug^t rather t o look f o r a l o g i c a l d i v e r s i t y of language 
about one world and expect to f i n d l o g i c a l problems which are prob-
lems about the use of words so that viiat once seemed to be a puzsle 
about facts becomes a puzzle about language.And secondly i t urges 
us that t o lock f o r meaning over vast acreages of shadowy facts i n 
a counterpart world i s to look f o r i t , p r i m a r i l y , i n situations inc-
luding but transcending the spatio-temporal situations which the 
language contrives to evoke and express.Ramsey assures us that he 
i s not suggesting that we should give up a l l question of ontology 
t h o u ^ he would say that we ought to be more circumspect and cautious 
about it.n:ius he was able to write i n I96O i n support of his views: 
"We must give our theology a l o g i c a l structure peculiar 
enou^ to ground i t i n the kind of situation I have... 
called a 'disclosure' - on such a view,to understand, 
f o r exampie,the assertion, 'the soul i s immortal',we 
would s t a r t , I suggest,with discourse about mortality 
and develop i n such a way as to lead to a disclosure 
which subjectively discloses to us everything that 
sentences containing the word, 'soul' aptly expresses, 
'Immortality' i s no 'property' of a thing called a 
•soul',and there i s no l o g i c a l kinship between, 'my 
soul i s immortal' and i t s verbal kinsman, 'my flowers 
are everlasting'." (CE p , l 4 ) . 
Contemporary empiricism,therefore.broadened to Include such disclosures 
as Ian. Ramsey would t a l k about,introduces f o r him a more generous acc-
ount of rationality,endeavours to map mystery,and displays a deliberate 
concern f o r the empirical basis of the Christian f a i t h as expressed i n 
i t s language of Bible,doctrine and l i t u r g y k n i t with appropriate a c t i v i t y . 
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The challenge of contemporary empiricism was there,but i t was a . 
challenge which Ramsey welcomed because i t brought about the s i t -
uation where Christian theology had t o think about the terms which 
i t used and explore the nature and form of i t s b e l i e f , I t was at one 
and the same time both a time of challenge and of great optimism. 
He opened his speech to the Parish and People Conference in Durham 
in 1967 (printed i n S p i r i t u a l i t y f o r Today) 
with the words, "My guess i s that theology today.whatever i t s weak-
nesses, i s much closer t o and much more suited to Christian devotion 
than i t has been f o r centuries," (op.cit.p . 74 ) , 
In t h i s speech he recalls how hard i t was for him when reading 
a paper to the Oxford Society f o r H i s t o r i c a l Theology very soon a f t e r 
the war, when theology was s t i l l very much what i t had been for a long 
time,to urge that theology should iake note of the growing empirical 
concerns with philosophy and i t s interest i n language vfhich at i t s 
most popular level had been expressed with great c l a r i t y i n A.J.Ayer's 
language,Truth and Logic some ten years e a r l i e r . l t was then s t i l l 
some four or f i v e years before the e x p l i c i t challenge of the Fals-
i f i c a t i o n controversy occurredJt was more than ten. yeirs after that 
before Paul van Buren,Altizer , B i l l Hamilton and the "God i s des-d" move-
ment and so on.All these mark d i f f e r e n t expressions at di f f e r e n t times 
of the battery of c r i t i c i s m which had been active f o r the past tvrenty 
or t h i r t y years,yet i t was Ramsey's b e l i e f t h a t , "our present theolo-
g i c a l t r a v a i l i s bringing new s p i r i t u a l i t y to birth"(Sp.for Today p.75) 
f o r i t asked of theology the question both vdiether andwhere i t touched 
down and b r o u ^ t to l i g h t questions which hung over much t r a d i t i o n a l 
theology of s p i r i t u a l i t y of whether i t did not imply "such a dichoto.my 
between the natural and supernatural as made that theology u t t e r l y 
vacuous o r , i f not vacuous,pointless." (ibid.p.76 ), but he r e j -
oices i n the fact that at least "whatever the case was t h i r t y years 
ago no-one i s now prepared t o deny the possible meaningfulness at least 
of r e l i g i o u s language." (Point.no.3.Summer I968,p.58). 
Optimistic as he was, hovrever, Ian Ramsey vas not blind to the fact 
that, not everyone greeted the challenge of empiricism with open arms 
as he di d . In an a r t i c l e on "The Cris i s of Fa i t h " (The-oria to Theoirr, 
vol.7,Jan.1973,PP?3-38) he noted|^"faced with the challenge of empir-
i c a l knovrledge men become negative,not to say neurotic.insensitive not 
to say incensed.in the defence of the status quo." (op. cit.p.24 )-
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As a r e s u l t of the growing importance which was being attached to the 
empirical and the secular,Ramsey realised that i t was becoming increasingly 
unsatisfactory and d i f f i c u l t to read o f f a t a l l easily God's purposes 
i n nature and history,"a point which i s obvious enou^ to the c r i t i c a l 
reader of the Old Testament and which l i e s behind John Wisdom's famous 
reraarkj "Ihe existence of God i s not an experimental issue i n the way i t 
was"(Proceedings of the A r i s t o t e l i a n Society 194^-5)."(The Crisis of Faith 
p,26). This point may be put i n the words of The Fourth R; 
"On the one hand there was the theological view that God 
controlled the events of natiire - r a i n or sunshine .Nat-
u r a l calamities were viewed as punishment,natural pros-
p e r i t y as reward.God was; d i r e c t l y involved alike i n man 's 
prosperity and i n his f a i l u r e s . F u r t h e r , i t was God who gave 
man the victory i n battles between nations .Yet f o r some 
four hundred years men have been developing very d i f f e r e n t 
interpre-tations of nature,human history aM history.The 
new ways of t a l k i n g about the world,human nature and about 
history,not only seem never to need the concept of God,but 
often, seems to be i n head-on c o l l i s i o n with a l l the ways of 
t a l k i n g t r a d i t i o n a l to the theologian." (The Fourth R,sec.82,p.42). 
Thus we are faced with the question of how we ensure that we t a l k sense, 
and how we make good sense ra-ther than bad sense of vfhat l i e s at the heart 
of our r e l i g i o u s f a i t h and conclusions.V/hen Ian Ramsey came to consider 
such questions as a yotmg man surrounded by l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s t s and 
challenged a t every point t o elucidate the meaningfulness of religious 
discourse he came t o see that such discourse could not do without alluding 
to the facts and the features of the world around us,and yet i t could not 
be s a t i s f i e d with such an "empirical, cashing" alone.It must^he maintained, 
therefore appeal t o both empirical c r i t e r i a and more: but not to more such 
c r i t e r i a , s i n c e i f t h i s were so there would be no transcendence;nor to sim-
i l e i r c r i t e r i a but i n another world since even i f we could imagine i t , i t 
could have no grounding a t all.Faced by t h i s predicajnent,he came to t a l k 
of disclosiires as that by which the transcendent made i t s e l f known both 
i n and t h r o u ^ the spatio-temporal,whether subjectively as "that i n ourselves 
which i s more than our observable behaviour,or objectively as that >rtiich 
we specik of in. terms of the Word of God.In other words,as we look around 
us,some so-called facts are there to be discriminated and looked at.These 
are,for Ramsey,the stock-in-trade of informative descriptive language - i n 
the case of persons,eyes,ears,hair and skin as i n Bishop Berkeley's Alciphron; 
but some other facts "declare themselves" and that i s how we recognise 
persons and personal a c t i v i t y . I n short,,what Ramsey i s main-taining i s 
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t h a t here,once again,we come t o a p o s i t i o n where we must,as he 
would have i t , c o n c l u d e t h a t theo logy a n d , i n d e e d , a l l r e l i g i o u s 
c l a i m s , C h r i s t i a n or any o t h e r , i n the end appeal t o ^ 'd isc losures" , 
moments o f v i s i o n , f l a s h e s o f i n s i s t , though i t i s t r u e , t o say t h a t 
such phrases as evoke such d i s c lo su re s may i n f a c t conceal the p o i n t 
t h a t a d i s c l o s u r e may no t be a t a l l spec tacu la r ,bu t r a t h e r possess 
the impressf/eness and growing s i g n i f i c a n c e o f a silence.Hence Ramsey's 
f r e q u e n t use o f the two metaphors expounded i n R e l i g i o u s language, 
" the i c e breaks" (a spec tacular d i s c o n t i n u i t y ) and "the l i g h t dawns" 
(a g radua l a w a k e n i n g ) . I t i s perhaps worth r e c a l l i n g , a s Ian Ramsey 
reminded h i s readers i n a l e t t e r e n t i t l e d The I n t e l l e c t u a l C r i s i s 
o f B r i t i s h C h r i s t i a n i t y ( T h e o l . , v o l . L X V I I I , n o.536 , F e b . I 9 6 5 , p p . I 0 9 - I I ) 
t h a t R e l i g i o u s Language was w r i t t e n a t a t ime when , t o meet a t t acks 
on the C h r i s t i a n f a i t h , i t was necessary t o show both t h a t r e l i g i o u s 
language cou ld not be read as i f i t were f l a t and a l t o g e t h e r d e s c r i p -
t i v e l i k e , "Blue Copper Sulphate t u r n s whi te on hea t i ng" ; and second-
l y t h a t "what there i s " i s no t r e s t r i c t e d t o " e m p i r i c a l f a c t s " supposed 
- i m p l i c i t l y i f no t always e x p l i c i t l y - t o be s o l i d , i n d e p e n d e n t , u t t e r l y 
o b j e c t i v e sense-data.He was t o express t h i s i n more p o s i t i v e terms 
throughout the ensuing years i n a l l i t s many dimensions and a p p l i c a t i o n s . 
W r i t i n g , f o r example, to h i s c l e rgy as Bishop o f Durham i n I968 i n an 
a r t i c l e i n h i s Diocesan magazine he says; "We who are C h r i s t i a n s be l i eve 
t h a t t h e r e i s a f a i t h dimension t o human ex i s t ence , t ha t there i s an 
e t e r n i t y i n which t ime i s f u l f i l l e d , t h a t there i s a d i v i n e which i s 
in terwoven w i t h the s e c u l a r . " (iTfie Church i n the Secular City*,The Bishop-
r ick ,vol .43.no.3.May 1 9 6 8 , p . ^ ) . 
The problems arose p r e c i s e l y because t h i s f a i t h dimension was 
never t a l k e d about - perhaps i t never could be t a l k e d about - i n a 
c l e a r and uneweptienable way; i f only the f a i t h dimension was c lea r 
t o everybody and i t s d e s c r i p t i o n agreed by everybody there would be 
no contemporary problems or con t rove r sy . 
I n regard t o the "more " vjhich Ian Ramsey would say t ha t the C h r i s t -
i a n c l a i m s , l i e s beyond,behind and w i t h i n the secular world,he se ts the 
problems and d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t o two groups w i t h , o n the one hand,what he 
c a l l s the " s o p h i s t i c a t e d " and,on the o the r ,wha t he c a l l s the "popula r" 
concept ion .The s o p h i s t i c a t e d a t tempts he sees as having descr ibed the 
"more" i n terms o f another wor ld , ano the r realm separated f rom t h i s 
e a r t h l y realm by a g u l f . T h i s o ther wor ld has then been regarded i n 
. ZfO -
terms o f some metaphysica l system w h i c h , i t i s c la imed,g ives the 
t r u t h about r e a l i t y , a r e a l i t y regarded as something q u i t e d i s t i n c t 
f r o m the appearances which cha rac t e r i ze space and t ime - This was 
the same k i n d o f metaphysics as we saw coming under f i r e e a r l i e r . 
To t a l k about "another wor ld " . i t was c l a i m e d , i s u n i n t e l l i g i b l e f o r 
i t i s t o u s e , o f a . w o r l d which i s i n p r i n c i p l e a l t oge the r d i f f e r e n t 
f r o m our own,a language which i s appropr i a t e only t o t h i s world f rom 
which t h a t o ther wor ld i n p r i n c i p l e d i f f e r s . M e t a p h y s i c s , o n t h i s v iew, 
(I II 
becomes a t bes t a f a n t a s y , a n imagina t ive piece of story,whose t e l l i n g 
i s designed t o encourage us t o take up a p a r t i c u l a r a t t i t u d e to>,^rds 
l i f e and t o regard i t , f o r exam p ie , a s a p i lg r image or vale of s o u l -
making ( c f .Braithwaite and h i s a t t i t u d e i n EVI^HB.) .The d i f f i c u l t y o f 
t h i s more 'Soph i s t i ca t ed* a t tempt t h e r e f o r e i s i t s growing i n c r e d i b -
i l i t y . u n i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y and i r r e l e v a n c e . I n the "popular" view on 
t h e o the r h a n d , t h i s 'more" i s not separated by any g u l f f rom the 
present viorld.On the c o n t r a r y , i t i s so c l e a r l y i n v o l v e d t h a t a l l 
transcendence and mystery i s l o s t and a l l men's f a i l u r e s and succ-
esses are a l i k e a t t r i b u t e d t o God and explained by immediate r e f -
erence t o h im.Desp i te a l l this,Ramsey would asser t t h a t the claims 
o f metaphysics are j u s t i f i a b l e since behind these erroneous expres-
s ions l i e man's fundamental metaphysical des i re to p l o t h i s p o s i t i o n 
i n the cosmos,a des i r e vfhich f i n d s i t s expression i n Ifeint's ques t ions , 
What can I know? \f l ia t o u ^ t I t o do? I'Jhat may I hope? I n h i s c o n t r i b -
u t i o n t o Prospect f o r Metaphysics (P f o r M,ch .X! On the poss.and pur-
pose o f a metaphys t h e o l . ) Ramsey argues t h a t the s i t u a t i o n which 
j u s t i f i e s metaphysics i s very l i k e what j u s t i f i e s f o r each of us our 
own use o f ' I ' " I n t h i s word ' I * we have a paradigm f o r a l l meta-
p h y s i c a l i n d i c a t o r s " ( o p , c a t . p.l63). "V/e speak of God",he wrote ,"by 
q u a l i f y i n g any and a l l d e s c r i p t i v e language,whether o f people,human 
b e h a v i o u r , o r the U n i v e r s e , i n such a way t ha t i t t e l l s a more than des-
c r i p t i v e s t o r y , i n such a way t h a t i t evokes a d i sc losure ,and t h i s I 
suggest i s most gene ra l ly done e i t h e r by q u a l i f y i n g d e s c r i p t i v e l a n g -
uage i n f i n i t e l y , o r by q u a l i f y i n g d e s c r i p t i v e language n e ^ t i v e l y . " ( i b i d . 
p .173). Ib i s idea was put f o r w a r d i n . i t s most d e t a i l e d form i n chapter 
two o f Ramsey's R e l i g i o u s Language and again i n Freedom and I m m o r t a l i t y , 
f o r example, i n the d i scuss ion i n chapter f i v e o f the language o f immort-
a l i t y and,more e s p e c i a l l y , a "future" l i f e . The p o s s i b i l i t y o f metaphysics 
a r i s e s t h e r e f o r e both because the re i s a t l e a s t one i n t e g r a t o r w o r d , ' I ' 
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(and hence he sees s o l i p s i s m as the l o g i c a l p r i m i t i v e metaphysics) 
and because t h i s word ' I ' i s g iven i n r e l a t i o n to a v i s i o n of what 
i s unseen , in a d i s c l o s u r e s i t u a t i o n . 
"The p o s s i b i l i t y of a metaphysical theology a r i ses 
when, to t a l k o f the o b j e c t i v e c o n s t i t u e n t o f a l l 
d i s c l o s u r e s i t u a t i o n s which go beyond what i s seen, 
t o u n i t e the va r ious metaphysical words t ha t are 
c a s t up i n t h i s way we use t h e word 'God ' .This word 
'God' i s modelled on,though i t has necessa r i ly imp-
o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e s f r o m , ' I ' . T h e s e d i f f e r e n c e s are i n 
f a c t grounded i n the observable f ea tu r e s of these 
v a r i o u s d i s c l o s u r e s i t u a t i o n s vfhich most a p t l y lead 
us t o God r a t h e r than t o ourselves or o ther peop le . " 
(P f o r H p . 1 7 4 ) . 
I n the years which f o l l o w e d the p u b l i c a t i o n o f Re l ig ious Language 
and Freedom and I m m o r t a l i t y we f i n d t h i s cont inued emphasis on the 
n o t i o n o f p e r s o n a l i t y and the r o l e o f the ' I ' such as we saw d i s p -
layed most markedly i n Ramsey's e a r l i e r works.These references 
r i s i n g more and more out of the realms of morals and e t h i c s as t ime 
goes on,appear as a constant theme t h r o u ^ o u t Ramsey's work. 
"Can an account ever be given by the s c i e n t i s t h i m s e l f , o f the 
s c i o i t i s t h i m s e l f , i n who l ly s c i e n t i f i c , i e . ' o b j e c t ' terms?" he asked 
i n " R e l i g i o n and Science: A Ph i losopher ' s Approach" (COJi,vol.162, 
Jan-Mar I 9 6 l , p p 7 7 - 9 1 , r e p r i n t e d CE pp. 143-58)."Here i s a ques t ion 
which i s s u r e l y to be g iven a nega t ive answer; otherv/ise we would 
o b j e c t i f y t h e s u b j e c t , s o roan i s l e f t f o r metaphysical key words ." 
How r e m i n i s c e n t t h i s i s n o t on ly of h i s e a r l y a r t i c l e on''The Syst-
ematic Elusiveness o f ' I ' " b u t a l so the f i r s t two chapters of h i s 
Freedom and I m m o r t a l i t y vfhere Ramsey, i n h i s d i scuss ion o f freedom, 
e x p l o r e s , f i r s t l y , t h e t ens ions between theo r i e s of . p r e d i c t a b i l i t y 
and d e c i s i o n ; on the one hand t h a t human w i l l i s or i s no t , respec-
t i v e l y , a mat ter o f what i s , i n p r i n c i p l e , o b s e r v a b l e and on the other 
hand t h a t a c t s o f w i l l are or are no t ob jec t s and t h e n , i n chapter 
two where he develops h i s t h e s i s t h a t " f ree" dec i s ion i s r i g h t l y 
seen as a response t o the p e c u l i a r chal lenge which vre c a l l moral 
o b l i g a t i o n and which i s the cha l lenge o f objec ts and more.The com-
p l e x d o c t r i n e o f f r e e w i l l i s , h e main ta ins ,a c la im t h a t there are 
c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s i n which s u b j e c t i v e l y a person transcends h i s 
p u b l i c behaviour and a c t s more than " o f f i c i a l l y " , s u c h as i n the 
parable o f the Good Samaritan which Ramsey uses as an example o f 
a man coming t o h i m s e l f , b e i n g most f u l l y human,when the Samaritan 
a c t s i n response t o the chal lenges which i n the same ivay but ob jec t -
i v e l y t ranscends any observables though i t may w e l l be expressed 
t h r o u ^ them whereas the p r i e s t and the l e v i t e , a c t i n g i n t h e i r " o f f -
i c i a l " way,pass by and f a i l t o respond t o the " o b l i g a t i o n * which 
presents i t s e l f t o them. (F&I p.30-31). 
These same ideas are expressed i n more contemporary terms i n , 
f o r example,Ramsey's d i scuss ion o f B io logy and Pe r sona l i t y ( p p . c i t . 
chap te r X I I I ) . where he says, "The c l a im f o r f r e e 
w i l l i s e s s e n t i a l l y the c l a i m t h a t c e r t a i n kinds of personal behav-
i o u r (ac t s o f w i l l ) elude the ne t o f s c i e n t i f i c discourse .To speak 
about f r e e w i l l i n t h i s senae i s t o c l a im some d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s about 
p e r s o n a l i t y , a c l a i m , f o r some b e h a v i o u r , t h a t i t has a 'personal-
b a c k i n g ' . " ( i b i d . p .177). Ramsey w i t h h i s usual form o f f e r s us three 
examples o f t h i s k i n d o f s i t u a t i o n i n which personal backing i s an 
impor tan t element i n a discussion.Vfe may look a t one example i n d e t -
a i l . J im,he s a y s , i s a r a t h e r hen-pecked husband who loves t o f l y h i s 
pigeons and one Bank h o l i d a y there i s a most e x c i t i n g pigeon race 
b e i n g h e l d i n the ne i^bourhood .But ,we f i n d him ins tead on the f r o n t 
a t New B r i g h t o n w i t h h i s w i f e and c h i l d r e n . " I am su rp r i s ed t o see 
you here Jim",we say. "Oh",says h i s w i f e , "he decided t o come t o New 
B r i g h t o n a f t e r a l l . " We l o o k a t J im .Did he? We p i c t u r e the var ious 
cause - f ac to r s i n a d i scuss ion which,vre may e a s i l y imagine,was mostly 
one-sided,and a t the end o f which Jim says, " Y e s , l e t ' s go t o New B r i g h t -
o n . ' There i s no need t o suppose t h a t w i t h s u f f i c i e n t a b i l i t y someone 
might n o t be ab le t o t e l l a compel l ing causal s to ry cu lmina t i ng i n 
J im's c r u c i a l remark.But t o answer the ques t ion whether Jim decided 
i n a sense which bo th i n t e r e s t s the m o r a l i s t and is a l so connected 
w i t h the problem of f r e e w i l l i t i s not a mat ter of whether h i s words 
were or were not complete ly determined by antecedent cause f a c t o r s . 
The ques t i on i s , d i d Jim give h i s words a personal backing or not? 
Suppose Jim w i n k s . I t may be ambiguous . l t may be what we would c a l l 
the vanquished w i n k . T h i s would i m p l y , " I have been sub jec t again t o 
e x t e r n a l pressures,and y i e l d e d . I d i d not behave ' l i k e a man'.There 
may,on the o ther hand,be the v i c t o r i o u s wink which would imply,"She 
t h i n k s she won,but a c t u a l l y I d i d i t f r e e l y . B u t e i t h e r vray - vanquished 
o r v i c t o r - the wink witnesses t o two senses o f d e c i s i o n . I n one case, 
the ' d e c i s i o n ' had J im ' s personal backing,and i n the other case i t 
had n o t . F u r t h e r , only Jim can know.(Ffi:I p.2,1-2), A second example,more 
c l e a r perhaps,but less p l a u s i b l e i s the s to ry o f a Duke of Newcastle 
who dreamed he was making a speech i n the House of Lords,and awoke t o 
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f i n d t h a t he was.The p o i n t i s t h a t i f we suppose a t t he moment o f 
waking the Duke decided t o give h i s words henceforward h i s personal 
backing.once again on ly he would Imow.The causal p a t t e r n could be 
e x a c t l y the same i n bo th cases. 
"The d i f f e r e n c e i s t h a t w h i l e a l l o f i t could be des-
c r i b e d homogenously as 'he i s speaking ' or ' the noble 
Lord i s speaking ' only p a r t o f i t could be accu ra t e ly 
de sc r ibed by the Duke as ' I am speaking' .The suggest-
i o n i s , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t what i s s i g n i f i c a n t about a pe r -
sona l backing,about the k i n d o f d e c i s i o n on which the 
d o c t r i n e o f f r e e w i l l c o n c e n t r a t e s , i s something denoted . 
by the word ' I ' f o r each o f us,and vjhich i s l o s t t o 
such o b j e c t words and phrases as 'He' or ' the noble 
D u k e ' . " (F&I p .23). 
The t h i r d example concerns the phrases " I ' m runn ing" and "He's r u n -
n i n g " s a i d by another person about me,and again the p o i n t i s , t h a t 
w h i l e the spa t i o - t empora l f e a t u r e s i n both cases might be i d e n t i c a l , 
i n f a c t o n l y the ' I ' phirase can l a y c l a i m t o personal back ing . 
I a n Ramsey's t rea tment o f the n o t i o n o f the ' s o u l ' i s very much 
a k i n t o h i s t rea tment o f the ' I ' . Keeping "close t o the e m p i r i c a l 
p o s i t i on" ,he vrrote i n Biolo.gy and P e r s o n a l i t y , " I would suggest t h a t 
the word ' s o u l ' can only be j u s t i f i e d i n r e l a t i o n t o c e r t a i n s i t u a t -
ions where what i s more about human p e r s o n a l i t y t l ian i t s over t be-
h a v i o u r i s d i s c l o s e d . " ( B + P p . l 7 8 ) . H e f i n d s vfhat he has t o say about 
the s o u l much nearer to the Hebraic approach t o (nSphgsh) as i t 
appears p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e Old Testament where the word " sou l " was 
so used as t o be a synonym f o r ' I ' or "person" describes the whole 
l i v i n g b e i n g - ' o b j e c t s and more",as opposed t o the more c i rcumscr ibed 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l view of the sou l as almost some k ind o f o c c u l t counter-
p a r t t o body, though t h i s t oo i s no t w i t h o u t i t s l i m i t a t i o n s .We s h a l l 
d i scuss t h i s i n more d e t a . i l when a l i t t l e l a t e r we come t o discuss 
the concept o f i m m o r t a l i t y as exp lored i n Freedom and I m m o r t a l i t y and 
i n t h e years subsequent t o i t s p u b l i c a t i o n . S u f f i c e i t t o say here 
t h a t we s h a l l g ive t h e l i e t o the u t te rence " . . . . i f we a l l o w i t t o 
be supposed t h a t . . . . . i m m o r t a l i t y i s ever the ' p rope r ty ' o f some ' t h i n g * 
o r ' o b j e c t ' c a l l e d the 'soul* .To use the word ' sou l ' i n such a vfay 
would be l o g i c a l l y i r r e s p o n s i b l e and c a v a l i e r . " ( F & I p.101).Indeed, 
modern medicine and e s p e c i a l l y the r e c o g n i t i o n o f a c lass o f psycho-
somatic i l l n e s s such as asthma have cu t across the neat Cartes ian sep-
a r a t i o n o f mind and body and now f o r c e s us t o S'.-e man as a un i ty .He 
accuses b o t h C r e a t i o n i s t and T r a d u c t i o n i s t of be ing equa l ly l o g i c a l l y 
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circumspect i n t h e i r t rea tment o f the l o g i c a l geography of the s o u l . 
" I f we wish t o main ta in the t h e o l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s o f the s o u l " , 
he says, "we must a t l e a s t g ive some s o r t o f h i n t as to the k i n d o f 
l o g i c a l p e c u l i a r i t y which s o u l language e x h i b i t s . " {F&l p .102). I t i s 
p r e c i s e l y the same k i n d o f l o g i c a l p e c u l i a r i t y which i s be ing advoc-
a ted here as we have e a r l i e r seen advocated by Ramsey i n r e l a t i o n t o 
the word ' I ' ( a c t i n g e s p e c i a l l y i n i t s r o l e as the comprehensive i n t e g -
r a t o r ).V?e f i n d much o f the d i scuss ion by Ian Ramsey o f the ' I ' , a n d 
thus o f freedom and immor t a l i t y_as inseparably bound up w i t h t h i s , 
b rought sharp ly i n t o f o c u s i n the many v a r i e d considerat ions o f per -
s o n a l i t y , i n v o l v i n g as i t does the t o t a l i t y of the s e l f . T h i s i s p a r t -
i c u l a r l y ev iden t i n such works as B i o l o g y and Pe r sona l i t y where , fo r 
instance,we f i n d p e n e t r a t i n g d i scuss ion of c u r r e n t n e u r o l o g i c a l dev-
elopments and,as i s o f p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t t o u s , t h e i r e f f e c t s on our 
no t ions o f f r e e w i l l and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I n a r e p l y t o a ques t ion f rom 
Dr.Rushworth i n r e f e rence t o the importance o f environment i n determ-
i n i n g b e h a v i o u r , f o r example,which asks amongst other things,v;hether 
Ian Ramsey would "agree t h a t the v a r i a b i l i t y o f response t o the same 
s t imu lus ( i e . a s a p p l i e d t o human bein,gs) i n a normal animal can be 
taken as an express ion o f f r e e - w i l l ? " ( B + P p.196). Ian Ramsey answers: 
"We need not deny t h a t b r a i n surgery could make a mar-
i o n e t t e of any o f us,and t h a t i n t h i s sense , f ree w i l l 
and p e r s o n a l i t y might d isappear .But t h i s does not mean 
t h a t f r e e w i l l i s no more than a v a r i a b l e response t o . 
a s i m i l a r s t i m u l i i n the env i ronmen t . . . . such v a r i a b l e 
responses to the same environment might be a necessary 
c r i t e r i o n of f r e e w i l l , b u t i t would not be s u f f i c i e n t . 
Free w i l l r a t h e r r e l a t e s t o t h e c la im t h a t i n c e r t a i n 
types o f a c t i v i t y - which a dmi t t ed ly occur as a resp-
onse t o some k i n d o f environmental chal lenge - we r e a l -
i z e ourselves as persons i n a ray t h a t i s not ne t ted 
by t h e d i s c i p l i n e s o f s c i e n c e . I f b r a i n surgery ever made 
a mar ione t te o f sonEOne;he would only be recreated as a 
person as and when he learned once a g a i n , f o r ins tance , 
t h a t k i n d o f f r e e response t h a t comes f rom responding t o . 
the chal lenge o f D u t y . . . " ( i b i d .P •197) . 
Here vfe see the p r a c t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f b r a i n surgery and neuro-
l o g i c a l research l i n k e d w i t h and r e l a t e d t o the d i scuss ion o f f r e e 
w i l l and the response t o the chal lenge o f Duty i n a way vjhich f o c -
uses and h i g h l i g h t s vfhat Ramsey would have us support by grounding 
i t as he saw so necessary i n the e m p i r i c a l v;orld,th9 world of s c i -
ence and t e c h n o l o g i c a l development though wi thou t be ing bound t o 
i t and l i m i t e d by i t . A g i i n , P r o f e s s o r Maynard Smi th ,whi le agreeing 
w i t h P ro fesso r Ramsey t h a t there are c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s - f o r e;<am-
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p i e a f t e r c e r t a i n b r a i n l e s ions - i n which a man cannot be he ld t o 
be r e spons ib l e f o r h i s a c t i ons ,ques t i ons never thless whether a man 
who has s u f f e r e d a p a r t i c u l a r b r a i n l e s i o n i s t o be he ld no t r e sp -
o n s i b l e f o r h i s act ions,"because those ac t ions are m a t e r i a l l y caused 
or determined?" or whether he i s t o be held not respons ib le "because 
o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r k i n d o f m a t e r i a l causat ion involved?" (ibid.p.199). 
Ramsey r e p l i e s w i t h c h a r a c t e r i s t i c emphasis on t h e t o t a l i t y o f be ing 
( i n c l u d i n g o f course i t s t ranscendenta l aspect) tha t we need t o d i s -
t i n g u i s h between a man's " a c t i o n " and h i s "behaviour ' .He takes a c t i o n 
. t o be t h a t which em.bodies a man's vfhole p e r s o n a l i t y , t h a t i s t o say, 
t h a t i n b e i n g a c t i v e , a man i s be ing most d i s t i n c t i v e l y h imsel f .Behav-
i o u r , on the o ther hand,he sees as the e x t e r n a l expression o f t h i s a c t i v -
i t y , i . e . behaviour i s what a c t i v i t y y i e l d s f o r study.A man who has s u f f -
ered a p a r t i c u l a r b r a i n l e s i o n may w e l l not be respons ib le f o r h i s 
behaviour bu t only when and because t ha t behaviour i s not the expr-
ess ion o f h i s o\m. a c t i v i t y . F o r Ramsey , t he re fo re , i t was necessary not 
t o r e s t r i c t t a l k o f r e spons ib le behaviour t o those specimens o f behav-
i o u r f o r w h i c h , f o r the moment a t any rate,vre have no causal exp l ana t i on , 
t / h i l e he agrees t h a t freedom and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y are not t o be i n se r t ed 
- i n t o gaps which f o r ths moment are l e f t by causal explana t ion hovjever, 
he f e e l s t h a t the case o f those who claim, freedom and r e s p o n s i b i l t y 
f o r some a c t i o n s , i s tha t i n those cases.a man's a c t i v i t y i s not some-
t h i n g o f which an exh.austive t rea tment can be given by the b i o l o g i c a l 
sciences b u t i s cha rac te r i sed by a s u b j e c t i v i t y which can never - and 
i t i s f o r Ramsey a l o g i c a l never - be t r a n s l a t e d wi thou t remainder 
i n t o a causal nexus o f o b j e c t s . 
Ramsey had argued a l o n g these l i n e s b e f o r e , n o t only i n F're&iom 
and I m m o r t a l i t y b u t a l so i n R e l i g i o n and Science; C o n f l i c t and Synthes is . 
_ - . which was publ ished 
the year b e f o r e B io logy and P e r s o n a l i t y . I n i t , c o n s i d e r i n g the n o t i o n 
o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , I a n Ramsey had v i r i t t e n : " I f a person commits ( f o r 
example) a murder, the ques t ion w i l l be a sked , 'D id he a t the t ime of 
comird-ttlng the ac t labour under such a d e f e c t o f reasons as not t o know 
t h e na tu re or q u a l i t y o f the a c t he vras d o i n g , o r i f he d i d know t h i s , 
d i d he know tha.t what he was d o i n g was wrong?'" Gould the murderer have 
chosen t o l e t h i s v i c t i m l i v e - i s i t j u s t a matter o f b iochemis t ry , 
concern ing , s ' ' y , the l e v e l o f b l o o d sugar i n the body e t c . , o r i s there 
something more? The mat ter i s drawn out by Ian Ramsey by re fe rence t o 
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h i s correspondence w i t h a Dr .Chr i s tophe r Ounstead which he quotes 
on pages t h i r t y seven t o e i g h t of h i s Bio logy and P e r s o n a l i t y , i n 
the chapter e n t i t l e d "What i s man?" .Dr.Ounstead i-Tites, "A s c i e n t i s t 
cannot p r o p e r l y answer e i t h e r o f these q u e s t i o n s . . . . f o r the language 
i n which they are couched i m p l i e s metaphysical assumptions i n p r i n c i p l e 
u 'ntestable by s c i e n t i f i c method." (opciup.37) .Does the s c i e n t i s t t h e r e -
f o r e r e f u s e t o answer? He has i n f a c t two r o l e s which must o r d i n a r i l y 
be p layed s imul t aneous ly , "As a s c i e n t i s t he must d i s regard f r e e w i l l ; 
as a c l i n i c i a n he must cons t an t l y asse r t i t s claims."(ibid .P-38).Ramsey 
sees the importance o f t h i s - i f f r e e w i l l and the re fo re m o r a l i t y i s 
exc luded , the ques t ion i s r a i s e d whether i t must then f o l l o w t h a t a 
s c i e n t i f i c soc i e ty must become amora l . "Wi th no r e l i g i o u s view o f pe r -
s o n a l i t y " , h e answers,"that seems t o be the i n e v i t a b l e conc lus ion . " ( ib id .p .38 ), 
I n a s'applementary note t o t h i s chapter he makes the p o i n t t h a t , 
"To t a l k about ' a c t s o f w i l l ' be ing e i t h e r baused' or 
^funcaused' seems t o me a l o g i c a l blunder - l a t h e r l i k e 
a s k i n g vrhat i s the square r o o t of my s ing ing .To t a l k 
o f an ' ac t o f w i l l ' does no t ( l suggest) name an event 
i n space and t ime .Tha t i t tes one set o f references t o 
s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l events or t o observable behaviour,vfe 
need no t doubt or deny .But v;hat we asse r t i s t h a t an 
' a c t o f w i l l ' i s an o n t o l o g i c a l p e c u l i a r which ,whi le 
d i s p l a y i n g i t s e l f i n spa t io - t empora l behaviour i s 
n o t l i m i t e d t o the behaviour i t d i s p l a y s i n t h i s viay." ( ib id .p .57 ). 
But what "more",we may be tempted t o a s k , i s there then i n an "ac t o f 
w i l l " than the spa t io - t empora l behaviour associa ted w i t h i t ? For Ian , 
Ramsey,to b e l i e v e i n f r e e v d l l is t o be l i eve t h a t i n c e r t a i n cases 
o f d e c i s i o n - whose ancest ry may be more and more revea led ,a t l e a s t 
once t h e d e c i s i o n i s " taken" ; a t the moment o f dec i s ion we know our-
selves a c t i v e i n a way which transcends a l l t h a t s c i e n t i f i c r e p o r t s , 
however complex,might r e l a t e . H e sees freedom as , "endeavours a f t e r 
s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n , s e l f - f u l f i l m e n t and s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g . . . .endeavours 
t o exe rc i se an o u t g o i n g , s e l f express ive a c t i v i t y . " ( P e r s o n a l i t y and 
Science - An I n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y Discuss ion , Ciba Foundation B l u e p r i n t , 
e d i t . I T R / R . P o r t e r , C h u r c h i l l L iv ings tone ,Edin :London I97I p . 127). Indeed, 
as Ryle had said,"Hen are n e i t h e r machines nor ghosts i n machines." 
The p l e a i s t h a t we t a l k o f persons as persons and not o f some form of 
compound of mind and body .Han. i s t o . b e seen not as j u s t another animal 
or o r g a n i s m , d i s t i n c t i v e only i n hav ing a p a r t i c u l a r b i o l o g i c a l complexi ty 
and s o c i a l b e h a v i o u r . P e r s o n a l i t y speaks o f more than a s p e c i a l brand o f 
o rg in i sm a l b e i t w i t h some d i s t i n c t i v e over t b e h a v i o u r . I n h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n 
t o C h r i s t i a n E th ics and Contanporary Philosophy he develops f u r t h e r 
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t h i s t teme o f the involvementof freedom i n the n o t i o n o f f u l l person-
a l i t y . Having discussed t h i s as we have seen i n B io logy and Pe r sona l i t y 
e s p e c i a l l y , i n regard t o i t s p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n s , i n the case o f c e r t -
a i n b r a i n l e s ions or ,perhaps less d r a m a t i c a l l y , i n the case o f the h a b i t -
u a l s h o p l i f t e r , w e f i n d the d i s cus s ion cont inued i n h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n , 
"Moral Judgements and God's Comimnds": . 
"A moral judgement"(he v j r i t e s ) "occurs as and when a 
group o f n a t u r a l p r o p e r t i e s 'comes a l i v e ' , ' t a k e s on 
d e p t h ' , i n t h i s sense d i s c lo se s a c l a im emerging f rom 
them,a c l a im t o which we respond i n a ' f r e e ' d e c i s i o n . 
We make a value judgement r a t h e r than a p l a i n d e s c r i - , 
p t i v e judgement,when the re a r i s e s around a group of 
p l a i n ' f a c t s ' v/hat I hs.ve c a l l e d elsewhere a ' d i s c l o -
s u r e ' , what migl t t be c a l l e d ' e t h i c a l i n s i g h t ' . W e are 
a l l a.ware o f what happens when (as we'd say) a puzzle 
p i c t u r e suddenly comes t o l i f e , w h e n a f l a t set o f s t -
r a i g h t l i n e s takes on depth,when ye t another hand i n 
a f o r m a l r e c e p t i o n i s t h a t o f a f r i e n d . T h e p l a i n , f l a t 
s i t u a t i o n mediates something e l se , r evea l s an 'under-
c u r r e n t ' - Around and out of t h e ' p l a i n f a c t s ' a d i s c l o -
sure o c c u r s . I have given examples elsewhere o f how i n 
t h i s way moral o b l i g a t i o n s or,more g e n e r a l l y , v a l u e 
c l a i m s , a r e d i s c l o s e d th-.ough and around p l a i n f a c t s 
and I would r e s p e c t f u l l y r e f e r the reader t o them." 
(CE-iCP p . 166), 
Some o f these examples appeared i n the f i r s t p a r t of chapter two of 
Freedom and Immor ta l i ty .One such example,the f i r s t i n the chapter , 
supposes the event o f a road acc iden t w i t h the consequent screech-
i n g o f b r akes , c r a sh ing o f metal aga ins t metal and groans.From a 
s t r i c t l y s c i e n t i f i c s t andpo in t Ramsey argues,we f i n d here a s i t -
u a t i o n i n regard t o the noises,human and otherwise,comparable w i t h 
those t o be heard i n the case o f " the g r i n d i n g o f meat i n an i n -
e f f i c i e n t mincer tu rned by a v i l e tempered b u t c h e r . " ( F & I p . 2 9 ) . I n 
t h i s case t o o , t h e noise preceeds the c u t t i n g up o f f l e s h and the 
d i s p e r s a l o f blood.What has been done here i s t o regard the s i t u a t -
i o n p u r e l y i n " o b j e c t " terms.The example i s developed f u r t h e r ; we 
are asked t o suppose t ha t one person who hears t h i s fearsome noise 
i s a doctor .He rushes out o f h i s house,yet t h i s need be no more than 
a r e a c t i o n t o s t i m u l i , y e a r s o f p r a c t i c e i n h o s p i t a l and l abora to ry 
leave him a c t i n g w i t h e l l the e f f i c i e n c y of a t r a i n e d automaton.Supp-
ose t h e n , t h a t a t the t ime o f the acc iden t , t he doctor vjas r ead ing , 
l i k e a l l .^ood doctors shou ld , the l a t e s t e d i t i o n o f the B r i t i s h Med-
i c a l Journal.Now,he might dec ide e i t h e r t o cont inue t o read h i s 
- 48 -
j o u r n a l q u i t e unmoved by the sounds outs ide o r , a l t e r n a t i v e l y , h e 
m i g j i t leave vfhat he was do ing and go t o the crash .Yet , argues Ram-
sey we need not say t h a t he"decided"to go t o the crash.He m i ^ t go 
q u i t e " a u t o m a t i c a l l y " . I t might s t i l l be j u s t a matter of t r a i n i n g 
or h a b i t , a g a i n the r e a c t i o n may be no more than a r e a c t i o n to s t i m -
u l i , a l b e i t t h a t a f a r more complex r e a c t i o n has taken place than 
be fo re ,due t o the g rea te r range and v a r i e t y o f the s t i m u l i . T h i s 
might be c a l l e d an "impersonal d e c i s i o n " , i f vre want t o t a l k i n terms 
o f d e c i s i o n a t a l l , s i n c e s t i l l a s c i e n t i f i c account o f the "dec i s ion" 
i n o b j e c t terms alone would be w h o l l y adequate.Suppose,however,that 
our d o c t o r f r i e n d , hear i n g the noise of the accident f e e l s , a s he 
might s a y , " o b l i g e d " t o leave h i s journa l .He might s t a r t t o t a l k o f 
"du ty t o human i ty" ,o f a "chal lenge" t o which he must respond.This 
s t a t e o f a f f a i r s alone w o u l d , f o r Ramsey,mark f r e e w i l l and respon-
s i b l e dec i s ion .Pe r sona l backing has been added t o h i s "decis ion" .A 
f r e e d e c i s i o n i s t h e r e f o r e n e i t h e r merely a r e a c t i o n to s t i m u l i , t h o u g h 
nor i s i t independent o f such,since the challenge issues f rom the ob-
j e c t s even t h o u ^ i t i s no t r e s t r i c t e d t o them; i t i s a personal r e s -
ponse t m n s c e n d i n g a l l the observables , the o b j e c t s , o f the given s i t -
u a t i o n . S i m i l a r l y our a t t e n t i o n i s drawn t o the parable of the Good 
Samaritan recounted by St.Luke (Lk . lO:30-35). (F&I p.30f.).Instead o f 
a motor acc iden t those invo lved i n the s to ry (and i t i s important t o 
add the phrase " i n the s t o r y " because the p r i e s t and the l e v i t e d i d 
n o t get i n v o l v e d i n the i n c i d e n t and t h a t i s the whole p o i n t ) are 
c o n f r o n t e d by a t r ave l l e r ,wounded on h i s vra.y t o Je r i cho .Both p r i e s t 
and l e v i t e , p a s s i n g b y , a c t i n t h e i r " o f f i c i a l " capac i ty ,moving only 
w i t h i n the channels o f the p a t t e r n s o f behaviour l a i d down by t h e i r 
o f f i c e . - once again we may speak of the s i t u a t i o n as " impersonal" . 
Then,along comes the Samaritan.Here i s not a s i t u a t i o n o f Samaritan 
meets Jew, (as i t was p r i e s t / l e v i t e meets o b j e c t outside the category 
o f r i t u a l l y clean e t c . ) bu t o f f i c i a l ca tegor ies are transcended and 
man meets man.The Samaritan i s moved (ionK^'^X'^^^')) ^.nd ac t s i n r e s -
ponse t o the challenge before him.He bandages the wounded t r a v e l l e r 
and gives him a l l the he lp t h a t he i s able.Such act ions make f r e e 
d e c i s i o n a dec i s i on p e r s o n a l l y backed."Such a c l a im d i sc losed through 
and around p l a i n f a c t s h.-.s t r a d i t i o n a l l y been spoken of by terms l i k e 
' D u t y ' or 'Mora l Law' and a t h e o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a r i s e s as and 
when such terms are t h e o l o g i c a l l y c o n t e x t u a l i z e d . " (CE-Klp . p.l66). 
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Moreover he arguesi 
" N a t u r a l I^w c la ims t h a t everyone who deserves t o 
b e . c a l l e d a person acknowledges some basic moral o b l -
i g a t i o n , which g ives r i s e t o mora l p r i n c i p l e s on vhich 
t he re can be general agreement .Fur ther ,s ince moral ob-
. l i g a t i o n has been t r a d i t i o n a l l y i n t e r p r e t e d i n terms 
o f God's w i l l , n a t u r a l law r e a d i l y l e n t i t s e l f i n days 
past t o a supplementat ion by C h r i s t i a n p r i n c i p l e s w h i -
ch were r e l a t e d t o t h a t p a r t i c u l a r mystery of h i s w i l l 
which was made known i n Jesus C h r i s t . " (CE+CP ,chap.XX: 
Towards the R e h a b i l i t a t i o n o f Na tu r a l Law p.383), 
I n d e e d , i t i s , t h e n , i n r e c o g n i s i n g a dominant moral c la im a b o u t ' s u r v -
i v a l " t h a t we recognise ourselves as d i s t i n c t i v e l y p e r s o n s . l t i s 
no t s u r p r i s i n g t h e n , t h a t , a s Ramsey a r g u e s , t r a d i t i o n a l l y the recog-
n i t i o n o f N a t u r a l law has been supposed t o be somehow d e f i n i t i v e o f 
human p e r s o n a l i t y . F o r t h i s i s , i n e f f e c t , n o n e o ther than the o ld p o i n t 
t h a t vre become persons i n d i s c o v e r i n g o r discerning moral o b l i g a t i o n , 
the p o i n t argued throughout Freedom and I m m o r t a l i t y and e s p e c i a l l y , 
as we have seen , in chapter two.Ramsey thus mainta ins t h a t i n r esp-
onding t o D u t y , "we become avfare o f ourselves and indeed our r e sp -
o n s i b i l i t y and freedom as and when we respond t ranscenden ta l ly t o the 
c l a i m o f what i s a t ranscendent moral chal lenge."(3+P p.l85 ) . I t i s i n 
becoming aware o f mors-1 demand t h a t we become aware o f ourselves ,our 
freedom and our r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . T h e example o f Ramsey's most quoted i n 
t h i s regard i s the w e l l known s t o r y o f David and Nathan ( I I Sam.12:1-7^) 
( c f . R L p.113 + Medic ine ,Mora ls and Han p.166-77 )«The l o g i c a l exercise 
which Nathan performed was t h a t o f c a l l i n g up by a parable such a des-
c r i p t i o n of. events as m i ^ t , a l o n g - s i d e David ' s behaviour,produce a d i s -
c l o s u r e o f the transcendent o b l i g a t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o vjhich David would 
"come t o h i m s e l f " , w h i c h , i n f a c t , a s we know,he d i d . 
I n h i s a c t i v i t y , man not only recognises h i m s e l f as f u l l y , man bu t , 
as Peter Baelz i n h i s C h r i s t i a n Hieology and Metaphysics (p.101) saysi 
" I n h i s a c t i v i t y and i n h i s p e r c e i v i n g - which i s , a f t e r a l l , a form o f 
a c t i v i t y - man i s engaged w i t h what i s o ther than h imse l f , and what i s 
o t h e r than h i m s e l f i s a t l ^ s t as r e a l and as s u b s t a n t i a l as h i m s e l f . " 
( c i t e d by ITR i n h i s review o f the book.Ch.Q.tly vol . l ,no.2,0ct.l968 p.l70;. 
I n a s p e c i f i c a l l y C h r i s t i a n con tex t then,"coming to onese l f " i s the 
appiqpriate response t o a cosmic d i s c l o s u r e which i n one way or another 
a r i s e s around the person o f Jesus who,Chr i s t i ans would c l a i m , i s the i n -
d i v i d u a t i o n o f God h i m s e l f .The c l a i m i s t l ^ t when the h i s t o r i c a l p a t t e r n , 
the Jesus o f h i s t o r y , "comes a l i v e " , t h e i n d i v i d u a t i o n , l i k e t h a t o f the 
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un ive r se or t ha t o f an a l l compe l l ing d u t y , i s the i n d i v i d u a t i o n o f 
God .l"/hen, f u r t h e r , i n such a s i t u a t i o n a s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e occurs and 
. we "come t o ourselves",we 'come a l i v e * the phrase a p t l y used about 
us i s t ha t we have found " e t e r n a l l i f e i n C h r i s t Jesus our L o r d " . 
But how may we express t h i s "o the r" v/hich i s other than ourselves? 
I n an a r t i c l e i n the f i r s t e d i t i o n o f New D i r e c t i o n s 
Ian Ramsey 
r e c a l l s how tvrelve years p r e v i o u s l y he had v / r i t t e n i n Freedom and 
I m m o r t a l i t y t h a t phi losophers whose concern was w i t h ordinary l a n g -
u a ^ as the bas i s o f t h e i r investig3.tions and r e f l e c t i o n s would do 
w e l l t o concern themselves w i t h the most ordinary, o f s i t u a t i o n s such 
as the casual remark on the pavement or the popular song s ince i n 
such language might be found clues to a dimension o f exis tence t h a t 
was untouched by more prec ise ways o f t a l k i n g , i n which the person 
was much l e s s s e l f - i n v o l v e d . I t i s t h i s ' o r d i n a r y language" which we 
f i n d on the promenade a t New B r i g h t o n , i n road ac^ i d e n t s . d i s a s t e r s a t 
sea,marriage,nickj iames and the c h i l d r e n ' s toys. " These e x h i b i t such 
d ivers i ty ,Ramsey would ma in ta in , a s might argue f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
metaphysics ( L e . f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y o f some language used a p t l y about 
Vfhat i s unseen) . In express ing the p o i n t r a t h e r more t h e o l o g i c a l l y , h e 
s t a t e s h i s b e l i e f t h a t God has no t l e f t h i m s e l f wi thou t a witness i n 
the o r d i n a r y language we use,thoU|^ t h i s o rd inary language can be so 
d i s e n f r a n c h i s e d as t o f a i l t o p o i n t t o the rock f rom whence i t I'las 
h e w n . I f we b e l i e v e , a s Ramsey vfould have us b e l i e v e , t h a t the ord inary 
and the secu la r may p o i n t t o the sacred, then su re ly we must a l so b e l -
ieve t h a t o rd ina ry language mo,y have t h i s r e v e a l i n g quality.Ramsey 
goes on t o apnroach t h i s f rom another d i r e c t i o n . H e s ta tes h i s b e l i e f 
t h a t , " the bas is f o r a l l r e l i g i o u s f a i t h , a n d f o r C h r i s t i a n f a i t h i n 
p a r t i c u l a r , i s t o be found i n d i s c l o s u r e s i t u a t i o n s where (as we would 
say) we "come a l i v e " . i n response t o something vfe "see" v/hich breaks 
i n on us ,which s u b j e c t i v e l y and o b j e c t i v e l y takes on depth."(New D i r -
ec t ions p.21). I t i s w i t h p r e c i s e l y such s i t u a t i o n s t h a t v(e have been 
i n v o l v e d i n our present d i s c u s s i o n j t h e doc tor a t the car acc iden t , t he 
Good Samaritan and the man vfho d ives i n t o the r i v e r t o save a drown-
i n g c h i l d regard less o f h i s own s a f e t y , a l o n g vdth co imt less others 
f r o m the pages o f Ramsey (and those of h i s predecessors such as 
B u t l e r ) , n o t a b l y works l i k e Freedom and Immor ta l i ty , exper ience such 
d i s c l o s u r e s as they respond w i t h c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a c t i v i t y when and as 
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they add t h e i r persona l back ing t o t h e i r a c t i o n s . 
Much the same sentiments were expressed i n Ian Ramsey's sermon 
a t the Conference o f Modem Churchmen i n I969 ( p r i n t e d i n Mod.Chman, 
N S , v o l . X I I I , n o . l , 0 c t . l 9 6 9 , p p . 7 - 1 5 ) . I hope t h a t I may be f o r g i v e n f o r 
q u o t i n g a t some l e n g t h a s e c t i o n o f t h i s sermon bu t , a s w i l l I hope 
be s e e n , i t i s an example o f Ramsey a t h i s best and w e l l i l l u s t r a t e s 
the p o i n t s which we have so f a r been making. 
" a man f i n d s h i s freedom,comes a l ive ,when he f r e e l y 
acknowledges something t h a t i n s p i r e s him,v;hen there i s 
a spontaneous response t o an a u t h o r i t a t i v e d i s c l o s u r e . 
We may have been s t r u g g l i n g w i t h a problem or v r r e s t l i n g 
w i t h a moral decision.V/e f e e l caught , imprisoned i n a v;eb 
o f t h e most i n t r i c a t e i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n s t r u c t i o n or b a f f -
l e d , oppressed by the complexities o f a moral problem.Then, 
i n one case,a p a r t i c u l a r technique b r i n g s a s o l u t i o n , 
t he re i s a breakthrough,a re lease , the l i g h t davms.we come 
a l i v e and i n coming a l i v e f i n d our f r eedom.Or , in the o t h -
e r case,as we d e t a i l the e m p i r i c a l f e a tu r e s o f the moral 
problem and a t the same t ime , survey the p r i n c i p l e s which 
enshr ine our i d e a l : aga in ,a b r e a k t h r o u ^ ; a matching; and 
around a c e r t a i n p o s s i b i l i t y emerges a moral o b l i g a t i o n ; 
we respond t o make our moral d e c i s i o n and i n responding . 
f i n d our freedom.The l i b e r a l i s he vfho i s concerned f o r 
t h i s k i n d o f f reedom, the freedom which emerges >.-hen we 
respond t o an a u t h o r i t a t i v e d i s c l o s u r e . I f people or i n -
s t i t u t i o n s , or d o c t r i n e s , a t t i t u d e s , s t r u c t u r e s or p o l i c i e s 
a re no t t o be oppress ive , they must be such as to win i n 
t h i s Vfay our spontaneous acknov/ledgement,our f r e e response. 
The l i b e r a l i n t heo logy , t he l i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n i n C h r i s t -
i a n i t y seeks then a freedom vrhich matches an a u t h o r i t y 
which i s nei ther |oppressive nor p r i v a t e . n e i t h e r a u t h o r i t -
a r i a n nor l a i s s e z - f a i r e . " ( o p . c i t . p . B . ) . 
Along these l i n e s , h e cont inues a l i t t l e l a t e r i n the same sermon; 
"An i n t e l l e c t u a l system whether o f science or p o l i t i c s or 
theology can be (as ; o p p r e s s i v e , i t cm enslave men,quite 
as much as i r o n f e t t e r s or economic circumstances.Men can 
be i n c a p t i v i t y t o a p a r t i c u l a r pa t t e rn o f reasoning as 
much as t o a f o r e i g n povjer.Reason m i ^ i t supply,and i t d i d 
s u p p l y , p a r t i c u l a r p r i n c i p l e s , p a r t i c u l a r systems t o give 
t h e C h r i s t i a n f a i t h a wide perspec t ive and the u n i v e r s a l 
a p p e a l , b u t a t the nex t move these very p r i n c i p l e s and 
systems could s t r a n g l e i t o f l i f e , " ( i b i d . p , 9 ) . ' 
and he concludesj 
" we must no t be imprisoned i n , o r bound by a p a r t i c u l a r 
s t y l i n g or p a r t i c u l a r images.This v;ould be i d o l a t r y . " ( i b i d . p . 9 ) , 
I n From Fear t o F ^ i t h ( e d i t . N .Autton,London:SPCK 1971) we again f i n d 
t h e theme o f wholeness talcen up i n Ian Ramsey's c o n t r i b u t i o n , "The 
Theology o f VJholeness",-.^here once again we findj^^the idea of man as 
more than b i o l o g i c a l man,psychologica l man.sociologia?.! man and so 
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on. Responding f r e e l y and spontaneously t o some d isc losed 
o b l i ^ t i o n , a c c e p t i n g some chal lenge t o v/nich I f r e e l y resfo.^cl when 
I say t h a t I am i n s p i r e d , t h a t i s a sense of a c t i v i t y a l t oge the r d i f f -
e ren t f r o m the a c t i v i t y which takes place vjhen I tumble dovm s t a i r s 
or f ^ l l o f f the buss t h a t i s what Ramsey c a l l s "behav ioura l a c t i v i t y " , 
because i t does not have my personal t a c k i n g - unless o f course I am 
d o i n g i t i n some comedy diow.Here once again i s the p lea f o r personal 
back ing as we saw i t i n the examples f rom Freedom and I m m o r t a l i t y (the 
d o c t o r , t h e Duke o f Nevreastle , the Good Samaritan) and elsev/here. " I have 
argued",he s i y s , " t h a t there can be no adequate account o f human person-
a l i t y , except by t a k i n g wholeness as a d e f i n i t i v e category."(FcEtoF. p .83) , 
For the C h r i s t i a n , t h i s wholeness i s t o be found i n the response t o the 
d i s c l o s u r e o f God i n C h r i s t , a response vhich,exfTcised i n freedom and 
s p o n t £ U i e i t y , b r i n ^ t o m a n , l i f e and f u l f i l m e n t . I n i t s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n 
expresses i t s e l f th rough our b iochemis t ry and our behaviour . "This per -
sonal a c t i v i t y , h o w e v e r , w i l l never i n t ime be p e r f e c t l y expressed, for 
we a r e , l i k e the Author o f our salvation.nEde p e r f e c t only t h r o u ^ s u f f -
e r i n g and death,and p e r f e c t wholeness i s b u t one way o f s t y l i n g our 
e t e r n i t y . " ( i b i d . y . & i ). 
The t r a n s i t i o n f rom t a l k about freedom and p e r s o n a l i t y t o t a l k 
about i m m o r t a l i t y ccjmes a t th is stage as an easy p rog re s s ion . In Freedom 
and I m m o r t a l i t y Ian Ramsey had w r i t t e n a t t t e beginning of chapter f o u r , 
"What s i t u a t i o n j u s t i f i e s b e l i e f i n i m m o r t a l i t y ? . . . .Any s i t u a t i o n v/hich, 
s u b j e c t i v e l y , i s my p u b l i c behaviour and more.In p a r t i c u l a r , s i t u a t i o n s 
o f ' f r e e d o m ' o f f e r us a t one and the same time discernments o f i m m o r t a l i t y 
as v f e l l . " ( F & I p .91 ) . He goes on to e x p l a i n how t h i s m i ^ t be so . "Vrnen we 
are ' f r e e ' " , h e says, "vre e x h i b i t what we c a l l 'personal d e c i s i o n ' .vre are 
' a l i v e ' i n a sense which m o r t a l i t y cannot exhaust; haI f -dec ided ,we are 
h a l f - a l i v e - vrholly o f f i c i a l , a n d f rom the s tandpoin t o f p e r s o n a l i t y vre" 
are dead a l r e a d y . " {F&l p .S^l ) . Death,he had already shown (see f o r exam-
ple P + F . , H i b b e r t Journal,vol.45,no.4,1955-6,PP.330-338 and F&I p .64ff . ) 
C£in have many meanings . B i o l o g i c a l " d e a t h " , f o r example , ta lks o f the break 
down of org3.nic processes,decomposit ion and the l i k e .Death f o r the psy-
c h o l o g i s t may be spoken o f i n terms o f a p o i n t beyond which we can never 
aga in show c e r t a i n behaviour r e sponses .Soc ia l l y , "dea th" i s t h a t occasion 
a f t e r which a man may-no longer throvr h i s d.arts or a t t end h i s d inne r par-
t i e s . D e a t h f o r t h e s t a t i s t i c m n is something which involves the pay out 
of insurance premiums and so the l i s t might go on..Death i s then , the 
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cessa t ion o f e v e r y t h i n g which i s now taken t o cha rac te r i ze a person's 
b e t & v i o u r .While i t i s t r u e t o say t h a t we may t a l k about people a c t -
i n g i m p e r s o n a l l y , t h e bu tcher , the t ax c o l l e c t e r , t h e d o c t o r , t h e booking 
c l e r k , t h e p r i e s t and the l e v i t e , w e a x e , i t has been argued more than 
t h i s , m o r e than our " o f f i c i a l " s e l f , w e are more than our biochemical 
r e a c t i o n s and organic proce3.3es,our behaviour responses,our economic 
s i g n i f i c a n c e and so on .When we a c t w i t h our"personal backing" ,vrhen we 
make our ' f r e e d e c i s i o n " vre become " a l i v e " and t h i s sense o f l i f e i s 
no t one which death as a d e s c r i p t i v e word can end , fo r " l i f e " now r e f -
e rs t o a s i t u a t i o n which i s no t exhausted by any one or a l l o f a set 
o f spa t i o - t empora l events . " . . . . T o j u s t i f y ' f reedom' by appeal ing t o 
d e c i s i o n - s i t u a t i o n s vrhich exceed p u b l i c b e h a v i o u r . . . . i s a t the same 
t i m e t o j u s t i f y b e l i e f i n i m m o r t a l i t y . " {F&l p.66)."Just as w i t h every 
c o n v i c t i o n o f freedom the re goes an awareness o f some ob l igp i t ion" ,he 
adds, " j u s t as freedom i s a response t o o b l i g a t i o n ; so vrith our con-
v i c t i o n about our ovm i m m o r t a l i t y , t h e r e goes an awareness of some o ther 
which - l i k e ourselves - i s no t r e s t r i c t e d t o the s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l . " ( F & I 
p . 9 9 ) . I f , a s Ramsey argues,we are not r e s t r i c t . ^ or conf ined t o those 
f e a t u r e s o f our exis tence vrhich are i n space and. time and are thus, i n 
t h a t way f r ee ,we a r e , i n t ha t sense, immortaJ. 
I n h i s a r t i c l e on I m m o r t a l i t y i n C o l l i e r ' s 
Encyclopaedia he a ^ i n reasser ted h i s c o n v i c t i o n t h a t b e l i e f i n 
i m m o r t a l i t y i s more than a c l a i m f o r mere sui-vival . Indeed,he sees 
man's b e l i e f i n i m m o r t a l i t y as a c o n v i c t i o n o f h i s transcendence o f 
t i m e , "The p o i n t . . . . o f a l l t r a d i t i o n a l argiments f o r i m m o r t a l i t y must 
l i e i n t h e i r a b i l i t y . . . . t o evoke s i t u a t i o n s which g ive man a v i s i o n 
o f h i s t ranscendence." 
The transcendence he says "may be d i sc lo sed as a man r e a l i z e s h i s 
m y s t i c a l j a r t i c i p a t i o n i n an evo lu t i ona ry process of cosmic propor-
t i o n s , a s and vrhen he r e a l i z e s h i s freedom i n responding t o Duty vrh-
i c h transcends the pressures o f s o c i a l convent ion; or vrhen i n moral 
progress he r e a l i z e s what i s 'beyond m o r a l i t y ' . " 
VJe see again the emphasis on what i s the "more" 
i n a s i t u a t i o n and a l s o the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c l i n k i n g together of the n o t -
ions o f freedom ( i n i t s r e l a t i o n t o d u t y ) and im.morta l i ty .This was the 
same k i n d o f t h i n g as Ramsey had found i n the vjorks o f Bishop B u t l e r . 
I n h i s a r t i c l e on Bishop B u t l e r w r i t t e n f o r the Er . ' / . ' i l l iams T rus t he 
wrote o f B u t l e r i 
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" I n h i s d i s cus s ion o f a f u t i r r e l i f e , B u t l e r argues t h a t 
.we Imo:v only the e f f e c t s o f death,and t ha t what we know 
at the present o f our ovm-povrer and a c t i v i t y exceeds 
these e f fec t s .VJ l ia t death is,v/e do not (and s h a l l n o t ) 
know t i l l we ourselves have d ied .Whi le death c e r t a i n l y 
removes the p o s s i b i l i t y o f having the s o r t o f p roo f 
that we have now o f someone be ing a l i v i n g person,never 
theless ,vfe cannot conclude w i t h c e r t a i n t y t h a t death 
des t roys l i v i n g persons.As he says (Works,vol I I , p . l 5 ) 
'We cannot argue f rom the reason o f the t h i n g , t ha t death 
i s the d e s t r u c t i o n o f l i v i n g agents,because we !<now no t 
at a l l what death i s i n i t s e l f ; b u t only some of i t s 
e f f e c t s , s u c h as the d i s s o l u t i o n of f l e s h , s k i n and bones . ' 
So,he concludes , there i s a pre sumption,however s l i j ^ t , 
tha.t we l i v e a f t e r death.As B u t l e r remarks l a t e r , ( J . B u t l e r , 
Works v o l . 1 1 ) , ' T h a t we are l i v i n g b e i n g s , a f f o r d s a s t r o n g 
p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t we sha.ll cont inue so; unless there be 
some p o s i t i v e ground,and there i s none f r o m reason or 
a n a l o g y , t o t h i n k death w i l l des t roy u s . . . . ' Such a view 
indeed could 'have no other ground,than some such imag-
i n a t i o n , as t h a t o f our gross bodies be ing ourselves; 
which i s con t r a ry t o expe r i ence . ' So,as he says,a supp-
o s i t i o n 'Vfhich i n a l l reason vfe are t o go upon' i s t h a t 
' ou r l i v i n g na ture w i l l cont inue a f t e r dea th ' Here i s a 
ques t ion o f g rea t consequence,and b e l i e f i n ira.fnortality 
w i l l thus be p a r t o f a reasonable l i f e and t o t a l commit-
ment ." (oPjCit.p.16-17 ). 
B u t , i f a n o t i o n o f i m m o r t a l i t y i s t h a t o f the transcendence of time^ 
then vfhat sense can we make o f such phrases as " e t e r n a l l i f e " . I n h i s 
On Be ing Sure i n R e l i g i o n , an expanded ve r s ion o f h i s F.D.Maurice 
l e c t u r e s o f I96I -2 ' " Ian Ramsey a r g -
ued t h a t the word " e t e r n a l " i s a key word i n the New Testament and 
t h a t s ince i t i s the aim of the d i v i n e economy t o draw our minds f rom 
t h e tempora l and t o f i x them on the e t e r n a l we o u ^ t then t o avo id 
any c o n f u s i o n betvreen t h o u ^ t s which our Lord has taken such pains 
to keep d i s t i n c t and vfhich indeed our conscience t e l l s us ought t o 
be s o . I t i s vfhen the tvro are confused tha t misunderstanding and per-
p l e x i t y a r i s e . I f we m u l t i p l y , M a u r i c e had argued i n h i s Theo log ica l 
Essays o f I853 (p .436,ci ted OBSR p.11),a thousand years by a thousand, 
by twenty thousand,by a hundred thousand,by a m i l l i o n we end up as f a r 
f r o m e t e r n i t y as ever.Our fundamental mistake t h e r e f o r e i s t o b r i n g 
Time i n t o the q u e s t i o n . " E t e r n a l " i s not synonymous w i t h " e v e r l a s t i n g " 
i f e v e r l a s t i n g is taken t o mean "go ing on i n a temporal t ime se r i e s 
for ever and e v e r " U n d o u b t e d l y the p o i n t of the word e t e r n a l i s 
to draw our minds f r o m the t empora l , t o f i x them elsevfhere" ( ibid.p.l6"; 
or,at l e a s t , the word " e t e r n a l " i s one which , "beginning v i i t h a temp-
o r a l r e f e r e n c e , w i l l he lp us t o draw our minds f rom f i x i n g on i t . " (ibid,p. 16-17. 
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tie may compare t h i s t o his a r t i c l e on "Hell" v/here he ex-
plores the doctrine of. Hell i n very Maurician terms,treating the ; 
idea of 'endless' punishnsnt very much along the same lines as he 
had treated on the idea of "eternal" l i f e i n On Being Sure in Rel-
igion i n 1963.1110 a r t i c l e on Hell was o r i g i n a l l y given as a Durham 
University Lightfoot Society Lecture and contains some very t y p i c a l 
Ramsey comments on the subject of l i f e a f t e r death.For ejgimple, 
"while t a l k about l i f e after death v d l l always b r i s t l e with l o g i c a l 
problems,nevertheless faute de mieux vie must speak of i t somehow or 
other i n terms of such features of our present existence as seem to 
us most fundamental to human,and i n particular (Butler would say) 
moral,existence."(Talk of God p .210) , ) 
However.vrhile Ramsey agreed that the mu l t i p l i c a t i o n of years by inc-
reasing degrees would leave us,at every stage,as f a r o f f from eternity 
as ever,he saw a marked dgree of s i m i l a r i t y between Maurice's example 
of the m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of years and an i n f i n i t e sequence i n mathematics 
(eg.|,j ^ "the i n f i n i t e sequence we may at any 
point be said to be "as f a r o f f " from unity "as ever ".Yet, argued Ramsey, 
i t i s equally true that while there i s no end to the story,nevertheless 
a t some stage or other we may "see" that to v.-hich the sequence is'point-
ing'*,viz 1 . Thus too with his example of the series of circles which he 
uses i n Freedom and Immortality. " I f someone",he vnrote, "draws a series 
of circles,centres 0^,02,0^,0^ 0^ respectively,and dravjs to each 
c i r c l e diameters A, Q^ B^  ,A^ 0 B ... .A 0 B respectively: we might 'see' at 
once that the r a t i o of any c i r c l e centre 0 to i t s diameter A 0 B vras 
r r r r 
constant." (F&I p. 114) - Herein is a disclosure situation by which we 
get to know what i s m&ant by the symbol vt'.So vdth t a l k of a''future l i f e " . 
"Immortality" t e l l s us something of which we can be aware here and now 
(the word belongs as we have seen to a disclosure i n the present).How-
ever,while we may now have a r e l i a b l e account of an i n f i n i t e series of 
moments,Ramsey i s aware that from t h i s vre have no reason whatever to 
assume tha t " l i f e * a f t e r death i s to be re^rded as temporally contin-
uous with t h i s l i f e . "Our picture of a continuous temporal series which, 
as ' i n f i n i t e ' inevitably extends beyond death,is only a r o u ^ vjay of 
working out the significance of v/hat i s given to us now i n our intimation 
of immortality." (F&I p.117), 
Ramsey vras only too quick to recognise the problems and d i f f i c u l t -
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. ies which faced those involved i n commending the Christian Faith; 
the problem of hovr to create such disclosure situations,such moments 
of vision,and moreover how to recapture the haunting situations of• 
l i f e which,too,led to those great moments of cosmic disclosure 'Vfhich 
s t i r men and become recognised as the point at which God i s revealing 
Himself. In fcicing t h i s question i n New Directions i n I969 (I'TD.NS.vol. 
1,no.1,Spring I969 PP»21-24)'he recalled that i n a memoir of Charles 
Raven he had written; 
"Sunset and moonlight,a moth emerging from i t s pupa : 
or the patterns of a bird's feathering - a l l these 
provided him with glimpses of the eternal; and God 
also met him i n splendour when he saw i n Liverpool 
a yovmg couple lovemaking on a seat by the roadside 
on St.James's Mount.IVhen i n the same c i t y he saw the 
proprietor of a dingy shop in s h i r t sleeves dispen-
sing packets of f i s h and chips vrrapped i n a newspaper 
to a crovjd of shawl clsd women,agE?An there was,he 
t e l l s us,'of a sudden the glory; and God f u l f i l l i n g 
h i s eternal task,giving his children t h e i r daily bread'. 
In t h i s vray,nature and human nature constantly rev-
ealed God."(op.cit.p.22,). 
The disclosure situations occur,then,in the ordinary events of l i f e 
which suddenly,by the disclosure,"come alive ","take on depth", ass-
ume new meaning and significance .They occur not only in dramatic 
events but i n the s i m p l i c i t y and beauty of the l i f e of the world 
as i t i s l i v e d from day to day.'.iherever people meet people there 
is God i n the midst of them waiting t o be recognised and whose re-
cognition gives us a glimpse of our a-rn imraortality,our 'eternal l i f e 
i n Christ Jesus our Lord" - that point at vihich we recognise the 
•more",the transcendent dimension of our l i v e s . I n his chapter on 
the Theology of Salvation i n Medicine Mom Is and Man ( ed. E. 
Claxtori and H.A.C.McKay,Blanford,1969,pp.67-77) with reference to 
St.Paul's d i s t i n c t i o n betweeh f l e s h and S p i r i t (Rom.8,cf.II Cor) 
Ian Ramsey renarks concerning t h i s that the contrast which St.Paul 
i s making is not one between mind and body,or between flesh and sp-
i r i t thought of as dichotomous but i s between,on the one hand,the 
person who makes his f l e s h l y a c t i v i t i e s his dominant concern and 
pursuit and on the other hand,the person who recognises that while 
he i s f l e s h l y he is also much more,and that he has an existence 
which while i t c e r t a i n l y includes,also extends beyond his eating, 
drinking and reproductive functions.This wider existence i n which 
man i s f u l f i l l e d , i n vihich he finds his 'wholeness' or 'salvation' 
Ian Ramsey sees as an existence which i s revealed,an existence in 
- 57 -
which a man experiences self-disclosure,when he comes to know God 
and h i s power and love i n Jesus,Christ.He wrote: 
"The one may be a whole man,but his integration comes 
from a purpose vjhich is e n t i r e l y earthly centered.The 
other i s a v;hole man with an integration which comes . 
from a purpose which arises i n a situation of a trans-
cendent kind,transcendent,th£it i s , i n not being r e s t r i c t -
ed to the sj^tio-temporal elenents of which s c i e n t i f i c 
disclosure speaks." (mm v.171), 
The divine act of creation (Gen.2 :7 ,cf.I Cor.15) I - E - S a f i r s t in-breathing 
of l i f e - the creation of the natural man,but with God's act i n Christ 
there v7as,so to say,a second in-breathing.Whereas the f i r s t gave to 
man hiiman l i f e , h i s n a t u i a l personality,the second gave him eternal 
l i f e , h i s Christian status though from f i r s t t o l a s t man is conceived 
as a unity.Ramsey's concern to see man as a unity remains'a constant 
theiTE ,as vre have seen, through out his work.The Cartesian du a l i t y , sha.tt-
ered by Ryle i n The Concept of Mind,finds no place either,in the tho-
u ^ t of Ian Ramsey.We my r e c a l l h i s comriBnt i n Biology and Personality; 
"The d i s t i n c t i o n between 'mind' and 'soul' has often 
been greatly blurred.The Greeks by no means spoke with 
one voice on the matter,as a popular view often believes. 
As f o r the Hebrews,the v/ord translated 'soul' ca.n be 
variously translated 'breath','life','mind','living being', 
'person' or 'self'.Yet vfhile there c^n be no easy ansvfer 
given as to v.hat i s meant by the word 'soul'....It i s un-
doubtedly true that vten a personality has been accounted 
for as the taking on of a soul,this soul i s supposed to be 
some 'thing' super-adcJed to what vBs there before.But con-
temporary philosophy vrould certainly vrarn us against taking 
t h i s kind o f explanation at i t s face value,for what could 
be meant by taJking of the soul as a thing, supposing i t t o 
be, on the one tend, something l i k e an object (or perhaps a 
mind) and yet u t t e r l y d i f f e r e n t from both of them since they 
and not i t are wholly spatio-temporal." (op.cit.p . l 7 8 ) . 
In 1970,in a.sermon preached to the B r i t i s h Association,in Eurham Cath-
edral, Ian Ramsey said: 
"The main mistake is t o supposes that theology i s prescrip-
t i v e , d i c t a t i n g the ansvrers to vhich s c i e n t i f i c enquiry must 
come.But the d i s t i n c t i v e function of theology i s . . . t o witness 
to 'depth'....to take seriously the moial dimension..Theology 
needs to do a task vrhich i t avoided doing f o r some three hun-
dred years; and deliberately refused to do a hundred years 
ago .But the roa^d to such an integration, the road to a cont-
emporary map-.Ting or projection of theology, i s the same as 
t h e road to a s c i e n t i f i c culture - through the crucible of 
contemporary social and moral problems shared by a l l disc-
i p l i n e s , " - (.Edwaris p.E7). 
I t was i n t h i s crucible of contemporary social and moxa.l problems that 
Freedom and Immortality had been forgsd i n 1957'Professor Braithwaite 
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had once complained that Professor Ramsey sometimes used the words 
"empirical" and " f a c t " i n contexts which surprised him.Use of these 
expressions made i t look t o him as i f Ramsey were committing the grav-
est of a l l category mistakes - t h a t of supposing an ought to follow 
from an i& (Gamb.Rev.i956).It mises the question of how one can comm-
i t oneself t o an empirical feet and how a fact can have a claim on one. 
He suspected that the inverted commas which Ramsey sometimes puts ar-
ound h i s "fac t s " indicated that these can only be referred to by s t -
atements whose 'logic" i s "odd'.in that i t includes the use of a sp-
ec i a l " l o g i c a l qualifier".Braithwaite was troubled about t h i s 'odd 
l o g i c " not least by the problem of how i t might be communicated to 
a non-Christian.As David Edwards notes i n his biography of Ramsey: 
"Braithwaite had put his finger on Ramsey's weakness as a 
philosopher,by complaining that Ramsey could not explain 
the 'facts' of Christian b e l i e f f u l l y to the non-Christian. 
I n part t h i s was due to Ramsey's own conviction .Although 
a l l men had a moral sense which went beyond thebiological 
drive to survival,yet t h i s did not ammount to the universal 
recognition of Natural Law,let alone God,by the conscience. 
For Ramsey,there was a disclosure which Christians,and only 
they,saw." (Edwards 
This is,perhaps,a l i t t l e harsh on Ramsey since f o r him the whole point 
of a disclosure was that i t was an act of revelation.. Admittedly, 
he did not explicate what the 'more" of l i f e vjas nor how and where i t 
was to be recognised,except to say that i t could just as easily be i n 
the common events of l i f e as i n the dracatic ones. 
i t vfas of course only h i s desire to show the empirical anchor-
age of a l l r e l i g i o u s discourse and not to explain i t away purely i n 
terms of empirical 'facts". 
In Theology (Jan.1965) Professor Ninian Smart claimed that a l l 
r e l i g i o u s language must somehow describe ultimate r e a l i t y and not just 
engineer the discernment of it.He added; 
" I f we take the descriptions avray, we take t r u t h away. 
That i s why Ramsey's position,though i t so f s r need 
not e n t a i l atheism,is compatible with i t . . . iGod*be-
comes the name f o r penny dropping experiences...It 
i s as though someone was to sjy that *God* was the name 
fo r a l l patches of blue...Ramsey thus has r e a l l y d i s -
pensed with transcendence....This i s equivalent 
to a superstitious atheism." 
Edwards,commenting on the period when Ramsey became Nolloth Professor 
of the Christian Religion at' Oxford suggests that Christian b e l i e f at 
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t h i s time often seemed to be treated as an inherited tradition,app-
ealing to the imagination,producing holiness-and courtesy but i l l 
a t ease with both science and democracy.The need to develop a dia-
logue between a t r a d i t i o n a l theology and the new philosophy was 
increasingly recognised,but the stress was on being thoroughly pro-
fessional, and, to be blunt,Oxonian,in philosophy.The key figure i n 
the Christian don's discussion group knovm as "the Metaphysicals" 
which Ramsey joined was the b r i l l i a n t l y graceful and ingenious 
Austin Ferrer,who,it appears made no secret of either his affection 
fo r or his suspicion tovards the newcomer.lt i s perhaps somewhat 
surprising that when,in 1957» Faith and Logic,a collection of essays 
by irembers of t h i s group appea.red under the editorship of Basil 
M i t c h e l l , i t contained no contribution by Ian Ramsey.This rai^t sugg-
est that the new professor had yet to prove himself amon^t the Ox-
ford philosophers. 
The same year as Faith and Logic was published saw the delivery 
of the Forvrood lectures on Freedom and Imraortality by Ian Ramsey in 
Liverpool.Their publication by S.C.M. in 1960 was not greeted by theix 
reviewers with an overwhelming enthusiasm though the journal,The ology 
regarded i t as "a book vfhich should be compulsory reading i n theol-
ogical colleges",and i n the Hibbert Journal, H.D.Lewis,whose very con-
s t r u c t i v e , . c r i t i c ism we s h a l l discuss i n a l i t t l e vrhile,maintained that 
"no-one who wishes to examine the problems of freedom and immortality, 
as they appear today can afford t o neglect t h i s book." J.I.Packer, 
vrr i t i n g f o r the Church of England Newspaper remembering how v;hen the 
empiricist r e v i v a l broke out ju s t before the l a s t viar,it was the del-
i s t of the young philosophers to dismiss a l l theological statements 
as nonsense on the grounds (admitted by both sides) that they cannot 
be experimentally v e r i f i e d i n the manner of s c i e n t i f i c hypotheses, 
remarks t h a t , "Now that the new empiricism i s middle-aged,.. . i t has 
become more sober and demanding " and thus commends such a book as 
Freedom and Immortality r i s i n g as i t does to meet t h i s challenge .The 
Times Literary Supplement (TLS Apr.8,1960) recognising that while, 
" l i k e Kant,Professor Ramsey j u s t i f i e s our b e l i e f i n free w i l l and 
immortality by reference to moral duty" and "holds that the situation 
of response to duty reveals a s e l f which, is not wholly bound io:m by 
spatio-temporal conditions i n respect either of causal determinism or 
of the l i m i t s of i t s existence" noted that, "nevei-theless a moral dec-
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i s i o n i s an event which takes place i n time," and wanted to know 
"how i t can be exempt from ordinary causality".Equally,it pointed 
out,that "although 'going-on' is not an adequate account of immort-
a l i t y , immortality e n t a i l s at least going on a f t e r des.th" and they 
further,therefore,wanted to know, "V/Tiat goes on and how i t goes on." 
"Professor Ramsey",they concluded, "has so l i t t l e i n the way of a 
clear answer to these questions that his book remains scarcely more 
than a pointer to problems which deserve consideration."(The comments 
from these reviews are taken from copies cut out from t h e i r respect-
ive journals and kept by Ian Ramsey amongst his private papers.) 
This i s , i t i s true to say,in many ways a f a i r c r i t i c i s m of Freedom 
and Immortality. As we have seen many of the answers to the questions 
raised by the c r i t i c of the Times Literary Supplement are answered 
when vfe look at Ramsey's work as a vrhole.Though v.e may be doing t h i s 
nearly twenty years on,however,the reviewer did have f i f t e e n years of 
Ramsey behind him but' one feels that he i s l i t t l e acquainted with v/hat 
Ian Ramsey had already had to say.Perhaps the trouble i s that Ian Ram-
sey assumed too much and I'irote too much from his o^•m. sure standpoint, 
unhelpful i n that he did not go so f a r as to suggiest vjays in which 
those presenting the Christian f a i t h to non-Christians might help to 
bring a,bout the a l l important disclosure situations.The revievfer f o r 
the Church Times('Two V i t a l Concepts".Church Times.8 Apr . l96o) prov-
ides us with a systematic and penetrating c r i t i c i s m of F'reedom and 
Immortality,aga.in only a short while after i t s publication. He c r i t -
icises Ramsey's use,and sometimes perhaps too frequent use,of i l l u s t -
rations from mathenatics and science.While he would admit that some 
of these at least 3xe not unhelpful,he thinks that their use often 
looks a r t i f i c i a l "and might unkindly be described as bogus" and he 
goes 80 f a r as almost to accuse Ramsey of using them merely to add 
a h i n t of academic respectability to the work.He doubts,secondly, 
whether indeed the very substance of Ramsey's arguments "would 
prove as a t t r a c t i v e to the empiricists as the form i n which they 
are dres red up". With regard to Ramsey's discussion of personal dec-
ision with i t s app^-al to seeing such situations as being more than 
j u s t t h i s or that beha.viour pattern but as the place where each of 
us i s d i s t i n c t i v e l y ' I ' j while admitting with Ramsey that i n a re-
sponsible decision there i s something more than can be explained 
by references to physical,economic or psychological determinism and 
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that at least a par t i c u l a r kind of free decision occurs as a resp-
onse to the challenge of duty or absolute value,he objects to Ram-
sey's introduction'of God at t h i s point,at least along the lines 
of his empiricist argument.He sees Ramsey's reference to non moral 
disclosure situations (connected with such phrases as " f i r s t cause" 
and "necessary being'')as being the introduction of the cosmological 
argument, "without support or defence,to j u s t i f y bringing i n God 
and i n aid of the transcendental chcjracter of moral o b l i ^ t i o n " . 
He concludes, "From the empiricist's standpoint there i s surely a 
b i g gap i n the author's reasoning here.Even to the more sympathetic 
reader i t may look suspiciously as t h o u ^ God i s being introduced 
to validate absolute moral values."Likewise with immortality.His 
synopsis of Ramsey i s , i n so f a r as i t goes,correct .At the root of 
a l l language about immortality f o r Ramsey _is the freedom of the 
human person and i t is as a person that one receives intimations 
of immortality,for vfhEn one exercises personal decision one i s "alive' 
i n the truest sense,and vihile death i s the termination of man as an 
object,bringing to an end his public bdiaviour,in so f a r as he i s 
an "object and more",he is imin.ortal.The Church Tirtes sees th i s ex-
planation of immortality as on a " d i s t i n c t i v e l y slender foundation" 
f o r an examination of the mys i n vfhich immortality can be s i g n i f i -
cantly described.The fundamental error of the reviewer i s t o see 
Ramsey's method and arguments as those of contemporary empiricism, 
seen without q u a l i f i c a t i o n or explanation.Ramsey however never con-
ceded to the empiricist position but saw that i t was nevertheless 
important t o give discourse about God a grounding,an anchorage i n 
the empirical world,and i t was t h i s with vjhich the book was involved 
and not i n providing a "proof" f o r the existence of C-od. 
The most s i g n i f i c a n t review of Freedom and Immortality,hovfever, 
was wri t t e n by H.D.Lewis f o r the Hibbert^ Jourml in 196l . ( Lewis R.) 
By way of introd-
uction Professor Lewis describes how "the philosopher who undertakes 
t o virite about religious questions today i s apt io .find himself bal-
ancing on a very slim tightrope."( op.cit.p . l 6 8 ) . I f he begins to 
speak of God as i f he were one e n t i t y among others then he w i l l f a l l 
f o u l of many c r i t i c s , n o t least amongst v^ hom are the empiricists.On 
the other side there i s "the bottomless abyss of not saying anything 
at a l l , " ( i b i d . J p. 168). While he admits that at no point does Ian 
Ramsey ever quite lose his foothold .Professor Lewis does add that 
- 02 -
"he....gives his readers some exceedingly anxious moments by leaning 
so f a r over on the side of the abyss of silence."( ibid.. p . l 6 8 ) . 
Lewis' c r i t i c i s m s are both helpful and,for the most part,well 
founded.He finds a certain ammount of d i f f i c u l t y i n Ramsey's use of 
the idea of personal tacking i n so far as he would l i k e to know how 
i t comes about,what i t $ value i s and how precisely to understand 
the "more" which,while expressing i t s e l f i n various observable d i r -
ect ions, ultimately transcends them.A subsidiary d i f f i c u l t y concerns 
the dismissal of behaviour which does not involve the free and per-
sonal decision as only reaction to s t i m u l i . Thus with the priest and 
l e v i t e i n the parable of the Good Samaritan -
"V/'ere they not i n t h e i r way acting responsibly or should 
we exempt them on the grounds that t h e i r choice i s not 
free? Many redoubta.ble defenders of freedom in the past 
have ended up i n the position of holding that only good 
actions,but never bad ones,are free and responsible.That 
accords well with one kind of theology,but not I imagine 
one that commends i t s e l f to Professor Ramsey."(ibid.p.170 ), 
He feels,too,some misgiving over Ramsey's description of a free dec-
isi o n as "spajiio-temporal and morearguing that a l l our conduct must 
i n some way be said to be temporal (though vre may also in some cases 
be said to transcend time); a.gain the quarrel i s over the "more" and 
the pi©, is that Ramsey be more precise over vhat he means by i t be-
cause a l l that we know is that i t is not an idea of a timeless s e l f . 
The discussion on immortality follovrs very closely that on free-
dom ..The main emphasis i s again on the fact that we are "spatio-temporal 
and more" ."because we are i n that sense free,in that sense we are imm-
o r t a l . " (F&I p,66 ), 9nd the same arguments fo r a more precise def-
i n i t i o n of the "more* thus apply once again. 
Lev/is' suspicion i s t'nat Ramsey i s , i n fact,conceding more than 
necessary t o pre\'ailing fashion and Ramsey's arguments along these 
l i n e s come dangerously close to suggesting that because we are persons 
and responsible beings we are ipso facto immortal when he says f o r 
example, " I t i s i n so recognising duty as something which transcends 
the spatio-temporal,that we recognise our own transcendence of the 
spatio-temporal,our own im:?.ortality."(F&I p.73 ). or "In some cases, 
our awareness of obligation and our awareness of im:iiortality are g i ^ n 
together." (F6;Ip , 7 2 ). • In short,for Ramsey,as we have seen,"immort-
a l i t y " and "unending l i f e " do not t e l l of some "property" of a 'thing" 
called a soul,or of some existence l i k e our public behaviour novr but 
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going on and on and on.They t e l l rather of a situation we know now 
which i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y d i s t i n c t i v e i n being more than spatio-
temporal. Further,vrhile Ramsey manages to stress "the sense of vfonder 
and mystery and depth vfhich surrounds the 'special situations' he des-
cribes even i f t h i s does lend these situations a religious char-
acter,that w i l l not suffice to establish particular.items of r e l i g -
ious b e l i e f . " (Lewis R.p.175). 
Here Lewis betrays that he has,like so many others,missed t t e 
point of Freedom and Immortality.If one t r i e s t o force the book to 
provide ansv/ers or proofs or to establish the v a l i d i t y of preposit-
ional claims then,ultimately the book w i l l f a i l to l i v e up to the 
task but then that i s not the purpose f o r which the book was written . 
I t s purpose,as Ramsey points out i n his reply to Lewis' cr i t i c i s m s , 
an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d , "Some Further Reflections on Freedom and Imm-
o r t a l i t y ' (Hibbert Journal vol.LIX,no.235,Jly.1961,3^9-55) was to 
make cle.ar vfhat he believed to be the empirical anchorage of discourse 
about the freedom of the w i l l and immortality .Ramsey, i t i s true opens 
himself to c r i t i c i s m because he so often assumes too much of his 
readers .Freedom and Imttiortality i s only f u l l y i n t e l l i g i b l e vihen read 
i n the l i g h t of the t o t a l i t y of Ramsey's works.It stands nevertheless, 
as a book of f i r s t rate importance not only because i t provides us 
with a survey of almost the whole of Ramsey's philosophy i n this area, 
though the background to i t s language l i e s elsewhere,in only about one 
hundred and f i f t y rages but more importantly because i t provides the 
theological world with serious attempt to come to grips with the prob-
lems vfhich both ctellenge i t and face our modem world. 
Ten years a f t e r the publication of Freedom and Immortality Ian 
Ramsey,by t h i s time Bishop of Durham,wrote i n his diocesan magazine* 
"VJe have today reached a stage v;hen,for very d i f f e r e n t 
reasons,ways of describing the faith-dimension in terms 
of t r a d i t i o n a l metaphysics as vfell as t r a d i t i o n a l ways 
of i n t e r p r e t i n g the world have a l l collapsed and broken 
doi-m and need a thorough overhaul.In t h i s context of 
breakdovm and collapse i t i s very easy indeed to dismiss 
the vrhole of r e l i g i o n and theology as a sham,the Church 
as the community of the imirature,and to acknowledge the 
secular in and by i t s e l f a l l sufficient."("The Church and 
the Secular City'.'lTic Bisho-nrick,vol.43.no.3.May i;68,46). 
I t vras i n reaction to t h i s kind of atti t u d e and the increasing pop-
u l a r i t y of a t h e i s t i c . o r at best agnostic.secularism that Freedom and 
Lmmort3.1ity came t o b i r t h both as a product of contemporary Christian 
th i n k i n g and as the focus f o r thinking to come.We may r e c a l l Professor 
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Dorothy Emmet's comrr^ ent on Ian Ramsey .that 
"Under his imperturbable demeanour he had a feeling 
of desperation about the need to rethink the problem 
of r e l i g i o u s t r u t h in a world vfhere our s c i e n t i f i c 
understanding of man,and indeed the understanding of 
science and philosophy themselves were changing i n vfa.ys 
.of which most people i n the Churches were unaware." 
(Edwards p.6) 
I n a n ' a r t i c l e on'^ The Cri s i s of Faith" (i^eoria to Theory,vol.7, Jan. 
1973,. ) i n 1973 he repeated t h i s warning that 
" As we face the c r i s i s of our ora time,the reaction 
of our predecessors to the c r i s i s of a past age i s a 
t e r r i b l e warning.Not only did they f a i l to face up sq-
uarely to searching issues; t h e i r side-stepping merely 
postponed u n t i l today the c r i s i s which should have been 
ifeced yesterday." (op.cit. p.24), 
His plea was as ever f o r theology t o step into the fray and to give 
account of i t s e l f .Long gone were the days when theology could rest 
sure i n i t s position i n the l i f e of men. "But l e t us not forget",he 
wrote i n S p i r i t u a l i t y f o r Today •'. . _ . 
; . • ' ' "that s e l f -
s a t i s f e c t i o n i n theology as elsewhere,very often accompanies a s p i r i t u a l 
blindness; whereas the concept of theology,as tentative and exploratory 
can better bear witness to every new insight into mystery and trans-
cendence,and may thus be seen as providing ever new expressions of a 
sense of finitude,-which matches,as i t arises from,a new sense of the 
i n f i n i t e . " (p.75)«l't was not,as vie have seen,a fray into which Ian 
Ramsey stepped with h i s eyes closed.At the end of Freedom and Immort-
a l i t y he vnrote of i t s convictions that they registered a protest ag-
ainst two popular misconceptions,that,on the one hand those with vrhat 
he c a l l s *an intense a f f e c t i o n for ordinary ]a,ngiiage"(Fc3:I p.152) must 
necessarily deny metaphysics or,on the other hand,that those who def-
end .metaphysics must necesariiy trade i n "occult and shadov/y viorlds" 
p. 152) which meant tha.t he had be si,as he had i n much of his work, 
f i g h t i n g on tvjo fronts at once,against secularism on the one ha.nd and 
blindness i n the face of the modern situation by theology on the other 
and He r e c a l l his /_ ".. . , i t i s a sobering r e f l e c t i o n that not many wars 
have been vfon under such a necessity."(F & I p.l52.)Jt i s the generations 
to come vrho w i l l know the answer,and i t i s only a shame that Ian Ramsey 
could not l i v e to see i t s progress 30 f a r and help i t along with s t i l l 
more of his wisdom and i n s i s t and piety. 
CHAPTER IV 
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" i n reading him,if you are bold enough to begin,bear 
i n mind the characteristic marks of his style.His 
mind was nourished by three streams; metaphysical 
philosophy,the scriptures,and the poetry of Greece, 
Rome, and England.But i n w r i t i n g he seldom refers 
t o others by name - perhaps only Wittgenstein quotes 
less - you may often hear behind his thought the 
resonance of some ancient or modem controversy,but 
mostly he writes i n dialogue with himself,a dialogue 
closely written and compressed...He demands unflagging 
concentration,This i s not to say that he wrote badly. 
He had the almost unique d i s t i n c t i o n among modem theo-
logians of w r i t i n g b r i l l i a n t and clear English,fax 
removed from those misty affirmations thundered from 
a neo-Germanic fog which now pass f o r thieology .But 
when he wrote philosophy he l e t you off nothing,"(Curtis p,249). 
So wrote P h i l i p Curtis in. his a r t i c l e , w r i t t e n two years after Farcer's 
death i n 1968,on "Dr.Parrer's Rational Theology"* 
Austin Marsden P^rrer,Warden of Keble College,Oxford from I960 
u n t i l h i s death i n I968 (and near the end of his l i f e elected a 
Fellow of the B r i t i s h Academy) was a philosopher and theologian of 
rare qualities,combining,to an unusual degree,both philosophical 
s e n s i t i v i t y and penetrating f a i t h , I t i s now generally admitted that 
Farrer deserved a wider audience than he received during his l i f e t i m e . 
He represented the best trsidition i n metaphysics i n the l i n e of A r i s t o t l e , 
Aquinas,Spinoza,Leibniz,Kant and Whitehead while remaining an unabashed 
spokesman f o r orthodox Chr i s t i a n i t y , a t odds, with the then current 
fashionsof Form Criticism,Positivism and neo-orthodoxy.Neglect of 
hi s work may be i n part due,too,to his remarkable i n t e l l e c t u a l indep-
endance.His style i s b r i l l i a n t l y graceful and ingenious and yet even 
at h i s best he was never an easy w r i t e r to understand.In both the 
world of philosophy and of b i b l i c a l studies he was regarded f o r the 
most part with puzzled interest.During his l i f e t i m e h i s work received 
l i t t l e discussion except i n reviews .perhaps understandable i n the l i g h t 
of the dominant p o s i t i v i s t and anialytic orientation of Oxford i n his 
day as we have seen; yet i t remains regrettable since he was so much 
concerned to come to grips with the various attacks on metaphysics and 
natural theology and even adopted the techniques and availed himself of 
the lessons of language analysis i n some of h i s work.He remains one of 
the few writers of the post-war period to have produced work of any note 
i n d o c t r i n a l theology i n the Anglican Communion.In his book New Directions 
i n Anglican Theology, R.J.Page writes. 
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'•'By contrast t o the f i f t y years preceding 1939.the .last 
quarter century h.-s not been marked by outstanding 
theological work of a constructive and systema,tic char-
acter i n Anglica-n circles.Good work there has been from 
time t o time.notably by E.L.Mascall,Austin Farrer,Leonard 
Hodgson and F.W.Dillistone i n England....Overall,however, 
one cannot escape the impression that Anglican Theology has 
been too much content to l i v e o f f i t s own fat...When one 
surveys the achievements of the l a s t several decades as 
a whole,and compares them with the period 1689-1939 "the 
contrast leaves one with l i t t l e cause f o r optimism." (op,cit,p,21 ). 
I t was i n the years j u s t preceding and during the second world war 
that what has become known as neo-orthodoxy exerted i t s greatest i n -
fluence i n Anglican c i r c l e s (see Alec R.Vidler,Twentieth Century 
Defenders of the Fn.ith,FY :Seabury,lS<6j,pp.79-101').While the vrritings 
of Karl Barth have never been widely accepted,if read,in Anglican c i r -
cles,his debate with Emil Brunner over the p o s s i b i l i t y and v a l i d i t y of 
any natural theology warmnted observation.Barth's suspicion of natural 
theology and,indeed,of apologetics i n general found i t s clearest ex-
pression i n his Gifford lectures of 1938 - The Knowledge of God and 
the Service of God. His influence was to turn attention to the Bible 
and i t s interpretation,and to render questions of natural theology, 
i f not suspect,then a^ t least of lesser importance and interest than 
the topics of dogmatics and theology i t s e l f . I t was during these years 
too,that the ideas of s/ren Kierkegaard f i r s t became available to the 
English reader.In the vnritings of Kierkegaard as with Barth,the English 
mind was presented with the reje c t i o n of any attempt to accommodate the 
Christian f a i t h i n t o any philosophical system which sought to "under-
stand" or to explain' i t . ( c f . s / r e n Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments^ 
For Kierkegaard the Christian f a i t h 
demanded a leap which inevitably took one beyond the bounds of rational 
inquiry. 
Combined with the e a r l i e r sociological,theological and philosoph-
i c a l situa.tion vihich vie have considered e a r l i e r in r e l a t i o n to the v/ork 
of Bishop Ramsey the effe c t of such a climate was to direct theological 
p u r s u i t , f o r the most part.aaiay from natural theology to other spheres. 
Not everyone hovrever followed the p r e / a i l i n g trend.Works l i k e Austin 
Farrer's F i n i t e and I n f i n i t e , which appeared i n 19 ' f3 ,anticipate some 
of the post war discussion,as did the publication of E.L.Mascall's 
He Who Is which J with his^earlierjExistence and Ana-logy, represents an 
attempt to reformulate the discussion of natural theology and to pre-
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sent afresh.the traditiona . 1 "proofs" and the analogy of being i n 
such a vfay as to prove relevant to the discussion current i n cont-
emporary philosophical circles.At t h i s point,ho.ever,neither Farrer 
nor Mascall had rea.lly come to terms with the philosophical object-
ions which were being raised by the r i s e of the l o g i c a l P o s i t i v i s t s 
and the Empiricists to any type of metaphysical theology (cf. Malvern, 
Xian Soc ( E l i o t ; ,BofTh. ,GS+H,Hre ,Our Culture ,TH(Maritain) ,.UoG(Marit-
ain).).Farrer howevei^^liad^and vras to present the theological and 
philosophical public with an apologia f o r theism of great o r i g i n a l i t y 
and importance by t r y i n g to impress upon people the fact that the 
problem of speaking about C-od could .not be evaded merely by denying 
the v a l i d i t y of natural theology. 
"There i s a superstition among revglationists"(he wrote 
i n F i n i t e and I n f i n i t e ) "that by declaring, themselves 
. independent of any proof of God by analogy from the 
f i n i t e world,they have escaped the necessity of con-
sidering the analOi^y or r e l a t i o n of the f i n i t e to the 
i n f i n i t e altogether.They are completely mistaken; f o r 
• a l l t h e i r statements about God must be expressed and 
p l a i n l y are expressed i n la.nguage drawn from the f i n i t e 
world....For the revelation h.-=s to be thought about to 
be received.,a.nd ca.n b^-. thought about only by the aid 
of vjords or f i n i t e images,and these aannot signify of 
God unless the appropriate 'mode of s i g n i f i c a t i o n ' fun-
ctions i n our minds."(FI p.2f.). 
The c r i t e r i o n to which Farrer appeals i n his work i s r a t i o n a l i t y , 
not the r a t i o n a l i t y which operates i n the narrow jarameters of 
l o g i c a l deduction,nor logic vforking i n a vacuum,as i t were,but 
rather r a t i o n a l i t y i l l u m i n a t i n g l y at work within the l i f e of f a i t h . 
For Farrer,the r e l i g i o u s thinker does not s t a r t in a world devoid 
of already functioning r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f and experience.He starts 
vdthin a r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n that i s as old as mankind .As Farrer 
notes,many teachers have taugKt things they had not themselves been 
t a u ^ t ; C h r i s t f o r example or Moses i "But the novelty was never r e l -
i g i o n itself.The pioneer began with a hereditary system f o r i n t e r -
p r e t i n g things religiously,and i n so doing found himself driven to 
innovation i n r e l i g i o n -not to an innovation called 'religion'."(FS p.'l). 
Stajiding vdthin the re l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n i n i t s sp e c i f i c a l l y 
Christian form,Farrer i s concerned to test the r a t i o n a l i t y of b e l i e f s 
which he f i r s t inherited and by which he then decided to l i v e .He was 
one of the most remarkable men of his age.He was b r i l l i a n t l y (some-
times a l i t t l e too b r i l l i a n t l y ) o r i g i n a l and his v;ork is marked t h -
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roughout by.the stamp of his personality though the material i s 
never forced or imposed upon.His scholarship is immense,his style 
of v i r i t i n g discloses the mind of a poet, yet his vnritings are never 
obscure or cluttered and they display a remarkable frankness.This 
i s often to be seen in the e x p l i c i t l y dialogue form of his vnritings. 
He has a capacity f o r putting himself i n his c r i t i c s ' shoes and 
pointing out t h e i r d i f f i c u l t i e s . T h i s , i t i s true to say,led to the 
accusation that he was,rather u n f a i r l y at times,conducting both sides 
of an argument himself,yet the capacity to do such merits our admir-
ation.' John Hick i n the forvjard to Reflective Faith said of Farrer, 
"His work i s so far removed from the realm of unanalysed slogans, 
vague metaphors,and a l l forms of sloppiness and imprecision,that to 
read someone of Farrer's stature is to lose any taste f o r the lov:er 
levels of theological v/riting."(RF p.xiv).He rema-ined hoviever f o r the 
vrhole of h i s career,an unfashionable thinker,or at least a non-fashionable 
one,working i n a f i e l d i n which few theologians of his day bothered 
or dared to venture .He vras "a speculative theologian at a time when the 
world at large had l i t t l e use f o r theologians and theologians l i t t l e 
use f o r speculation".Over the years his work grew steadily more unifiod 
and though he must often have been tempted to withdraw from the stra=m 
of contemporary philosophy,this he never did.J.H .Houlden i n the preface 
to The Brink of Mystery says t h i s about him: 
"For theologians....he had a message: not to conceive 
t h e i r task too nar ovily and to l e t a wide range of 
human resources of mind an:t he.art contribute to the 
task of clothing i n words our e>:perience of Goi. 
Farrer b u i l t bridges,easily ruined,often ignored and 
we l l worth keeping i n repair."(op.cit,p.x ). 
And l^arrer himself once wrote that "The grand error about i n t e l l e c t u a l 
. i n t e g r i t y . - ' • i s the b e l i e f that i t can be achieved by 
the l i m i t a t i o n of view; by scrupulous care i n cleaning 
out the mo3,t of a xvovj tovfer or c u l t i v a t i n g the hedges 
round a fool's paraxlise.There can be no i n t e g r i t y about 
refusing to pronounce upon things from which vre avert 
our eyes.InteF3rity of mind i s th3 acknov.'ledgement of 
t r u t h . " (celeb.of Faith p. 15). 
Ife was a man of deep i n t e g r i t y vihp consistently refused to dodge l o g i c a l 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
I t i s not my intention at t h i s point t o give any systematic 
account of any one of the writings of Austin Farrer in any d e t a i l , 
yet i t i s necessary that we consider at least the major of them to 
illaminate the background of his thought insofar as they meet certain 
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needs',propose certain, views and oppose certain contemporary schools 
of thought .His work i s uncluttered by the use of c r i t i c a l appairatus 
and h i s works are almost e n t i r e l y free from footnotes. 
Without doubt the most s i g n i f i c a n t of Farmer's philosophical 
w r i t i n g s was his f i r s t major work,the massive Fi n i t e and I n f i n i t e 
which appeared i n 19^ *3. By 1959»a reviewer i n the Times Literary 
Supplement judged that " i n Dr,Farrer the academic world has one of 
the most in t e r e s t i n g minds of the century" though his work evoked 
l i t t l e sustained examinatlon.lt may be noted i n general,however,that 
there i s a marked difference between, his e a r l i e r and his l a t e r works, 
not only i n subject matter but i n h i s viiole approach to the problems 
of theology.In his a r t i c l e i n Theology on "Austin Farrer's Concept of 
Divine Providence",Brian Hebblethwaite shows how by the 1960's we 
f i n d Farrer s i t t i n g much more loosely t o t r a d i t i o n than before.His 
r e j e c t i o n of b e l i e f i n the Devil i s an example of t h i s (cf.Love A l -
mighty and I l l s Unlimited and Saving B e l i e f ) . I t i s a common feature 
of modern theology that i t has to reckon with the loss of conviction 
carried by t r a d i t i o n a l arguments and has been forced to rethink the 
whole apparatus of theism.Farrer hammers out the problems posed by 
the contemporary climate,scrutinizing with t y p i c a l i n t e g r i t y the ob-
jections and counter-objections,and especially those raised by modem 
science,to the various ways of understanding the r e l a t i o n between God 
and the world. ' 
When F i n i t e and I n f i n i t e appeared,the f i r s t phase of 
l o g i c a l positivism s t i l l occupied a confident position on the English 
philosophical scene and the propositions of metaphysics and theology 
had,as we have seen,been arrogantly dismissed as meaningless nonsense. 
Theology had f o r the most pai*t retreated to a position of the discuss-
ion of the Fathers car of scripture and seldom ventured into the realms 
of philosophical discussion,Those who wrote on questions of theology 
as such tended either to repeat what St.Thomas had once said , i n s i s t -
ing on the p o s s i b i l i t y of inescapable demonstration and wri t i n g with 
a curious a r i d i t y , o r , i f they avoided St.Thomas,they philosophised naively, 
ignoring the problem of the analogical language employed by theology. 
I t was i n t o t h i s s i t u a t i o n t h a t Finite and I n f i n i t e was bom, "the f i r s t 
deliverance of r a t i o n a l theology to be on the one hand rigorous and f u l l y 
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awaxe of the d i f f i c u l t i e s of t a l k i n g about God and on the other hand 
to t a l k about a God who vjas the God of Christian tradition,and not a 
modified I d e a l i s t hangover." (Curtis p .250), 
Farrer faced squarely and with d i s t i n c t i v e wit and c l a r i t y both 
the superstition that t r a d i t i o n a l theology thinks of God as a being 
among other beings,and the equally unfounded assertion that the fun-
ction' of theological arguments i s to f i l l i n the ^ps i n s c i e n t i f i c 
explanations.He vrrote i n the f i r s t edition of Finite and I n f i n i t e ; 
"We iTTOmise also to renounce dramatic order.By t h i s 
is meant an order which produces the rabbit o f t h e i s t i c 
proof from the hat of impartial cosmology.It i s indeed 
t r a d i t i o n a l to use several hats i n d i f f e r e n t l y , i n order, 
one must sup rose,to underline the fact that between hat 
and r a b b i t there i s no connexion whatever.So sometimes 
i t i s impartial cosmology,sometimes impartial ethics, 
sometimes opistemolog/,or even aesthetics that plays 
the p a r t : no doubt one could think of others: We work 
up an insoluble antithesis; we fence round a lacuna of 
explanation; bang goes the p i s t o l , and therefore we say 
God: " (FI p.6). 
We see i n F i n i t e and I n f i n i t e the Scholsstic-Zxistotelian view of 
the absoluteness a.nd independence of God from the world,combined 
witha v o l u n t a r i s t i c metaphysics of f i n i t e substance which,like the 
process- philosophy of hTiitehead, a l l o v r s f o r an '.indetermined future 
at a l l levels of the created world and f o r human c r e a t i v i t y and 
freedom. 
Unlike the process philosophers however,Farrer was unwilling 
to give up the orthodox Christian b e l i e f that f i n i t e existence i s 
r a d i c a l l y contingent upon a transcendent creative agent. Finite and 
I n f i n i t e then,was conceived by Farrer as a defence of Thomist 
theology,the defence of God as actus purus , a s ipsum esse, though 
Farrer indeed saw St.Thomas as remaining too much under the i n f l u -
ence of A r i s t o t l e . 
"He (ie.Farrer) s a w i n aprocess metaphysics of w i l l , 
the philosophy required to express consistently the 
fundamental point of Thomas' natural theology which 
Thomas himself could not express because of his meta-
physics (although he was,to be sure.attempting to say 
things A r i s t o t l e did not and could not say).The p h i l -
osophy of essence and existence requires elaboration 
i n terms of w i l l before the perfect creative agency . 
of God can be philosophically articulated."(Henderson p.7). 
Farrer's philosophy provides such elaboration as Henderson i n the 
above quote sees necessary.His early Thomism sets him i n c o n f l i c t 
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with the divine revelationists.Even in-his l a s t years he expresses 
dis t r u s t fulness towards process theology,In Finite and I n f i n i t e 
Farrer takes as his s t a r t i n g point f o r the development of his theory 
about f i n i t e e n t i t i e s that poitit of reedity which,he argues,we can 
know best and which is therefore able to serve as a clue t o under-
standing the being of a l l things,viz. acts of deliberate w i l l .For 
Farrer as f o r Ramsey,the s t a r t i n g point of the argument i s "the person". 
From the veiy beginning of his philosophical work Farrer understood 
w i l l as ohtologically revelatory i n a way that other things cannot 
be .Despite his focus on w i l l , however, Farrer ^ n e r a l i z e d from his 
analysis of a c t i v i t y i n the w i l l i n Aristotelian-Thomistic language 
of substance,form,essence,act and potency; so that his theology 
expresses what appears to be a scholastic way of thinking.He both 
developed arguments f o r the existence of God i n terms of the essence-
existence and a c t u a l i t y d i s t i n c t i o n and insisted that God himself must 
not be conceived of as being dependent on anything outside himself. 
"God w i l l s and knows a l l he is,as a l l He w i l l s and 
knows.He i s i n r e a l r e l a t i o n to nothing i n that 
nothing outside him conditions his a c t i v i t y 
Those who wish to make theology easier f o r the 
imagination by receding from t h i s position,have 
removed every metaphysical reason f o r believing 
i n God at a l l . " (FI p . 5y ) . ^ 
Gervase Matthew OP i n his review of Flarrer's F i n i t e and i n f i n i t e 
(Rev.Fl(GH).) saw Farrer's study of the nature of Being as having 
an especial significance f o r the future of Thomism i n England,thou^ 
he has much reservation about describing Farrer as a Thomist.Farrer's 
s t y l e , i t i s true, i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y his own,reflecting the concise 
and compressed nature of his thinking and i n such cases i t i s d i f f i c u l t 
t o know whether to label his writings as "Thomist" or whether rather 
t o go only so far as to recognise that the thought behind them i s 
influenced by the thought of t h i s particular thinker. 
Both d i r e c t l y and i n d i r e c t l y by reaction Farrer owes much to the 
work of the l o g i c a l poeitivists.Hebblethwaite suggests that Farrer's 
insistence on the hand of God being perfectly hidden seens to i n v i t e 
Flew's challenge to specify what difference i t makes to speak of God's 
hand a t a l l (Hebblethwaite p.226-?). Farrer,indeed,was very sensitive 
t o the empirical demand,and attempted to specify the experiential grounds 
both f o r thinking t h e i s t i c a l l y and f o r reading nature,history and our 
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om l i v e s i n terms of the outworkings of - a sovereign providence. 
But the experience of grace,. of our own w i l l being caught 
up by God's w i l l working i n us,on which he l a i d so much stress i n 
Faith and Stieculation and which he rega.rded as the clue f o r i n t e r -
p r e t i n g God's action i n nature and hi s t o i y as well i s undeniably 
f o r him private experience,whereas the empirical demand i s s t r i c t -
l y for.public evidence. 
The debt owed to Thomas,is,however,ob-
vious and i t . i s true t o say that F i n i t e and I n f i n i t e marks the 
f i r s t time that a Lnod.ern English philosopher of Ferrer's standing 
had discussed and u t i l i z e d Thomism i n a modem metaphysical system. 
As i n the v7ork of Thomas the place of analogy i n mental concepts 
and the recognition of a fimdamental d i s t i n c t i o n between essence 
and existence help to form the main groundwork of his thought. 
" I t i s clear",(vrrites Gervase Hatthev?) "that a state-
ment of analogjr i n terms of mental concepts can form 
the only bridge betvfeen Thomism and that Logical Pos-
i t i v i s t c r i t i q u e which has shown i t s e l f one of the 
most v i t a l movements of our time." 
He adds by way of warning that 
"any Thomist must part company with the author 
(ie.Austin p^rrer) at the phrase, 'an impoverished 
by-product form of the essence-existence argument 
i s ths.t which substitutes the d i s t i n c t i o n possible-
actual'." (Rev.Fl(Ol) p.3-r). 
Mascall, too, i n the paper v/hich he wrote f o r the B r i t i s h Academy on 
the dauth of Austin Farrer i n 1968,saw the error of la b e l l i n g Farrer 
a Thomist or neo-Thomist i n the s t r i c t sense of the term.Writing on 
Fi n i t e and I n f i n i t e i n the f i r s t part of the paper he ss-js 
"In t h i s he ca,me f o r t h cOs a fir m advocate of natural 
theology agf-inst the fashionable school of the 'rev-
e l a t i o n i s t s ' . Steering ^  middle-course between the 
Hiomists,vrhom he accused of a r i g i d Aristotelianisra 
and of makinp,- untenable claims of ines.-japa.ble demon-
st r a t i o n s , and the 'Moderns' whom he accased, of c/ad-
ing r e a l problems and refusing to philosophize serious-
ly i f at a l l , he set out to rehabilita^te the doctrine 
of Analogy i n modem form." (proc .Brit.Acad .p .^35). 
Against the w i l l of the " r e v e l a t i o n i s t s " such as Karl Earth,to whom 
we have made reference e a r l i e r , t o expunge metaphysics from.theology 
he argues that even our reception and interpretation of supernatural 
revelation involves a natural- or r a t i o m l kno'.dedge of God and that 
t h i s presupposed r a t i o n a l theology; r a t i o n a l theology'id^turn,involves 
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metaphysical elements,notably some notion of substance.Furthermore, 
t h i s involvment serves the interests of piety as much as those of 
logi c "for r e l i g i o n i s based on respect f o r being - f o r God,yes, 
but only because God i s seen to be xmiquely worthy of i t by a mind 
open to respect f o r being i n general."(GV p.66)# 
Fr.Vincent Turner SJ,writing i n Theology on "Mr.Austin Farrer's 
Metaphysics of Theism",is impressed with the way i n vrtiich Farrer, 
p s i r t i c u l a r l y i n his F i n i t e and I n f i n i t e , breaks loose from the usual 
t r a d i t i o a of natural theology outside Scholastic circles,most of 
which has been of a Kantian and I d e a l i s t flavour and has presupposed 
the habitual reduction of the notion of substance to the notion of 
subject.Fr.Turner sees the phenomenalism of today and yesterday " i n 
i t s antimetaphysical agressiveness" as the heir to a t r a d i t i o n which 
i s much older than Hume or Kant but "has been shaped by Kant and dig-
n i f i e d by post-Kantian Idealism i t s e l f - a body of doctrines which on 
closer scrutiny betrays some astonishing resemblances to contemporary 
positivism"(op.cit.p.9 9).Traditional metaphysics then,metaphysics of 
an A r i s t o t e l i a n mould,he sees as "a corpse,not only c o l d , i t would app-
ear but rotten".He sees Austin Farrer as basically empirical in.temper, 
w e l l acquainted with philoso^iiy "Kantian and modem,Cartesiaa and Berk-
eleisin" and while he sees i n Farrer a radical Thomism i t i s not one 
which i s merely exegetical or "a serving of a twice cooked dish". 
While he feels that i t i s perhaps no exaggeratiwi to commend Fin i t e 
and I n f i n i t e as the f i n e s t contribution t o natural theology that has 
appeared f o r many a long year he expresses certain reservations con-
cerning i t s construction and presentation which w i l l be dealt with 
when l a t e r we come to examine the work i n greater d e t a i l . 
In h i s Twentieth Century Religious Thought, John MacQuarrie i n 
hi s chapter on Neo-Thomism and Roman Catholic Theology shows none of the 
reservation of either Gervase Matthew or Father Turner in i d e n t i f y i n g 
the name of Austin Farrer with the Neo-Thomists.His c r i t e r i o n f o r the 
name of Neo-Thomist i s the use of ideas inherited from the t h o u ^ t of 
St.Thomas and Scholastic philosophy,many of which,as he observes,derive 
u l t i m a t e l y from Aristotle.He believed i t t o have at i t s disposal an 
ext r a o r d i n a r i l y subtle and adaptable conceptual framework.lt distinguishes 
between ^ act" and "actuality" and 'potency" or " p o t e n t i a l i t y " and, with the 
exception of God who is "pure act" (actus purus) everything i s made up 
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of both act and potency. Among other elements in the heritage which 
neo-Thomisra has received are the doctrine of causes,the proofs f o r 
the existence of God and the doctrine of analogy along with the under-
standing t h a t philosophy does not contradict the revealed truths of 
theology but i s autonomous i n i t s own sphere.Reason,correctly applied, 
i t i s believed, w i l l lead to results which support the assertions of 
rev e l a t i o n . 
These ideas are not,of course,simply reassertai by neo-Thomism. 
I t s task i s rather to apply them anew t o the problems of our own time. 
These ideas f i n d t h e i r renewed application i n the works of both Ian 
Ramsey and of Austin Farrer,to d i f f e r i n g degrees and i n d i f f e r i n g ways 
(cf.H-D Chenu,Is Theolopy a Science?).Neo-Thomism,then,recognises the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of metaphysics and holds that the business of philosophy 
i s synthesis as well as analysis. 
In chapter 7 of h i s Existence and Analogy,which discusses Farrer's 
F i n i t e and I n f i n i t e and D.M.Emmet's The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking, 
Mascall quotes Professor A.E.Taylor's comment (JTS,vol.XLV,l9tf3,p.239, 
c i t e d EA Mascall p. 159) that Dr.Farrer "shows himself to be t h o r o u ^ l y 
steeped i n Thomism" and "indeed h i s argument i s couched a l l t h r o u ^ i n 
Thomist technical language....".The main reason f o r t h i s he sees as the 
simple one,that i t i s appropriate t o discuss the issues of r a t i o n a l 
theology,so f a r as i s possible,in the t r a d i t i o n a l language in which i t 
has been h i s t o r i c a l l y delivered to us,yet he i s insistent that Farrer 
i s "no b l i n d devotee of Thomist formulae". We may note,too,how radiceilly 
e x i s t e n t i a l is Farrer's whole attitude,Fr.Vincent Turner sees t h i s as 
one of i t s chief merits.Dr.Farrer's book,he writes : 
" i s both extremely t r a d i t i o n a l and extremely 'philosophical' 
precisely because i t s metaphysics i s through and through 
an e x i s t e n t i a l metaphysics.Herein,perhaps,lies i t s greatest 
o r i g i n a l i t y . F o r with a wealth of fresh insights the old 
problems of analogy and the cosmological schema are t h o u ^ t 
out aga.in i n the context of the immanent a c t i v i t y of f i n i t e 
selves." ( p p . c i t . p.lO^l)* 
Dr.Mascall agrees. "In l i n e with t h i s fundamental existentialism,is 
Dr.Parrer's conviction t h a t any f i n i t e whatever,if we know how to look 
a t it,declares the existence of God."(EA p . l68) (cf.Ramsey's phrase 
t h a t the universe and i n par t i c u l a r the world "speaks the cosmic lang-
uage of God" and the development of t h i s i n RL..)» 
Commenting on the c e n t i a l i t y to Faxrer's argument f o r r a t i o n a l 
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theology of the d i s t i n c t i o n of essence and existence i n a l l f i n i t e 
beings,Mascall further notes that the function of the arguments de-
rived from the part i c u l a r kind of f i n i t e being which i s man (the 
anthropological arguments) is not ultimately t o c a l l our attention 
t o characteristics which are pbssesed by man alone among f i n i t e 
beings.but,by putting before us the type of f i n i t e being with vfhich 
we are most f a m i l i a r (namely ourselves)*to c a l l our attention to a 
universal character of f i n i t e beings as such .He further observes that 
Dr.Farrer seems to be asserting that we subjectively experience our 
ovm dependence and then, v a l i d l y a f f i r m i t of f i n i t e being as a whole. 
(Mascall himself would suggest that we rather objectively apprehend 
dependence i n a l l the f i n i t e beings which we perceive and then tirrn 
to ourselves i n order to experience i t subjectively.) "The charac-
ter of deprndence can v a l i d l y be affirmed of f i n i t e being as a whole, 
although i t i s only as i t occurs i n ourselves that vie can learn what 
dependence 'feels like'."(E/i p.169) says Mascall. Compare t h i s with 
Farrer's, "There i s no question of demonstrating God from the creat-
ures by a pure inference.God,being a unique existent,must be appre-
hended i f he i s to be kno>m at all.But....he must be apprehended i n 
the cosmological r e l a t i o n (that i s , h i s r e l a t i o n to the f i n i t e world) 
and not i n abstraction from i t . " (FI p .^5)» 
Donald MacKinnon in his pa.per f o r the Malvern Conference of 19^1 
on*Revelation and Social Justice*wrote, "The mystery of man's being 
i s seen i n his freedom and i t s obverse,the utterness of his dependence 
on grace.VJithout grace man is not man." (Malvern p.'97).We shall see as 
time goes on that herein i s a major difference betvreen the work of Ian 
Ramsey a-nd that of Austin Farrer.In the vrritings of the former there 
i s l i t t l e or no mention of the concept of grace while,for the l a t t e r , 
though indeed he never made i t the sole basis f o r seeing nature and 
history as the sphere of providential action,the concept i s of central 
importance and the believer's experience of grace i s stressed.This di s -
t i n c t i o n ' d l l become more apparent vjhen vfe come to examine the works of 
Farrer i n more specific d e t a i l . I n his a r t i c l e "Providence and Divine 
Action", Brian Hebblethwaite-shows how,for Farrer, the God-world r e l -
ation and the God-miin r e l a t i o n are constant but that this constancy i s 
best conceived as the-constancy of consistent action in the execution 
both of an overall purpose for the world and of particular purposes fo r 
in d i v i d u a l l i v e s within it.The evolution of the cosmos,the developing 
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history of man and of Isra e l i n particular,the l i f e of Jesus and 
our own lives,are a l l . t o be seen as developing,dynamic a f f a i r s , 
t e l e o l o g i c a l l y ordered and i t i s they that are the f i e l d of the ; 
hidden hand of God making them make themselves,if Farrer's theory 
of double agency i s right.What i s more,each active element in the 
whole complex story,from the most fundamental particle t o human 
beings and human history i s not only t o be seen as being held i n 
being by the creative .act of God,but also furthered on his m.y and 
woven i n t o the whole providential pattern by the hidden divine hand. 
Thisis not, however,totB .seen as a . one-sided personal r e l a t i o n f o r 
there comes a point when the believer .taken up into God's w i l l , f i n d s 
himself responding to grace.Nor i s i t entirely an act on the side of 
the believer, f o r the human response i t s e l f i s t o be seen as God's 
action i n us. 
l i ^ r r e r ' s whole theology i s a theology of action and w i l l , a c t i o n 
(human action,that i s ) being the prime analogy f o r our conception'of 
the divine agency which we experience i n grace and discern i n nature 
and history as r e a l i z i n g specific ends,not j u s t waiting for some over-
a l l purposivenesG to be discerned.We might compare th i s with I.T.Ramsey's 
Models f o r Divine A c t i v i t y , ' Hebblethwaite c r i t i c i s e s Ramsey's t r e a t -
ment of t h i s idea f o r "collapsing a l l t a l k of God into his favourite 
formula of 'models and q u a l i f i e r s ' He .continues, "Realizing that 
the c r u c i a l models were models f o r divine a c t i v i t y he had to say that 
a c t i v i t y was a univocal notion since the conception of analogy had got 
sv;allovjed up by that of model.We might say that Ramsey's heart vras i n 
the r i g h t place,but that his theory of reli g i o u s language vjas inadequ?.te 
to the task of bringing out the necessary d i s t i n c t i o n s . " (P+DA,.?28-9). 
Every one, even the most devoted Barthian v/ho wishes to convey any sense 
at a l l must of necessity use the terms of our knowled^ of the world, 
ourselves and our nature and history,but the metaphysician, " i f he must 
use analogy t o describe f i n i t e experiences,he can,like the poet,know 
both h i s mystery and his analogy and out of his knoviledge f i n d new 
analogies t o correct his f i r s t choice.The theologian v.Titing of God's 
p a r t i c u l a r a c t i v i t y uses vihat words he can f i n d i n scripture or makes 
f o r himself." (Curtis v.Z^k). For ferrer.as Ourtis points out,the crux 
of how the theologian t r u s t s his analogies depends on his b e l i e f in 
the 7_'esurrection and on those stories of the empty tomb which anchor 
our t a l k of the resurrection t o the empirical world.and which,as f o r 
- 77 -
the incarnation.distinguishes images from platonizing myth- "For 
i f the images do not and did not mea-n in the world of flesh,what 
i s l e f t but piety and morals." (Curtis p.255). 
As we read more of Farrer's work,we can see that Farrer clearly 
intends t o include himself i n the retreat from absolutism.We f i n d 
i n the preface to Faith and Speculation that by I967 he was engaged 
i n a purgation of "the old A r i s t o t e l i a n leaven from the voluntarist 
metaphysics I sketched so many years ago i n Finite and Infinite"(FS p.v) 
and else-rthere he described Faith and Speculation as containing, 
"that reform of the theology proper of Finite ?.nd I n f i n i t e , from 
an actus purus to a causa sui formulation...."(Letter from Farrer, 
Sept.8,1966,cited PAof ,G ). Scholastic Aristotelianism made the mis-
take of l i m i t i n g the l i f e of God to a l i f e within himself.Process 
theology makes the opposite mistake of l i m i t i n g the l i f e of God to 
his l i f e i n r e l a t i o n t o the world.F'arrer,in opposition to both,argues 
that God i s an absolutely free and creative agent 
and that we cannot,therefore,deny that he has a l i f e 
apart from and independent of the world he has created.On the other 
hand,such a perfect agent must be able w i l f u l l y t o condescend to create 
a world and to relate himself to the world he creates (cf. 'Philosophical 
Reflections on Creation" O.R.Jones,pp.101-133,229-260 i n Science and 
Religion, I.G.Barbour,London:SGM, 1-968). Thus Farrer's solution to the 
problem of the r e l a t i o n of God to the world is to say that God lives 
both apart from and i n r e l a t i o n to his creatures.And insofar as God 
l i v e s in r e l a t i o n to his creatures,he l i m i t s his foreknowledge and 
control,allowing them to act f r e e l y and creatively and responding to 
t h e i r actions in an e f f o r t to help them a t t a i n t h e i r hi^best good,even 
o f f e f i n g himself up as a s a c r i f i c e i n order to recreate them.to a new 
l i f e . F a r r e r does not so much re j e c t process theology as c r i t i c a l l y 
adapt i t to the c h i r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y Christian vfay of thinking. 
As Farrer began to focus d i r e c t l y on issues involving the r e l -
ation of God to the world we can see how he began to l e t his volunt-
a r i s t metaphysics shape his theological conclusions rp-ther than simply 
support the t r a d i t i o n a l views ( c f . f i n a l chapter of Freedom of the 'Vill 
and more c l e a r l y i n his theodicy Love A l m i ^ t y and I l l s Unlimited,- his 
apologetic work Saving Belief and i n the very short A Science of God?) 
In Far2rer then,v/e f i n d from the outset the idea of a God who i s a l t o -
gether free and who i n t h i s freedom con choose to create a world in 
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which images of his own freedom (human persons) are allowed to 
develop and i n r e l a t i o n to whose a c t i v i t y he adjusts his own l i f e 
and upon v/hom he makes his actions wait. In Love Almighty and I l l s 
Unlimited f o r example,he vvrestles with the problems of providence 
and evil.Here f ^ r r e r argues that i f there i s to be a world i n which 
certain unique goods are possible,it must be such as to include 
" l i m i t l e s s accident*'or "uncalculated e f f e c t " and that God i n cre-
a t i n g such a world must l e t i t be i t s e l f and act to draw "some good 
out of every accident" (op.cit .164). In A Science of God? he says t ; 
"God thinks things as they are and designs them to 
go the i-ay they go.He does not impose an order ag-
ainst the grain of things; he makes them follow 
t h e i r own bent and work out the world by being them-
selves. I t is no matter of regret to God that the • 
universe i s not a piece of streamlined engineering. 
I t i s meant to be what i t i s - a f r e e - f o r - a l l of 
self-moving forces,each being i t s e l f with a l l i t s 
mi-ght/and yet (Wonder of wonders.') by t h e i r free 
interaction s e t t l i n g into the balanced systems v;e 
know and in t o the complexities whereby we exist."(op.cit.P«76). 
VJhat we f i n d here i s the gentle persuasion of nature rather than the 
fo r c i n g of things.Concern with the problem of providence led Farrer 
to speak of God as a being with whose w i l l the events of the world 
and the actions of men sometimes do and sometimes do not conform. 
So begins the v o l u n t a r i s t i c reform of his theology t o vfhich the meta-
physics of F i n i t e and I n f i n i t e and Th^ Freedom of the Wil l were well 
suited.Here i s the movement from actus purus t o causa sui described 
e a r l i e r . " I make no concession",vjrote Farrer i n a l e t t e r on 24 March 
1966, "to those viho wish to r e l a t i v i z e God or to qualify his prior 
a c t u a l i t y . " In phrases such as t h i s one may perhaps see the confirm-
ation of the usual interpretation 01 his e a r l i e r thought,as indeed 
he himself sa>f i t , as defending the Thomist position.In his l a t e r 
work v/here he suggests that God is to be thoug^it of as the primary 
and perfect case of free and creative w i l l , i s to be seen the change 
which he described i n the preface to Faith and Speculation as the 
"purgation of the old A r i s t o t e l i a n leaven."(op.cit.p.v 
Thus we can see how Farrer indeed steers the middle course 
between the divine r e l a t i v i s t s .positing a r e s t r i c t i o n of pov;er in 
God by recognizing no l i f e of his beyond his r e l a t i o n to the world, 
and the Scholastic Absolutists,positing a r e s t r i c t i o n of power in 
God by making God incapable of condescending to a l i f e in r e l a t i o n 
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t o the world.His fundamental metaphysical principle indeed i s esse 
est operari.(FI p.21). 
In the preface t o his book God- the Problem, Gordon Kaufman 
writes, "Althou[-:h the notion of God as agent seems presupposed by 
most contemporary theologia-ns AiEtin Farrer has been almost 
alone i n t r y i n g to specify carefully and consistently ju s t what 
t h i s might be understood to mean." _ 
Farrer's response to the contemporary challenge reflects both the 
continuity and change within recent B r i t i s h philosophy .His v/ritings 
are an attempt to meet his c r i t i c s at the point of t h e i r logical 
i n t e r e s t s without surrendering the tenets of his ovm f a i t h and b e l i e f , 
thougb indeed there i s always to be seen the central c o n f l i c t between 
the r e s t r i c t i o n cf philosophy to analysis and Farrer's insistence 
that i t also consists i n synthesis.. 
His refusal to exclude metaphysics from philosophy is based 
neither upon the impossibility of such a venture nor upon the d i f f -
i c u l t i e s posed by the v e r i f i c a t i o n principle but rather marks an 
attempt t o do j u s t i c e 'to realities,such as the i n t e g r i t y and freedom 
of the s e l f . He has what he c a l l s "an appetite for r e a l being" ( c f . 
FI p.701,GV chap.^,et a l . ) . Not that Farrer ever swallowed the meta-
physical p i l l whole.As vre have seen,along with the Analysts he rejects 
certain meanings of metaphysics and denies that i t s method i s solely 
deductive,His attempt to include certain descriptive and explanatory 
functions within philosophy i s f a r from an indiscriminate defence of 
metaphysics.The analysis of language vfhich te undertakes i s far from 
the quest f o r an ideal language of the formalist wing of the analytic 
movement but should rather be seen as lending support to his view 
that philosophical theology is explicative i n function and i t comports 
with his t r a d i t i o n a l i s m i n r e l i g i o n . 
His work throu^diout displays t h i s tension of collaboration and 
dissent.In the early l9'+0's we f i n d Farrer in his Finite and I n f i n i t e 
engaged with the l o g i c a l positivism of Ayer's Language,Truth and Logic. 
By the early I950's,in A Midwinter Dream (University; A Journal of En-
quiry , v o l . I , pp.86-9O reprinted as "A Theologian's Point of View",The 
Socratic,n0.5,1952,pp.35-^ ; abridged version reprinted as "Theology 
and Philosophy",RF,pp.1-4) for example,he i s engaged in a dialogue 
which both shovrs his interest in the extension of religious language 
(ie.the general acceptance of the propriety of more types of statements 
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than the t r a d i t i o n a l two - " f a c t u a l " and 'analytic*, and >rfiiGh inc-
ludes allusions to Wisdom's garden and to Braithwaite's adoption of 
certain a t t i t u d e s ( p r i n c i p a l l y the agapeistic). By I938 The Freedom 
of the W i l l can be seen as e x p l i c i t l y p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the renascence 
of the philosophy of mind of the l a t e 1930's. Indeed Ryle's c r i t i q u e 
of Descartes helped Farrer,as also i t helped Ian Ramsey,to further 
his own exploration of the mind-body problem i n method as well as 
content (cf,FW pp.13-19). Above a l l , these bools and t h e i r successors 
of the 1960*8 show him appropriating more than ever the "therapeutic" 
function of langua^ analysis established by Wittgenstein.His t r e a t -
ment of some of the problems of freedom and e v i l , f o r example,show 
this,whereby he dissolves the problem by correcting misunderstanding 
i n the logic of our language about it.Indeed as Hebblethwaite i n his 
a r t i c l e on Farrer's concept of divine providence says: 
" the r e l a t i v e l y small books which Farrer published 
i n the 1960*s (Love A l m i ^ t y and I l l s Unlimited. Saving 
B e l i e f , A Science of God? and Faith and Speculation! 
contain,among other things,the most direct,sustained, 
and searching treatment of the problems of divine prov-
idence that modem theology has to offe r , t h a t problem 
i t s e l f being the most perplexing as well as the central 
. problem of Christian Theism." (Hebblethwaite p.341), 
He points out how Farrer was much too good a theologian simply to go 
along with fashionable trends,though he notes that i t i s interesting 
t o see that i n Farrer's l a t e r works questions are raised and answered 
much more d i r e c t l y than i n the e a r l i e r ones i n that much less i s allow-
ed t o pass t h r o u ^ h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l scrutiny unscathed.We f i n d both 
rigour and realism i n his approach as he examines both objection and 
counlfer-objection.Above a l l , a 3 we have noted,Farrer achieves an ever 
more perceptive awareness of the challenges put to Christian theicm 
by the methods and discoveries of modem science. 
We have concentrated almost t o t a l l y so far on Farrer's work i n 
the realm of philosophy but i n f a c t Farrer wrote extensively i n a 
f i e l d that was to exert a fascination over him for the whole of his 
life,namely t h a t of b i b l i c a l exegesis.In t h i s he displayed an imag-
i n a t i v e ingenuity which provoked at one and the same time both admir-
ation and apprehension.The principle that governed his work in exegesis 
was that of typology,according t o vrtiich the t h o u ^ t and the w r i t i n g of 
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the authors of the New Testament was dominated,whether consciously 
or unconsciously by the assumption that the words and deeds of Jesus 
were the outworking of the great Old Testament themes .This i s not to 
suggest that Farrer,like the contempora.ry scholars of the "deraythol-
ogizing" school, thought that the gospels were pieces of imaginative 
w r i t i n g with l i t t l e r e l i a b l e h i s t o r i c a l basis; on the contrary,for 
Farrer,as we have seen,God was the ultimate ground of history. Fund-
amental to Farrer's b i b l i c a l exegesis,as we s h a l l see i n discussing 
i t more closely elsewhere ,v/as the conviction found throughout his 
writings,that divine t r u t h i s f a r more adequately expressed thr-^-ugh 
images than through concepts.Farrer never ultimately worked out in 
d e t a i l an epistemology of the image,parallel to the many epistemologies 
of the concept which philosophers have devised; the nearest that he 
came to t h i s was in points of his Bampton lectures of 19^8 e n t i t l e d 
The Glass of Vision vrhich he described as an attempt to bring t o -
gether his thou.iits on three things - the sense of metaphysical p h i l -
osophy,the sense of s c r i p t u r a l revelation,and the sense of poetry. 
He was f a r more interested to show hoi-; images worked than i n con-
s t r u c t i n g any formal theory about them. 
We can,and shall,see how immense was the contribution of Farrer 
t o the i n t e l l e c t u a l l i f e of Oxford.The excessively l i n g u i s t i c bisis 
of English philosophy and the excessively sceptical na.ture of the 
German New Testament c r i t i c s f a i l e d to throw him o f f balance.lt i s 
iro n i c to think that descriptive netaphysics,constructed on our actual 
or active use of language,vas being attempted by Farrer years before 
the s t r i c t u r e s of Positivism were l i f t e d i n England by the work of 
men such as Hampshire and Stravison and i t i s a cause of regret that 
the work of Austin Farrer was so much neglected during his l i f e t i m e 
and indeed f o r too many years a f t e r his death. A comment in a l e t t e r 
by Austin Farrer to E.H .Henderson,dated 24th.March l966,two years 
before h i s death may serve as a f i t t i n g conclusion t o t h i s general 
appraisal of his work.He vnrote; 
"You ask about ray position i n the philosophical world. 
I 3-m disregarded because I am an orthcx3.ox professional 
t h e o l o g i 3 j i,and because I do not keep up with the p h i l -
osophical game.I do not attend philosophical conferences. 
I d o n o t write f o r the philosophical periodicals; i f any-
one bothers to c r i t i c i s e me I don't answer them.And vfhy? 
My attention is hopelessly d i s t r a c t e d . I am interested i n 
scripture,especially the gospt-ls.I have t h i s college,of 
which I am what you'd c a l l president.I am also i n charge 
of the-chapel; I am an expositer of doctrine i n our t e r r i b l y 
weak Church and I do what I can by preaching and pious 
working to crumble the bread of Truth f o r the people." - -
CHAFrER V 
The vrritings of tine late Dr.Ferrer constitute a r e f l e c t i o n of both 
the continuity of,and the changes which have been taking place with-
in,recent B r i t i s h philosophical theology.Throu^out these changes he 
sought to meet those who would consider seriously his work^at t h e i r 
point of interest.He himself always remained f i r m l y i n control of 
h i s subject matter and positive i n the defence of what he believed 
t o be the case.For e>3.mple,as v.'e have seen,Karl Barth's work largely 
contributed to the climate i n which theological pursuit in England 
was turned away from natural theology to other spheres.lt was against 
Barth that Austin Farrer directed c r i t i c i s m i n a review of Barth's 
Doctrine of the Word of Gal and God i n Action i n Theology in I936 
(Theol.,vols.32-3,1936) ,In the f i r s t place he c r i t -
icized Barth's method and l o g i c , accusing him of .putting forward 
a nonsensical theory that paradox i s the i n t r i n s i c nature of 
the divine Word ( op,cit,p,370)»In the second place he accuses him 
of being a dogiaatist only in his own sense - i n fencing an a.rea fo r 
the free operation of the Word - and he virites 1 
"An instructive example is his treatment of freedom 
in mail's response to grace.He refuses a l l theories 
• v;hich attempt to co-ordinate man's v j i l l and God's 
and while asserting the absolute r e a l i t y of man's 
free act,simply appends a series of negations.It i s 
a unique case of freedom vfhich does not presuppose 
a previous inborn capacity; a r e a l self-determination, 
yet not so as to exclude an absolute higher determin-
a t i o n by God " (. op.cit,p>371) 
Fiirther^Farrer l a i d great stress on the notion of God's providence. 
This i s a concept almost en t i r e l y ...absent from the works of Ian Ramsey 
and constitutes one of the most major differences i n t h e i r thought, 
(cf .Reiflarks in Faith .and Logic and other essays on providence v) 
For Farrer, " in provid.enc-e God i s supposed to act in and through 
natural agencies to br i n g about his purpos.s and s p e c i f i c a l l y not in 
gaps between them."(P+DA p.244). I t i s about providence i n t h i s sense 
that Austin Farrer virote,though c h i e f l y i n his l a t e r vforks, "about 
what God can and does do i n and through his creatures .without forc-
ing them or faking the natural story." ( ibid.2'1-4). Indeed Farrer 
sugge.sted that the whole web of creaturely events i s to be construed 
as pl i a b l e or f l e x i b l e to the providential hand of God. Moreover, 
t h i s action in nature and history becomes manifest,not at part-
i c u l a r points i n the natuici.l story.but when we so look at nature and 
history,not j u s t when we r e f l e c t on the believer's~ o-,m s e l f under-
standing. So Farrer distinguished his position from that of Barth i n ' 
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that f o r him the conception of the Word suffers analysis into two 
elements - language which does not represent but indicates; and the 
experienced action of God upon us,which does not represent but i s , 
and only indicates insofar as i t s incomplete,derivative and antic-
ipatory character points beyond i t s e l f to i t s source .Despite the 
protestations of Barth,the key f o r Farrer i s experience: language 
ulti m a t e l y does not represent but only points to the place where 
God v d l l s to act upon us,either backwards to v4iat he has done or 
forwards t o what he w i l l d o , f i n a l l y , i n the resurrection.He expresses 
si m i l a r views i n his review of Melville Chaning Pearce's An Essay i n 
the Christian Co-ordination of Contraries (CQR, vols. 123-4,pp.328-30.) 
where he w r i t e s j "....we do not experiaice God.existentially or 
otherwise,we experience that i n which the other world i s hidden 
and implied,'the c r i b i n which Christ l i e s ' . " (cf.Ramsey's t a l k , 
discussed above,of the universe t a l k i n g "the cosmic language of God".) 
Thus we can see that f o r Farrer as f o r Ramsey the nature of the 
material world i s essentially parabolic. 
Both Farrer and Ramsey agree that the questions of metaphysics, 
and indeed of theology,are r e a l questions.In his review of Paul Ortegat's, 
Philosophie de la Religion (JTS,vol.4o,pp. 100-1.) Farrer contends that 
the questions of metaphysics are real questions insofar as metaphysics 
i s the science of that which i s absolute and he states his b e l i e f 
t h a t "the true metaphysics can be demonstrated i n two ways,positively-
and d i a l e c t i c a l l y t positively through the evidence of i t s own p r i n -
ciples and the coherence of i t s own system,dialectically by victorious 
confrontation with r i v a l doctrines."(op.cit.p.100 ), 
Alongside the doctrine of providence runs another doctrine which, 
l i k e that of providence,though i t occupies a central position i n the 
works of Dr.Farrer,is again almost e n t i r e l y absent from the writings 
of Ian Ramsey.This i s the doctrine of grace and i t constitutes as we have 
already observed,a second major difference between the works of Ramsey and 
Fairrer.In his essay i n The parish Communion on "Eucharist and Church i n 
the New Testament" he wrotes 
"Since,then,the whole r e a l i t y of the redeemed society resides 
i n Christ,who i s both i t s focus,its cause and i t s highest archetype, 
and who by the predestinating grace of God,must spread abroad his 
being ,to embrace a l l beings within it,we shall see what the mystical 
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i d e n t i f i c a t i o n means." (op.cit.p.83). Farrer's work remains grounded 
i n the natural order.He continued i n the same essay 1 
"To embrace l i f e and t o suffer death are not two things, 
but one and the same .We are i n a world where the Resurr-
ection l i f e can be possessed only by anticipation,only 
i n the s p i r i t and i n such a nanner that the old l i f e of 
the f l e s h continues alongside of i t and i n s t r i f e a ^ i n s t 
it,Even,perhaps.were we sinless as our Lord,our fleshly 
being would continue to make inordinate claims,even t h o u ^ 
l i k e him we never conceded them; and so we should s t i l l 
f i n d the death pains of the flesh to be the continual 
growing pains of the S p i r i t . " (op.cit.p.9I) 
The important t h i n g remains,however,that the believer's l i f e and the 
natural order are to be interpreted i n the l i ^ t of the grace and 
pro v i d e n t i a l agency of God.Not only can min co-operate with the cre-
ative w i l l of God,and.it may be noted,thereby discern God's a c t i v i t y 
i n the process,but,Farrer would suggest,in t h i s purposive providential 
agency he sees that i t works i j i the natural order and not in the ep,ps 
i n i t . 
Thus we have seen two concepts essential to the t h o u ^ t of Dr.Farrer, 
those of providence and grace,of which,in the order of knowing,grace 
takes ths primary position.Their c e n t r a l i t y i n Farrer and t h e i r almost 
t o t a l absence i n Ramsey r e f l e c t s vrell. the difference between the mind 
of the poet and that of the s c i e n t i s t . 
In 1939 i n 'The Theology of Morals" Farrer wrote 1 "The g i f t s of. 
grsice recover to us the pattem of the true nature and enable us to 
develop i t s capacity beyond what nature can." (op.cit.p.I78). But where 
and how,asks Farrer,do we i n f k c t f i n d the moral t r u t h that springs 
from these " g i f t s of grace"? To follow scripture alone is,he believes, 
i n s u f f i c i e n t , w h i l e to follow the dictates of conscience alone i s t o 
desert h i s t o r i c a l revelation and to be each his own Moses.Ultimately 
then,he believes th3.t i f we believe t h a t grace restores and perfects 
nature,we must also hold that Christ restores and perfects natural 
moral "sense" or "reason".(cf,I.T.Ramsey,"The Rehabilitation of Nat-
u r a l Law" i n Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy . SGM Press; 
London I966). - . 
We f i n d once again the customary rooting of the discussion i n the 
f i n i t e world i n Farrer's essay on "The Christian Doctrine of Man" i n 
the second volume of The Christian Understanding of Man where Farrer 
writes* 
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"Words about our f i n a l consumnatlon or the end 
would bear no sense unless they bore analogy to present experience. 
And so the actual reception of grace,as being a foretaste of our end, 
i s our very key to the conception of i t , " ( X i a n Doct.of Man p .75)» 
Thus the Christian l i f e carries vdth i t a sense of being in via 
(cf.J.I'iaritain A-pproaches to God ,Allen & Unwin 1955)-Ii^ short, 
"....the Christian doctrine of man's end and consumipation i t s e l f , im-
plies that the creator has assigned to man a determinate nature which 
can be perfectly f u l f i l l e d but not passed beyond."(Xian Doct.of Kan p.76), 
This i s not to suggest that the present pattern of our nature i s un-
alterable since grace,Farrerviould suggest,-ray "perform upon us marvels 
that vre cannot conceive,but s t i l l i n perfecting,not superseding our 
nature - a nature which is a datum for grace and imposes a measure on 
what gr?~ce may e f f e c t : just vjhat measure we cannot know." (ibid.p.75 )• 
Man,apart from revela-tion and grace,is s t i l l m".n,and the 
creature of; God,and,though he may be corrupt i n his s p i r i t u a l nature, 
he has s t i l l the povjer of r e f l e c t i n g on his true nature and obtaining 
some impression of the j ^ t t e m of . i t intended by God.He may not even 
.,.te.J?>'a?"e,Farrer v.'ould say, t h a t God is,but that does not prevent his hav-
ing some sense of a goal set tefore him, " because man as a s p i r i t -
ual being i s essentially an aspirantrS^nd an aspirant must have an object 
for his aspiration; i n being aware of himself i n any wise,man i s 
aware,hovjever confusedly,of a pattern of true nature." (ibid.p . 7 o ) . 
Once again we can draw no l i n e that man's unaided moral r e f l e c -
t i o n i s incapable of passing since, "there i s no single moral convic-
t i o n t h a t nature m^ y not arrive at f o r herself,so long as we are speak-
ing of ma-n's ideal for his own l i f e on earth,or for his relations with 
his nei^bour." (.ibid.p..78 ). (cf .K.E.Kirk, Vision of Gody 
Kirk suggests t h a t only i n disinterested contemplation does man f i n d 
the solution t o h i s e t h i c a l problems.C:^ also F.V?.Sill is tone,The Christ-
ian Understanding of Atonejnent,chap.VIII^Ibe Image of Perfect integration" 
pp.310-353 2-nd. Farrer's b e l i e f i n heaven in'Heaven and Hell"(Savini^ Belief 
chap.VI) - the laying of ourselves open to be l a i d hold of by the ob-
jects of our b e l i e f ) 
I t is,Farrer would suggest,the paradox of our humn existence th',t 
mn thus becomes an object t o himself (cf, I .T .Ramsey's "The Systematic 
Elusiveness of ' I ' . " ) . . i t i s 
the mystery of the w i l l that he i s thus concerned with r e a l i s i n g what 
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he i s ; "that man's v d l l i s free - that i t i s a v ; i l l i n fact,and not 
something else - i s cer t a i n l y Christian doctrine,however many views 
have "been taken by Christians about the scope of his. freedom " 
(Xian Doct.of nan p.88). 
Ferrer does not necessa.rily sug^st an arbitrary freedom of choice, 
t h a t man i s able t o w i l l anything that could ever come into his head, 
but yiha.t we must assert,he would say, i s that man has freedom of e f f o r t 
and here he i s in entire agreement with Ian Eaneey.It is Farrer's con-
tention that a man can recognise an aspiration as the highest he has, 
either absolutely, or ths highest possible i n any given set of circum-
stances and can recognise t h i s only by e f f o r t on his part.Herein l i e s 
man's freedom,v/hether or not he chooses to make the e f f o r t and again 
i n whether he chooses to bring his action into l i n e with his aspirat-
ion.Man's freedom may indeed be marred in part by impediments of one 
kind or another (cf. his chapter on Adam and Lucifer i n Love Almighty 
and I l l s Unlimited) but Farrer suggests that i t i s enough to assert 
that he has some freedom,however narrow i t s scope. 
In one of his most " f c c m a l i s t i c " discussions (Met.of Morals)i't "^ -s 
Kant's contention that i f a man were t o recognise a h i ^ e s t good as 
the highest he must already be able t o discriminate the pattern by 
reason.The merit of Kant's position- i s that i t gives credit t o nature 
(cf. Philosophy, vol.50,1975,p. 135f .L-.M.MacKinnon's a r t i c l e on "Kant's 
Philosophy of Religion"). Farrer suggests that the faculty of judge-
ment i s a faculty of recognising which is the better of two or more 
objects: "In order t o acknowledge Hamlet as the best of plays I do not 
need an innate taowledge of Hamlet but only a power of comparing i t 
with other works."(Xian Doct.of Kan p.90). 
The same i s true of the recognition of. true good-.i-.Tienever we 
encounter i t we Icna-/ i t to be superior to a l l else that v,'e know. 
This does not however apply to the notion of the highest good,since 
good can only be apprehended as such with the co-operation of desire 
and since ours i s so warped as to render us incapable of recognising 
i t , t h e presentation of the good objectively i s only possible i f i t i s 
accom|B.nied by the subjective correction of aspiration and t h i s i s 
the work of the Holy S p i r i t . A l l I need is to be a mind i n order that 
there may be something there for revelation to illumine and a desire 
and a : ^ i l l to be clothed with the love of God shed abroad i n the hee,rt. 
Here we see the classical Augustinian tension -memoria ,inteli£entia,vol-
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unt'as. (cf. ;\nselm,Proslogion). The freedom of the fa c u l t i e s prior 
to the action of grace need only be therefore that they exist,not 
such that they are capable of responding to God apart from God's 
enabling action. 
The co-operation with God,thou^, which takes place is not, 
l e t i t be understood,that of abstract i n t e l l e c t alone but the co-
operation of the whole self and thus man becomes rather than merely 
possesses r a t i o n a l i t y . "God i n v?illing h i s own existence",vrrites 
Farrer, " w i l l s absolute good.Man i s the image of God insofer as he 
both has a w i l l and w i l l s the supreme good according to his a b i l i t y . " 
(xian Doct.of Man p.91) or^ as he puts i t i n his review of G.Santa-
yana's The Realm of the S p i r i t , " . . . . i n the Christian view,will i s 
the act of the S p i r i t , o r conscious reason,penetrating as i t were the 
animal soul and d i r e c t i n g the humn machine- by voluntary choice." 
(op.cit.p.l2/f ). Thus God acts as agent in man's l i f e . 
Repeating the sentiments of The Christian Doctrine of Man Farrer, 
i n his review of The Realm of the S p i r i t , t a l k s of "....the Christian, 
seeing himself as a f a l l i b l e and perverse s p i r i t u a l soul,a w i l l often 
,abused,and never pure,yet whose very principle i t i s to aspire a f t e r 
t r u t h and perfection," looking up "to that Supreme Being in whom t r u t h 
and perfection are,without any varis-bleness or shadow of turning." 
C op.cit.p . l 2 5 ) , 
The year 19^ 1-3 saw the emergence of Farrer's immense work Finite 
and I n f i n i t e . I t s purpose was threefold, "To state the vfhole mech-
anism of the mind in Viorking with the scheme of the /jialogy of Being, 
or,as I have called i t , t h e cosmological idea....to reveal a l l the hidden 
met3,phors and t r i c k s (bf l o g i c a l complication....","To show the involve 
-ment of theology with an at least i m p l i c i t doctrine of f i n i t e sub-
stances,and to restate the doctrine ex p l i c i t l y . . . . " , " T o show how far 
down i n our com.-non thinking the question of f a i t h enters .This i s not 
t o use f k i t h i n a sense appropriate t o revealed theolog>' but as i t is 
an act correlative with these highly important but not yet undeniable 
i n t u i t i o n s vjhich mould our p r a c t i c a l thought." (FI p . v i ^ I t i s his con-
tention that the Thomists possess the true principles f o r the solution 
of the problems of r a t i o n a l theology,and,above a l l else, the problem 
of analogical argument and analogical predication,thougji he admits 
that "by t h e i r r i g i d Aristotelianismand tii e i r - insistence on the poss-
i b i l i t y of inescapable demonstration thc;y make themselves vi l e , i n 
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modem eyes." ( F I p . v i ) . In other words,analogy f o r Farrer results 
i n something much more tenable than modern Thomists ( t h o u ^ not St. 
Thomas) would have supposed.(cf.V.Preller, Divine Science and the 
Science of God - A Reformulation of Thomas Aquinas, chap .4,"Scientia 
Dei and the Unlmown God*,pp.179-266, Princeton UP,1967). The mod-
ems, on the other hand,he says,by reaction, "deny that the problems 
exist,and either philosophise about the I n f i n i t e Being vdth surpris-
ing naivety or refuse to philosophise at a l l and content themselves 
with introducing a certain degree of order in t o the deliverances of 
diffused or pa r t i c u l a r i n s p i r a t i o n . " ( F I p . v i ) . There is nothing f o r 
it,says Farrer,but to restate the doctrine of Analogy of Being in 
credible form. In short, "The way t o prove the p o s s i b i l i t y of r a t -
ional theology is to ;-rrite i t in such a vray as to convince the read-
er that one i s w r i t i n g about something and not about nothing." ( F I p . l ) . 
In his a r t i c l e on "Mr.Austin Farrer's Metaphysics of Theism"j 
Fr.Vincent Tlirner,v7hile commending Finite and I n -
f i n i t e as perhaps "the f i n e s t contribution to natural theology that 
has appeared for many a long year,..." . (V.Tumer p. 100) displays 
a marked reservation about the importance of the work.He c r i t i c i s e s 
both i t s style and construction.Certainly "to read him t h r o u ^ and 
to follow his argument in a l l i t s parts and complications and i t s 
coherence demands an e f f o r t of close and patient attention such as 
very fev/ philosophical books demand."(. ibid.p. 100 ), He acc-
uses Dr.Farrer of being difiCuse,elliptical and "sometimes so a l l u s i v e 
as to be cryptic,soiiBtimes so con^sted that the pursuit of t h o u ^ t 
leaves the reader brofen winded." (ibid.p.100 ), He thinks 
that the transitions are badly managed and yet despite the f a u l t s 
of construction and presenta.tion he considers the substance to be 
good,althou^i he feels that perteps too much court is paid to the 
l o g i c a l positivists.Such a challenge makes i t clear how the persp-v 
ective had shifted from Earth.It is obvious now that Austin Farrer's 
Finite and I n f i n i t e anticipated i n an interesting manner some of the 
discussions vrhich were t o take place a f t e r the war and is thus,though 
admittedly d i f f i c u l t ' a n d involved,of great importance (though t h i s 
perhaps explains why the book did not f o r many years,and perhaps has 
not yet,recei';ed as wide attention as i t ou ^ i t ) . -
The same year saw the publication of E.L.Mascall's He Vfho Is 
which,with his e a r l i e r Existence and Ana.logy, represents an attempt 
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t o reformulate much of the content of natural theology,specifically 
the t r a d i t i o n a l "proofs" and the Analogy of Being, i n a way which 
took account of some of the problems being posed i n philosophical 
c i r c l e s . l t i s f a i r to say,however,that both Farrer and Mascall at 
t h i s time,together with Dorothy Emmet i n her Nature of Metaphysical 
Thinking (19^9),had not taken f u l l account of the philosophical ob-
jections t o projects i n metaphysics or philosophical theology ( c f . 
I.T.Ramsey i n Prospect f o r Metaphysics).Each author s t i l l f e l t , 
however,able to move with confidence within the framework of t r a d -
i t i o n a l theism.H.A.Hodges,as a philosopher,is someone who exhibits 
i n both his philosophical and theological works: the incapacity (perhaps 
commendable) to. take the p o s i t i v i s t s too seriously(cf."Things and 
Persons" Logical Positivism and Ethics,Proceedings of the Ari s t o t e l i a n 
Society,supp.vol.XXII,19^8 and "What i s to become of rhilosophical 
Theology?" i n Contemporary B r i t i s h Philosophy,ed.H.D.Lewis,Allen atid 
Unwin 1956). 
The f i r s t part of F i n i t e and I n f i n i t e i s devoted to the analysis 
of the nature of theological statements and the way i n which they 
are used,anticipating what was soon to become a stock phrase among 
philosophers,Wittgenstein's maxim, "Don't look f o r meaning,look for 
use ". 
(cf.I.M.Crombie,"Wie P o s s i b i l i t y of Theological Statements" i n F^ith 
and Logic (chap.II),Allen and Unwin 1957»pp.31-84 and "Theology and 
F a l s i f i c a t i o n " i n New Essays i n Philosophical Theology,(chap.VI),part 
( i i ) ed.A.Flew and A.MacIntyre,SCM PresstLondon 1955,PP.109-131 by 
I.M.Crorabie). 
Farrer's cancem was with the exhibition and c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the 
propositions of t h e i s t i c metaphysics.The discussion of analogy i n 
t h i s section i s excellent? i t i s both detailed and careful yet of 
wide range. 
In the second part of the book,which makes an examination of 
f i n i t e substances,Dr.Farrer proceeds to validate the th e i s t i c hyp-
othesis by a reasoned defence of t h i s doctrine. 
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This discussion takes up two-thirds of the book,some ts-io 
hundred pages.The doctrine of f i n i t e substance i s discussed on 
the grounds of,and must be understood i n the l i g h t of,Farrer's 
theory of the active s e l f ( c f . Christ,I'a-ith a.nd History,ed.S.W. 
Sykes and J.P.Clayton,CUP,1973.chap.16,"'substance' i n Christology 
- a cross bench view"D.H.MacPIinnon,pp.270-301.) .As Bishop Berkeley 
maintained,we know vihat i t i s l i k e to be a cause and here too the 
r e q u i s i t e analogues are sought dn the nature of f i n i t e substances 
or agents,for e>smple,selves and the active s e l f is conside red esp-
e c i a l l y i n the unity of the act of w i l l . 
Part I I of Finite and I n f i n i t e can be further sub-divided 
i n t o three sub-sections.Firstly the idea of substance i s examined 
from a l o g i c a l and l i n g u i s t i c standpoint in order that the v a l i d i t y 
of the use of the notion of substance my be establidied.The section 
includes a r e f u t a t i o n of the p o s i t i v i s t s and vindicates substance-' 
language,for as E.L.Mascall i n his Existence and Analogy vrrites, 
"the notion of substance is the indispensible basis of any t h e i s t i c 
metaphysicjin spite of the f a c t that i t has been almost universally 
rejected since the time of BerlKeley and Hum ."(E+A p . l 6 l ) . ?Ie then 
goes on with a discussion of the s e l f as representing,as we have 
sa,id, the most accessible instance of substance.To establish the 
\' a l i d i t y of the concept of s e l f he demonstates how the r e a l i t y of 
the w i l l may be sho-.Ti i o f o l l o w from the f a i l u r e of any attem.pt to 
reduce i t to a mere l o g i c a l class of mental states or acts.(Professor 
Hod.gsQn i n his review of Finite and I n f i n i t e i n The Qaardian^ Nov. 
12,19'-^3 describes t h i s section on 'substa,nce' as "a book within a 
book ." j 
Austin Farrer sums up his results by arguing for two structures of 
unity since '.he contests,the unity of the s e l f is neither the focus-
sing of many acts i n the single act nor is i t the continuity of act-
i v i t y from one act to th2 ne:-ct.Both indeed belong to the unity of the 
s e l f vfhich i s neither, -
is i t s e l f indescribable, i t i s not a structure or pattern (accidents) 
but that which has these (substance) .A good x-eason fo r i t s elusiveness 
is t o be found,Fa,rrer argues, i n the very form of thou,?ht.The unity of 
the s e l f and i t s s t r u c t u r a l complication cannot be grasped i n one; yet 
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they imply and support one an other.The unity i s best seen when the 
se l f i s exposed to external things and not to i t s ovm constituents'. 
Thus f o r Farrer the s e l f is to be seen as a continuous i n t e l l e c t i v e 
and creati^/e a c t i v i t y v/hich proceeds by concentration into success-
ive particular, acts.Hence i t i s the substantial connection provided 
by a c t i v i t y as such and studied under the name of w i l l which holds 
together the self as well as the act.The act i s not even as an act to be 
seen/self-sufficient; i t s boundaries extend to embrace the t o t a l i t y 
of a self,which i s thus metaphysically,and not just phenomenally or 
l o g i c a l l y , one. 
Farrer's fundamental metaphysical pr i n c i p l e i s "Esre est o-^erari 
..." ( F I p.21) though by taking (deliberate) acts of w i l l as the type 
of operation vrhose nature i s most knovjable.he is able to conceive f i n -
i t e e n t i t i e s as on a r i s i n g - f a l l i n g scaled existence.(cf.A.O.Lovejoy, 
The F'ree Chain" of Being,NY:Harper,I960, M.1).Chenu,Nature ,Man and Soc-
i e t y i n the 12th.Century,trans.J.Taylor and L.K.Little.Chicago UP,1968 
p.21 and M.D.Knowles OSB,"The Influence of Pseudo-Dionysius on Western 
Mysticism" i n Christian S p i r i t u a l i t y .Essays in honour of G':>rdon Rupp, 
ed.P.Brooks,SCM:London, 1975,PP.79~95.See also,C.S.Lewis,The^ piscarded 
Image,p.70f. on Pseudo-Dionysius ). On such a scale the position of 
any e n t i t y on the scale is determined by the degree of consciousness, 
deliberation,freedom and c r e a t i v i t y i t s acts are capable of a t t a i n i n g . 
In arguing,therefore,to the necessity f o r a primary and perfect case 
of being he i s arguing not to actus ]7urus or even to a being whose 
essence and existence are identical,but to a perfect,free and creative 
w i l l , t o a being who v ; i l l s to be a l l that he is,and i s a l l that he w i l l s 
t o be.This accords well v/ithAquinas' principle that no impotentia can 
be posited of Goi.Once again we f i n d that Farrer's argument is f i r m l y 
rooted i n the f i n i t e world .He wrote,: 
"Every argument f o r God's existence must start fi'om 
the world of f i n i t e s or from the nature of f i n i t e 
substance as such....We must take seme d i s t i n c t i o n 
w i t h i n the f i n i t e and then claim to show that the 
co-existence cf the elements distinguished i n the 
way i n vrhich they do co-exist,is i n t e l l i g i b l e only 
i f God exists as the grounds of such co-existence."(FI p.262). 
P h i l i p Curtis i n his a r t i c l e on The Rational Theology of Dr.Farrer. 
comments on t h i s , t h a t . \ 
"I n asserting the cosmological r e l a t i o n - the rela,tion 
of f i n i t e t o an i n f i n i t e being - we are c l a r i f y i n g 
what we Imow in a confused way.Descartes in his Medit-
ations I I I saw God as a clear ajid d i s t i n c t idea "involved 
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i n his thinking.Farrer sees God in the experience 
of f i n i t u d e , i n knov/ing the f i n i t e we grasp the i n -
f i n i t e as the fulness of being.God and the world 
i n the cosmologica.1 r e l a t i o n are grasped together."(Curtis p .251)» 
This provides an i n t e r e s t i n g comparison with the work of E.L.Mascall 
for whom the world constitites a splintered image of God's existence. 
Farrer's raw material i s simply that v.tiich may be Imown in the l i f e 
of any human agent,though viewed i n a l i g h t which may open our eyes 
and make us say, "that i s Vihat r e a l l y happens.' "(cf. P.amseyls notion 
of the "disclosure s i t u a t i o n " In RL).We are not then to be seen merely 
as a s t r i n g of contiguous pa,rts,we have a past and a present and we 
move towards a future i n which are our projects,some of them freely 
chosen,and we move,for J^rrer, i n the l i g h t of the r i s i n g - f a l l i n g 
scale of existence which we have noted e a r l i e r as a mark of Parrer's 
work,from mere habit t o conscious choice.To realize this scale i s 
thus to accept a doctrine of f i n i t e substance with genuine causal 
relations,that i s to say,my acts do r e a l l y flow from me,from what 
I am and what I will,and the a c t i v i t y so seen i s the basis of our 
t a l k about God i n terms of w i l l . i n t e l l e c t and goodness- i f we accept 
Farrer's argument.If these terms are further applied to a unique 
existent i t is,Farrer believes,because i n the co-existence of ele-
ments i n our f i n i t e l i f e \ie are confronted with the source of our 
splintered being. 
So thought L ^ .Farrer i n 1 9 ^ 3 'In his l a t e r writings,such as 
The Freedom of the W i l l and Faith o-nd Speculation, as vje shall see, 
he was inclined to detect i n his e a r l i e r v;ork an "Kristotelian leav-
en" v;hich ought,he f e l t , t o be purged out, Notably t h i s vras to be 
found i n the arguments of Part I I I of Finite and I n f i n i t e , r e l y i n g 
on the essence-existence d i s t i n c t i o n and posing the question,"why 
t h i s existence i n t h i s mode?".But he never abandoned his insistence 
on the r e a l i t y of the scale of being which vre have mentioned earlier 
;(cf.the evolutionary arguments i n Metaphysical Beliefs, S.E.Toulmin, 
R.W.Hepbum and A.MacIntyre,SCM.London, 1957) ,!-xovm in human act,and 
on the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of existence v/ith activity,and he never ceased 
to throw l i g h t on the simultaneous nature of human act as free and 
l i m i t e d v/hich i s the clue to understanding the completely free act 
which i s God.It must be remembered throughout,however,that "for Far-
r e r the c r u c i a l point is that fi'eedom involves .indeed is,transcendence, 
and on t h i s Farrer alvjays remained unmoved."(Curtis p.253), 
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We have noted i n Dr.Farrer the .influence of the great medieval 
Dominican St.Thomas Aquinas and in Dr.Farrer's system the place 
of Thomas' Five Ways i s held by the 8 usiological and the 5 anth-
rop->logical arguments vrhich appear i n Part I I I of Finite and I n f i n i t e . 
These arguments are used by Farrer t o divide the types of f i n i t e 
d i s t i n c t i o n available as the basis for analo.gical d i a l e c t i c into ^ ^f'-^ ,. 
two cla.sses.The; usiological^'arguments are those vfhich can be used l'^ "^ )^-«^ >^  
of f i n i t e beings i n jgeneral while the antliropological are those used L--.'--—^'.'^  
of the pa r t i c u l a r tyne of f i n i t e being t h a t v.'e are,i^.man. Both classes f -vv' 
are i n fa c t to be seen as needed oecause God must be exhibited ?-s the '^^^f•^^'•• ^' 
- ' .W-' J' 
creator of a l l f i n i t e being while,he contends,we have no direct laiow-
ledge of any pa r t i c u l a r mode of existence except our ovm - "Without 
anthropology'- we should not start,and without usiology we should not 
a r r i v e . " (FI p.264) , (Farrer sub-divides his usiological arguments . 
into tvro classes :-
A. based on the f i n i t u d e of f i n i t e beings - includes the two contrasts 
of: ( l ) Essence-Existence 
( I I ) Actual-Possible 
B. based on substantial relations,sub-dividing them i n t o : 
( I ) operation and i n t e r i o r effect 
( I I ) continuous ingredience 
( i l l ) discontinuous ingredience: formality a^ nd informality 
(IV) discontinuous ingredience: condition and action 
(V) generation 
(VI) generation and decay 
( I I ) - ( V I ) are a l l concerned with d i f f e r e n t aspects of the contrast 
between the se l f - u n i t y of an operation and the affectednesS of other 
operations by i t . 
The anthropological arg-uments are subdivided as follows:-
( I ) I n t e l l e c t as such and i t s huiaan impurities 
( I I ) w i l l as such and i t s human li m i t a t i o n s 
( I I I ) i n t e l l e c t u a l and volunt?~ry a c t i v i t y 
(IV) moral obligation 
(V) The pursuit of perfection.) 
"In a l l t h i r t e e n cases the proceedure is,broadly speaking,the same. 
The r e s u l t of a l l t h i s can be summed up i n Farrer's own words, 
"The knowledge of God to vfhich r a t i o n a l theology leads 
us -the kno-;;ledge of him vfhich i s bound up with an app-
rehension of the universal aspects of f i n i t e existence 
or of human existence - i s the knowledge of existent 
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perfection conceived thcroug^. the analogy of s p i r i t , 
and the knowledge .that t h i s Being i s the creator of 
a l l f i n i t e existence.But that i s all.We learn from 
i t that a l l f i n i t e s , i n being themselves and express-
ing t h e i r natures i n t h e i r acts,are expressing also 
the c r e a t i v i t y of God who creates through them."(FI p.299) , 
For Farrer, freedom i s to be described i n terms of the development 
of r a t i o n a l and f u l l y voluntary'- action by the specialization of acts 
which were'previously d i f f e r e n t aspects of a single form.The oper-. . 
ation of free v d l l he sees i n the l i ^ t of the construction of ch-
aracter, indeed he describes character as "....the policy of choice." 
( F I p . l9 l),l'Je r e c a l l Ramsey^ point that a free decision demands an 
ap-oropriate response or commitment -the adding of our personal back-
ing - i n order to be a free decision (cf.F&l chap.II and elsevihere). 
•Similarly i n Farrer we f i n d that i n Farrer's estimation, "....the 
p r a c t i c a l judgem.ent i s not complete without an act; I have not w i l l -
ed u n t i l I have (i n my own sincere expectation) committed myself,and 
only then insofar as I have committed myself." ( F I p . l 55).Again t h i s 
provides a s i g n i f i c a n t point of comparison between the work of Dr. 
Farrer and ths,t of Professor Ramsey. 
I t w i l l have been noted that throughout the discussion so f a r , 
no mention has been made of the subject of immortality i n t h i s con-
text.The reason i s that F i n i t e and I n f i n i t e deals with the topics of 
r a t i o n a l theology and Farrer feels t h a t , i n his OV.TI words, " ra t i o n a l 
theology deals with God and freedom,but not with Immortality,Providence 
or Grace,except in considering t h e i r mere p o s s i b i l i t y when the idea of 
them has come from another q u a r t e r . " ( F I p.300),Thus vre must viait a 
l i t t l e longer before Dr.Iferrer provides us with any detailed thought 
on t h i s p a r t i c u l a r aspect of the doctrines v?hich we have here set 
out to explore. 
Throughout Finite and I n f i n i t e Farrer apceals t o the method 
of analogy propounded and employed by St.Thomas Aquinas.In his a r t i c l e 
on "The Extension of St .Thomas's doctrine of /malogy to Modern P h i l -
osophical problems" in the Downside Review Fsnrex continues and ex-
pands t h i s theme; 
"The modern passion f o r • i n t e l l e c t u a l c l a r i t y r e a l l y 
has shovm tha,t other r e a l i t i e s beside the divine 
are incurably mysterious: and. ;.'e have got t o 
wrestle with th.e mystery and not deny i t . I f we 
want to borrow from the medievals,let us borrow-
what can help us.They did develop an instrument 
f o r vnrestling with mystery,where they yaw mystery, 
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namely the analogical method.It is f o r us to apply 
i t i n fresh f i e l d s . " (ExStT p .71) . 
Now,as Br.Farrer points out,the t r a d i t i o n a l Thomist would have drawn 
a hard and fast d i s t i n c t i o n between our knowledge of sensible f i n i t e 
substances and our knowledge of God.The f i n i t e substance offers i t s -
e l f t o us t h r o u ^ i t s sensible accidents v.liile the lineaments of the 
divine essence do not present themselves i n and with the immediate 
objects of sense-knowledge as the forms of creaturely essence do. 
Therefore our knowledge of God i s analogical whereas our knowledge 
o f f i n i t e substance i s not, " I apprehend f i n i t e substances f o r what 
they are," wrote Dr.Ferrer, "but to God's being I can only analogize 
from the creaturely signs." (ibid.p.71 ).Farrer goes on to suggest 
that the balance of the contest between creaturely being and the 
being of the Creator has altered,and tha t , f o r the modem,what we 
take t o be our apprehension of f i n i t e substances approximates f a r 
more towards the t r a d i t i o n a l accounts of our apprehension of God than 
s t r i c t traditionalism would have allowed.In short St.Thomas meant that 
"The r e f l e c t i v e mind,in connection with i t s apprehension 
of the f i n i t e being,has a confused conception of i n f i n -
itude of being as that essence whereof the f i n i t e i s a 
reduced and l i m i t e d copy,and as that existence whereof 
every contingent existence i s the e f f e c t . " (ibid.p.77 ) . 
He t i e s t h i s t o his b e l i e f i n i t s r e l a t i o n t o t a l k of the freedom of 
the w i l l i n his comment that " I believe myself to have an indubitable 
awareness of my own acts of voluntary decision...." (ibid.p.77 ) . 
This awareness i s essentially an int e r n a l phenomenon.In an a r t i c l e , 
"On Credulity",he maintained that vAien we ask what that true essence 
of man is,which the insincere betrays,the f o o l misses and the callous 
ignores- and the perverse distorts,we,in fact,open up a completely new 
dimension of questions.We are. then up against an object which i s quite 
d i f f e r e n t l y related t o us from the objects of science or personal 
understanding.The d i s t i n c t i o n he draws i s between that which i s "out 
there" and tha t vhich i s "within", "within" not as our states of mind 
are " w i t h i n " but "within" with a depth which i s so much deeper than they 
can ever attain.He elaborates on t h i s i n a way reminiscent of Ian Ramsey's 
a r t i c l e on "The Systematic Elusiveness of 'I'. " Farrer wri t e s i 
"Just as you cannot become aware of the personal r e a l -
i t y of your f r i e n d by t r y i n g on him preconceived qu-
estions of psychological or economic science,but only 
by understanding the impact of his existence,so i t i s 
with awareness of your own being and destiny ,suid of i t s 
demands on you.You cannot say: I propose to open j u s t a 
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.crack of my mental door and admit only those facts 
to which I have already issued blue tickets,You have 
to throw the door open,however mysterious or t e r r i f y -
ing or overv/helming the body of fact may be that tum-
bles i n . " (On Gred. p . 5 . Cf.also F&I chap,III ) 
• ., ' The theme i s continued in "Does God Exist", 
where he addsj 
"V/e can become aware of a whole universe of creatures 
objectively,but there is only one c r ^ t u r e we can ex-
press subjectively,and that i s o u r s e l f . I can become 
aware through outv/ard experience of the patterns of 
a c t i v i t y which .nake up .m:.ny levels and sorts of bein,gs, 
• f o r example,a b i o l o g i s t can examine the a c t i v i t y - p a t t e r n 
of the body of a frog.But one cannot taste what i t i s 
l i k e t o be a frog, one can only taste vfhat i t i s l i k e to 
• be a man." (DGE p.42), 
Thus Farrer would argue that what i s important fo r us i s the fact 
that we experience our ovm existence as an activity...of self-determination. 
To be a man,Farrer su g ^ s t s , i s to te the arch-
i t e c t of one's own L i f e - we do what we choose to do,yet "the ast-
onishing and almost t e r r i f y i n g f a ct of our ovm freedom only thjrovfs 
i n t o h i ^ e r r e l i e f the fact of i t s l i m i t a t i o n s . " (ibid,p.^2 )• Thus 
we can see how Fcirrer contends .that God designs t h r o u ^ us rather 
than f o r us (cf ."Editor's Introd.uction", Theodicy :^  Essays on the 
Goodness of God,the Freedom of Man ,anc the Origin of E v i l by G.Iv. 
Leibniz,ed.A.M.Farrer,tr.E.M.Huggard,Routled£e and Kegan I ^ u l , 1 9 5 1 , 
pp .7-^ ' -7) . We experience such l i m i t a t i o n s i n two sorts.There are 
those imposed by the brute force of the physical l i m i t a t i o n s of • 
our bodies,the fact that " I a-m a man and not an angel." ( DGE ,p.^2 ) 
and there are "those l i r a i t a t i o n s which,.unlike those which l i m i t us 
by the things v/hich we cannot do, l i m i t us i n the doing of those 
things which we ca.n do.Farrer vrr6te, " A l l serious men know that 
they are l i m i t e d not only by vjhat they are but by vfhat they are 
called to _be: not by what the human race has attained (vihich i s n ' t 
on the average anything very grand) but by what the human race in 
general,and they themselves in particula.r,are called to a t t a i n . " (ibid.p.42 ). 
HeJ'a.rgues that a-11 f i n i t e existence i s ordained because i t i s f i n i t e 
especially i n the case of ourselves v;here we can experience what i t 
feels l i k e t o be under divine ordinance.Even at the point of our 
most human,.-nost indepencenit,most godlike aspect - that of our free 
v r i l l vre are no less under the mysterious divine ordinance ,thou.2h "our 
free w i l l ceri:ainly has great p l a y , i t can even reject i t s true dest-
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iny: but that,we knov,,is a sort of suicide ." (ibid'.p.44),{-rnat i n 
fact the w i l l i s , i s then explained and described as, "A power free-
l y to frame projects seen to be good and to execute them because 
they are seen to be goal ." ( ib id .p .46)jrr3,tional impulse,hovrever, 
invades our r a t i o n a l choice at every point, and the two aspects can 
never be f u l l y separated.- . This i n turn means that vre can never 
f u l l y understand the business that we bring about and consequently 
we cannot choose vfha.t i s simply good but only the best of the poss-
• i b i l i t i e s t hat circumstances op-en f o r us. I t i s t h i s fact that gives 
. p l a u s i b i l i t y t o the deterniinists'case, "so natural i t i s f o r us to 
-measure the modicum of w i l l we possess by the standard of th i s ab-
solute, creative freedom vrhich i s v/hat \ie mean by God." (ibid.p.46 ) 
The question of what p a r t i c u l a r contingent events might suggest 
about C-od's a c t i v i t y i s taken up i n Dr.}icirrer' s Bampton Lectures 
published i n 1948 - The Glass of Vision. Revelation,Curtis suggests, 
was given i n the form of propositions ,but a century of c r i t i c a l study 
made t h i s view seem untenable.Instea.d we must therefore f i n d God's 
revelation i n his saving a c t i v i t y . In The Glass of Vision Farrer 
wrote "We have n'ot to distinrjuish between God's action and ours 
but between two phases of God's action - his supernatural action, 
and his action by vfay of nature ."Cop.cit.^.3).'It i s d i f f i c u l t " , h e con-
tinued, "to see how anything resembling Christia-nity can survive the 
denial of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , f o r C h r i s t i a n i t y i s f a i t h in Christ,3,nd 
Clirist i s God acting not only by way of nature,but superna-turally. 
I f you reduce Christ t o a part of God's natural action,he i s Christ 
no longer." ( i b i d . p . 3)^rrer finds the- naturalness of nature i n the 
fac t that- i t i s the re a l operation of second causes .vrhether those 
causes are bound or free.Men are,for him,as free as they discover 
themselves to be,and i n exercising t h e i r freedom they express t h e i r 
nature. This does not mean,however,that man i s free to do. whatever 
he likes.As Farrer says,he cannot exercise the a c t i v i t i e s of either 
angels or eagles.he can only exercise his own,those,that i s to say, 
which belong to his nature and to his place i n the t o t a l nature.It 
i s thus Fai-rer's contention that the natural mind ma,y know of God 
whatever i s involved i n the perception of i t s own necessary depend-
ence upon him,as of secondary upon primary being and act. v.'hat the 
f i n i t e mind perceives i n d e t a i l and fulness,Farrer believes,is alvfays 
f i n i t e existenceivfhat i t perceives of God is the bare form of a.n 
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absolute act,seen as enacting the various m u l t i p l i c i t y of f i n i t e 
existence. ' 
The Glass of Vision vas the nearest Farrer ever came to work-
ing out an episte.fiiology of the image i n any form comparable to the 
many epistemologies of the concept v:hich abound i n the philosophical 
vforld,thou^ even here i t i s never worked out i n detail.-He described 
these lectures as. an attempt to bring together his thoughts on three 
things - the sense of metaphysical philosophy,the sense of s c r i p t -
ur3,l reA-'elation and the sense of poetry.His method was to show how . 
the images worked by the use of example rather than by the construct-
ion of any formal theory.However,he remained insistent that i f the 
iirages are approached i n a s p i r i t of rationalism then they w i l l u l t -
imately f a i l i n t h e i r task of communicating knowledge - the images 
themselves must illuminate us and .indeed i t i s not possible (or 
necessary were i t possible) to get behind them to any underlying 
non-metaphysica.1 f a c t s ; 
"....The metaphysician cannot point away from his 
analogically expressed thoughts about the natural 
mysteries to some non-analogical thoughts a.bout 
them which mean a l l that the analogical thoughts 
mea,n.He has not got any su-b non-analogical thoughts: 
analogy is the proper form of metaphysical thought, 
in the realm of thought there i s no getting behind it."(GV p.74)» 
(cf . The Idea of the Transcendent, G.F.Voods in Soundings ed.A.Vidler, 
pp.^1-3-67,CUP,l';*62 •). The efficiency of such thoughts depends not mere-
l y on the r a t i o n a l capacity of the human mind to reco.gnise likenesses 
but they are,Farrer would say,given by God to the Jews,refashi.oned-
and reworked by Christ and t.hus continued through the A.postles and 
the Church. Here Farrer's epistemology of the image aligns i t s e l f 
v;ith his doctrine about revelation and i t s communication and develop-
ment.To r a t i o n a l i s t eyes t h i s method seemed too subjective v/hile to 
t r a d i t i o n a l Evangelicals i t seemed to do less than justice to the 
place of f a i t h i n Ch-istian commitment. Even though The Glass of Vision 
i s primarily ab-out revelation and "the form of divine t r u t h i n the 
human mind" (op.cit,!.') there is,hovjever,no study of divine providence 
as such. 
In the "Editor's Introduction" to Theodicy: Essays oh the Goodness 
of God , the Freedom of Man and the Origins of E v i l by G..Leibniz, 
Farrer,having stated his b e l i e f that "Every t h e i s t i c pVillosopher 
i s bound,with wha-tever cautions,to conceive G-o-d by the analogy of 
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• the human mind" (Theod.p.lQ9) goes on to ask vrhat material the f i n i t e 
mind sup]?oses f o r an analogical picture of the i n f i n i t e mind in the 
making of choices or decrees? The point of th i s material i s to make 
the sense of "analogy" and "freedom" clearer i n a particular theol-
ogical application which reciprocally illuminates "freedom".The use 
of such language of God,Farrer sug-ests. has i t s f i r s t and natural 
application to oursel-ves. We a l l of us choose and in our choosing 
exercise r e a l freedom of the mind (cf.I.T.Ramsey's t a l k of the 
adding of our personal backing.discussed above). The f i n i t e mind, 
as Farrer conceives i t , i s nothing but "a self-operating succession 
of perceptions,ideas or representations."(Theod.p.110). With regard 
to some of our ideas -we nevertheless have no freedom,those f o r ex-
ample which represent us to our bodies.In Farrerian terms vfe think 
of them as c o n s t i t u t i n g our given substance .Thus we regard them i n 
terms of sheer data as we do those reflections of our environment 
which they mediate to us.They mke up a closely jacked and confused 
mass and Ferrer sug.^ests that they represent the s p i r i t u a l counter-
part t o the force vjhich we have to recognise i n things as physically 
interpreted,though indeed,being real s p i r i t u a l f o r c e , i t i s quasi-
voluntary i n that i n t h i s sense we w i l l to be ourselves though t h i s 
w i l l i n g i s merely a w i l l i n g to conform to the conditions of our ex-
istence and we are,in fact,making no choice,. Acting freely,or per-
forming deliberate acts,on the-other hand,contains not only the element 
of force but also choice.This choice i s exercised between alternative 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s a r i s i n g out of our sit u a t i o n i n virtue of the appeal 
exercised by one alternative as seemingly better.Farrer repudiates 
any suggestion that t h i s mi^ht lead to a determinist position - that 
would be to say that i f God has chosen the whole form and fabric of 
the world a,nd has chosen everything i n i t , t h i s must necessarily i n -
clude the choices vre s h a l l make .Any dioices that have already been made 
f o r us are patently not r e a l choices at a l l . However i f vre do not our-
selves exercise rea,l choice then we can have no clue as to what any choice 
would be,let alone vrhat divine choice would be and so the whole arg-
ument f a l l s . Farrer finds two possible linss of escape from such a 
predicament.One the one hand he suggests that vre migit define human 
choice i n such a vay that i t allovjs f o r predetermination without 
ceasing to be choice (which i s precisely vihat Leibnia attempted to 
do) or,on the other hand,alternatively we ma,y malce the most of the 
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.negative element i n a l l theology.For,as Farrer says, "we do not 
p o s i t i v e l y or adequately understand the nature of i n f i n i t e creative 
w i l l (and) perha.ps i t i s precisely the transcendent glory of divine 
freedom to be able t o vfork i n f a l l i b l y tiirough free instruments." (The-od. 
p. 1 1 1 - 1 1 2 ) . 
In "tji English A.ppreciation" i n Kery.graa and Myth Austin 
Farrer expands his discussion on the r e l a t i o n between poetical symbol 
and l i t e r a l f a c t , "Angels above the blue and devils underground f i t l y 
frame the s e t t i n g of man i n the s p i r i t u a l heirarchy," he wrote, "but 
exca\^tion w i l l not reach the one nor aeronautics the other." (KH-H p.215) . 
Indeed, "St.Augustine vras aware of the importance of distingijishing 
the l i t e r a l from the symbolic,a,nd the schoolmen theorised the problem 
almost ad^  nauseam." ( i b i d , p , 2 l 6 ) » I t i s i n ICerygma and. Myth that we f i n d 
Farrer speaking of the use of f a i t h to confirm evidence and asserting: 
" i t i s possible through f a i t h and evidence together,and through neither 
alone,to believe that Christ r e a l l y and corporeally rose from the dead." 
(ibid.p,2 2 0 ), Again he vrrites j "I'fhat Christians f i n d i n Christ through 
f a i t h inclines them at certain points to accept with regird to him 
testimony about matters of fact vihich would be inconclusive i f offered 
with regard to any other man." (ibid,p,220)^Boobyer c r i t i c i s e s t h i s 
a t t i t u d e because he fe e l s that i t " i s not f a i t h confirming evidence 
but f a i t h bringing about a'jump beyond evidence; and small t h o u ^ the 
jump may seem,conclusive pro-of i s s t i l l lacking that vfe have come dovm 
on something true."(Boobyer p.39»cited S of C p.275 )«In the same a r t i c l e 
Farrer expresses his b e l i e f that the value of the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s i s 
i n opening the eyes of the materialists to invB.rd things.Existentialism, 
he believes,shows them how to t a l k i n a tolera.bly ha.rd and exact vray 
about personal interaction,about freedom,responsibility and decision. 
In short he believes that i t reveals in something l i k e the sense 
the word bears f o r Christian thought,though he adds the warning that 
" when i t i s used to set up a r b i t r a r y l i m i t s to the scope of our thought 
we h?-ve every reason to suspect and hate i t . . . . " (K#1 p.221) , 
1955 saw the publication of an a r t i c l e i n The Twentieth Century 
Encyclopaedia of Religious Knowledge on the topic of "Analogy" 
i n vjhich Farrer sets out once aga.in his viev/s,with t h e i r attendant 
Thomist background,on- the use of analogy and analogical language. 
He b-r;lieves that "Analog;,'- .is both the name of a philosophical problem 
about the meaning of theological statements and of a particular solution 
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.offered t o t h a t problem." (analos^ p.<?-^). He po i n t s , out t h a t much' 
rel . i g i o u s l3.nf;aa.Qe i s metaphoria'il.fisia-ative or p a r a b o l i c a l and 
ths,t i t thus bases- i t s e l f upon some s o r t of analo£fy between d i v i n e 
t h i n g s and cre-aturely things, u sing the l a t t e r t o set foCT/ard the 
farmer much i n the same viay as St.Paul uses the r e l a t i o n of members 
t o head i n an animal body t o express the r e l a t i o n of C h r i s t i a n s t o 
C h r i s t . 
A, sermon e n t i t l e d , "Hov; do VTC knovj t h a t we have found Him?" i n 
C h r i s t and the C h r i s t i a n provides us with a good 
e>53.mple of FUri-er's n o t i o n of grace,v.'hich,as v;e have observed above, 
is- so notably absent from the v r r i t i n g s of Ian Thomas Ramsey.To quote 
t h i s sermon a t l e n g t h v r i l l not only give us an insight into his 
standpoint on .grace but also provide us vdth a most moving eiample 
of l i c i r r e r ' s g r a c e f u l s t y l e c a r r i e d here i n t o h i s preaching.Farrer w r i t e s : 
"He assures me,God assures me,mrtly througti my mind, 
as when I reconsider the manger and the cross,the words 
and the works,the sepulchre and the throne of Jesus,and 
see t h a t they are divine.But he assures me also i n my 
life,throu£ti h i s dealings vath me; f o r he gives me grace. 
Yes,he gives me grace; and though I s p i l l the water of 
l i f e upon the .ground before h i s very eyes,not even p u t t i n g 
t h e cup to my lips, h e f o r g i v e s me,and gives me more. As 
those vrho cannot love through the meaness and d i s t r u s t -
f u l n e s s of t h e i r minds cease t o be able t o be l i e v e i n the 
love, which others bear tb£m,so the despite t l i a t \-ie do 
God's grace destroys our knowledge o f it.Kovr do I Icnow 
t h a t I have found Him? Not, heaven knows, be cause I cejinot 
s i n , t h e nearness o f h.Ls grace,and the dearness of h i s 
l o v e , o f f e r me o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r s i n n i n g such as I had 
not when he was f u r t h e r removed; f o r now I can throw 
h i s mercy i n h i s very fa,ce.But there i s a grace beyond 
grace,a grace m.astering tl-e contempt of grace,the grace 
of repentance,to which he r e c a l l s me; and thus indsed I 
knovr.not t h a t I have found him,but t h a t I hs-ve been found 
by him." (op.cit.p . 8 6 - 7 ) ' 
His sermon i n The B i b l e and the C h r i s t i a n e n t i t l e d "The ever>'day use 
of the B i b l e " contains an e a r l y expression of Farrer's views on h e l l . 
(Cf.I.T.Ramsey on "Hell" i n Talk of God mentioned above .; Farrer's 
chapter on "Adam and L u c i f e r " i n h i s Love Almignty and I l l s Unlimited, 
and G.Bonner, The Warfare of C h r i s t , F a i t h Press,I962 ( l a s t c h a p t e r ) . ) 
He vjas l a t e r , b y the time of Savin.g B e l i e f , t o r e j e c t j ( b e l i e f i n the d e v i l 
a l t o g e t h e r .The sermon revolves around Marlov.-e's Faustus. P^ustus express-
es wonder t h a t Hephistopheles should be 1s t out of h e l l t o v i s i t him 
and i s ' addressed by the f i e n d ; 
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•"V/hy,this i s h e l l , n o r am I out o f i t . T h i n k s t thou t h a t 
I who savr the face o f Goi am not tormented v/ith a thou-
sand h e l l s i n being depriv'ed of everlasting^ b l i s s ? " 
"The d e v i l has seen God face t o face", says Dr.Farrer, "thou3^i we 
have only seen him by the r u s h l i g h t of f a i t h , i n a glass d a r k l y ; y et 
su r e l y , t h e equanimity i s s u r p r i s i n g , w i t h which vie deprive ourselves 
of heavenly vision,and do not heed the h e l l we are i n . " (SS p.150). 
Much t h e same idea i s expressed i n h i s a r t i c l e i n F a i t h and L o f i c 
on "Revelation",from another p o i n t of view. Here R i r r e r contends t h a t 
f a i t h i s not a mere b l i n d b e l i e f t h a t c e r t a i n a t t i t u d e s and p o l i c i e s , 
u t t e r l y unremunerative i n t h i s w o r l d , v r i l l be,as he says,inexplicably 
rewarded i n another. F a i t h i s f o r him that v.'hich assures us of ever-
l a s t i n g s a l v a t i o n , b u t only because i t i s a vay of l i f e here and now. 
The way o f f a i t h convinces us not by easing l i f e but by,in some myst-
erious way, deepening i t . F a i t h and Logic f i r s t appeared i n 1957,the 
product, as we have seen e a r l i e r , of the C h r i s t i a n dons* discussion 
group "The Hetaphysicals" o f v.-hich ivustin Farrer ms a member. I n 
i t F a r r e r holds f a s t t o h i s b e l i e f i n i n s p i r a t i o n , a touch of the 
d i v i n e presence i n prophet,apostle and believer,though tljere i s a 
new emphasis on the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of saying how God does t h i s . The 
same c o l l e c t i o n of essays contains another chapter by Austin Ferrer 
on "A S t a r t i n g Point f o r the P h i l o s o p h i c a l Examination of Theological 
B e l i e f " (F+L c h . I pp.9-30). The essay tre3.ts on the themes of theolog-
i c a l statements and parable and the l o g i c behind them,This he does largely 
by reference t o the work of Kant.In i t we f i n d t h i s comment on d i v i n e 
providence and man's freedom of w i l l : "Patient of man's im:;erfections, 
God f o r g i v e s but does not to l e r a t e . F o r , b y a c o s t l y and incessant a c t i o n 
b e a r i n g on man's f r e e v r i l l , h e persuades h i n tovjards h i s e v e r l a s t i n g 
good.'(F4-L p.12^), Thus a claim- i s made on our natures vfhich d e f i e s 
d e s c r i p t i v e ex-planation and l i n k s v.'ith Ian Ramsey's contention of 
the "and more" element i n the d e s c r i p t i o n of our being.In the same 
essay,too, v:e f i n d m t e r i a l which i s reminiscent of Ramsey's i n t e r p r e t -
a t i o n of B u t l e r ' s maxim th?.t "Probcability i s the very guide of l i f e . 
" I t i s a l o g i c a l t r u t h " , h e says, " t h a t the claim made on us by a drown-
i n g man cs.mot be deduced from any genuinely d e s c r i p t i v e statements t h a t , 
we may make e i t h e r about h i n or about ourselves; but tha t i s not t o deny 
t h a t the claim a r i s e s out of h i s nature and ours." (i b i d .p. 132).Thus once 
again we can see tha,t despite what a.re undoubtedly major d i f f e r e n c e s 
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between the works of I.T.Ramsey and A.M.Farrer,there i s a l s o a great 
deal Vfhich i s si m i l a r , a n d the consideration of such may prove t o be 
o f v i t a l importance f o r the' f u t u r e of English a p o l o g e t i c . 
CHAPTER VI 
The year 195? saw not only I.T.Ramsey's Forwood lectures on Freedom 
and Immortality but also Austin Farrer'B Gifford lectures on The 
Freedom of the W i l l . Two years l a t e r , i n 1959» Ian Ramsey was to rev-
iew the published form of those same Gifford Lectures i n The Journal 
of Theological Studies. - He was not entirely s a t i s f i e d 
with what he read.Certainly "none but Dr.Farrer could have written 
t h i s book,Its l i t e r a r y b r i l l i a n c e delights the reader; i t s metaphors 
are elegently ccsnplex and i t s aphorisms sparkle." So wrote Ian Ramsey 
(Rev,FW.ITR.p.^58)» Nevertheless there were certain aspects of the 
problems raised by the lectures which remained f o r Bishop Ramsey 
elusive? once formulated ttiey tended t o disappear "in a wonder that 
i s akin t o worship and a sense of creaturely dependence " ( i b i d , 
p.458). Just how t h i s disappearing takes place remains f o r the most 
part,however,unexplained, 
What Parrer i n The Freedom of the W i l l i s attempting to give 
the reader,is a credible and possible account of the r e l a t i o n which 
exists between our conscious action and the kind of physical action 
pattern which i s the study of the natuml s c i e n t i s t .Any action per-
formed by us of vhich we are aware ( i e . conscious actlon;is a pattern of 
physical functioning which l i k e a l l of the h i ^ e r forms of o r ^ n i s -
ation has what Farrer c a l l s the r e a l power to bewitch the lower forms 
and lead them a new dance.He never abandoned his insistence on the 
r e a l i t y of the scale of being which we found e a r l i e r i n Finite and 
I n f i n i t e ^ which sees created things ranged i n order from l i f e l e s s : 
matter at the bottom t o man at the top and i n which the human act 
takes i t s place.Nor did he ever abandon the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of exi s t -
ence with a c t i v i t y (esse est operari) even as he attempted t o purge 
out from h i s l a t e r works the " A r i s t o t e l i a n leaven" which he f e l t t o 
be present i n the e a r l i e r ones and especially i n Finite and I n f i n i t e . 
He argues unceasingly that the nature of the human act as free and 
unlimited gives us,by analogy,a clue t o the understanding of the 
completely free act which i s God,thou^ he admits that "no analogies 
are more than partial,and a l l p a r a l l e l s , i f we allow ourselves t o be 
misled by them are misleading."(OI£S p.5^). He seeks throu^out his 
work therefore,to give f u l l value t o the laws of nature and the phy-
sical'processes vihich are the object of the scientist's study. Never-
theless he i s equally clear that a mechanical view of the universe 
f a i l s t o do j u s t i c e t o both the m u l t i p l i c i t y of existing systems and 
to phenomena such as reason or w i l l which exist alongside them. The 
hand of God i s t o be seen, therefore,not only i n the evolutionary 
process,but i n history and i n individual lives,insofar as we per-
ceive what i t i s t o co-operate with God's providential grace.Des-
p i t e i t s limitationsitherefore.the natiiral universe i n general and 
the natural world i n part i c u l a r i s not a closed system but open to 
the control of the divine w i l l which brings t o f r u i t i o n particular 
effects from the mass: of int e r l o c k i n g systems of >rtiich i t i s com-
posed.Again we f i n d the theme,recurrent i n Dr.Farrer's philosoph-
i c a l w ritings,of God making the creature make i t s e l f ; that i s t o 
say,he draws out what he sees as the peculiar r e l a t i o n between free 
creaturely a c t i v i t y and the continuing a c t i v i t y of God i n the a f f -
a i r s of the created order.This applies,as we have sug^sted,not 
only t o evolution i n general but t o individual l i v e s as w e l l and 
nowhere more so than i n the l i f e of Jesus.Whenever the eye of f a i t h 
looks a t the created world i t must perceive,then,both the creature 
making i t s e l f and God making i t make i t s e l f . Farrer further distinguishes 
d i f f e r e n t modes of the divine actioa i n r e l ^ i t i o n to the d i f f e r e n t 
levels of creaturely existence. Brian Hebblethwaite represented t h i s 
position c l e a r l y when he wrote; 
"In the case of mere physical forces,there i s the h i g j i -
est degree of mutual externality betweai the two; i t 
is natural enough t o speak of God's action here £is the 
. action of a cause.In the case of r a t i o n a l creatures 
there is more mutual penetration; the entry of the div-
ine i n t o the human may be called inspiration on the one 
side and co-operation on the other.In the person of 
Christ the mutual interpretation i s complete; i t i s 
necessary to t a l k of a personal identity."(Hebblethwaite p.5^7). 
Farrer thus believed that,at the human level,God's usual mode of 
a c t i v i t y i s by the employment of human hsmds. 
The Freedom of the W i l l i s written i n the soliloquizing style 
which i s so rarely absent from Farrer's writings,though i t i s here 
self-confessedly more evident than elsewhere. He wrotej 
" . . . . I have used the device of a running debate between 
the doctrines of freed an and necessity.I hope that my 
readers w i l l recognise t h i s as what i t is,a convenient 
method f o r discussing everything,first or l a s t ; and 
that they w i l l not complain either because my determin-
i s t changes colour l i k e a chameleon,or because,at any 
given point,he lacks the complexion of what they take 
to be the true doctrine."^.FW.pp.vii-viii). 
This i s , o f course.exactly what happened - his c r i t i c s complained, 
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perhaps not altogether u n f a i r l y , t h a t Farrer was conducting both 
sides of the argument according to his own. rules,and that as a 
consequence while the book runs m quite happily,the reader is 
soraetLmes surprised j u s t how f a r he has been taken.Nevertheless, 
i t was Parrer's specific purpose to write i n t h i s way and he does 
i t j i t must be admitted,for the most part successfully. 
The importance of the w i l l i n r a t i o n a l theology i s a theme 
which runs throughout the work of Dr.Farrer .The scale of being 
which we found expounded i n F i n i t e and I n f i n i t e and which i s de-
veloped i n The Freedom of the will is essentially a scale of free-
dom which moves from mere habit at one end to fully conscious choice 
at the other .Behind the theory of ths scale of being ( scala natura ) 
one may f i n d traces of the Platonic and neo-Platonic concept of 
^ r t i c i p a t i o n " - the theory that lower thingjs i n the world of "many" 
share i n the perfection of the one ideal form that they more or less 
resemble - that the Thomist doctrine of Analogy seems to presuppose. 
In the l a t e r The Freedom of the Will,Farrsr examines t h i s doct-
r i n e of the w i l l , s i n c e without will,which must be^by d e f i n i t i o n , t o 
some degree ,free, the doctrine of f i n i t e selves which pervades his 
writings cannot be maintained.The unity of the s e l f i s concentrated 
pr i m a r i l y i n the act of w i l l . He wrote i n The Freedom of the W i l l : 
"To discuss free w i l l i s essentially to discuss will.The addition 
of the adjective 'free' does not distinguish one sort of w i l l (free) 
from another that i s not.'Free' i s l i k e 'proper'/normal','healthy', 
and a s t r i n g of other words which negate privations or exclude mor-
b i d i t i e s ( F W . p. 106). 
The Gifford lectures axe an outstanding refutation of philos-
ophical determinism.VJhat Farrer sets out to show i s that the deter-
minist case - whether ancient or modem - is never satisfactory as 
the whole story and that i t i s i n t e l l i n g the whole story that theol-
ogy becomes relevant as a necessary suppleramt.The fact that we act 
in, one way rather than i n another cannot ultimately be explained by 
purely physical laws.Ultimately these provide f o r us only the d i r e c t -
i n g framework f o r such patterns of action.Indeed,if our actions were 
decided f o r us by physical laws alone,necessary as these are,conscious-
ness would be dienied any natural u t i l i t y , 
"You cannot play croquet i f the mallets turn out to 
,.be flamingoes uncurling as they swing and b a l l s turn 
i n t o hedgehogs.We can play croquet or indeed perform 
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any physical act because we can rel y on the results 
which are intended i n our actions: and we do not deny 
that much of our l i f e i s not intended: I do not plan 
how t o walk or breathe.I am given a f i x e d pattern .But 
I may impose my own super-pattern on ray materials; and 
ray knowledge of ray freedom here i s that which i s most 
luminous to me: i n the l i g h t of i t I can interpret my 
neighbour>and face his claims since the freedom I have 
i s the freedom t o choose,but the claims which confront 
me I do not choose.I can choose to ignore them^but not 
without t r i v i a l i t y can I claim to make up my l i f e as a 
poem as I go along." (FW p.lO ), 
Thus,my ftaeedom i s a freedom of choice 
a.nd i t i s exercised i n the f i e l d of the natural world within the 
context of the m u l t i p l i c i t y o f natural laws which compose the cre-
ated order. 
i U r r e r i s insistent,despite the arguments of Professor Ryle , 
that while these two ways of t a l k i n g about the person - the conscious 
subject and the physical object - may f i t together,and f i t very w e l l , 
they w i l l never fuse. 
" I n speaking of any person,"(he writes), "we must 
either r i d e our mental horse or our physical horse. 
The f a c t that the two horses keep i n step with one 
another a l l along make i t comparatively easy to vault 
from the back of one to the back of the other but our 
speech s t i l l cannot ride both at once; even less,by 
any l o g i c a l magic,turn them i n t o one horse and ride 
t h a t . " (FW p.11). 
Farrer's argument i n The Freedom of the W i l l i s developed by reference 
to A,J.Ayer,G,Ryle and Lord Samuel (the context i s set by a series of 
broadcasts,afterwards published under the t i t l e of The Riysical Basis 
of Hind i n which seven s c i e n t i s t s summarized,in several aspects,the 
then present position of physiological know ledge. Reply was made by 
Ayer,Ryle and Lord Samuel who was a f r i e n d of Einstein and President 
of the B r i t i s h I n s t i t u t e of Philosophy .Amongst his works i s his Essay 
i n Physics, I95I (Ny:Harcourt Brace 1952}.). By means of the s o l i l o -
quising idiom he thus maintains i n The Freedom of the W i l l a non -
determinist position against Lord Samuel's position that the "inc-
reased exactitude both on the side of psychology and neurology"(FW p.21) 
m i ^ t b r i n g these two types of statements closer together. He attacks 
Ayer's contention that "anyone who has reflected on what the expression 
of a mental state and vdiat a report about alterations i n the brain 
means, w i l l see that there can be no f u r t h s r l i n k between them,than.... 
de fac t o concurrence,for what on earth could any further l i n k be 
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supposed t o be?"(PW p.8).Ayer's sug£?stion i s th a t to attempt such 
a l i n k i s t o murder the language i n which we t r y to frame i t and 
that a l l t h a t would be thus created would be a hybrid from t a l k of 
neurology and consciousness.While Ryle attacks Ayer's dualism by 
taking the s e n t i e n t , i n t e l l i g e n t , a c t i v e bodily man as; one,Farrer, 
while often close to Ryle,attacked,as we have seen,any attempt to 
fuse the physical and the mental.We may r e c a l l a t t h i s point the 
si m i l a r arguments raised by Ian Ramsey i n his Biology and Personality 
debate which we have discussed above. 
In the face of the arguments presented by such n^n there devel-
ops Parrer's own complex theory,in terms of what he describes as 
"areas of bodily functioning" which,while seeking to do f u l l j u s t i c e 
to the realm of physical, law,refuses,as we have seen,to accept them 
as capable of providing any f u l l or ultimate explanation,Whenever, 
says Farrer, there i s a conscious act - be i t playing tennis or doing 
mental arithmetic - some bodily function i s involved,though he would 
admit that i t i s pl a i n that t h i s "area of bodily functioning" varies 
enormously,Further a l l t hat goes on i n t h i s bodily functioning i s 
never available to consciousness and i t i s neurology which can look 
at what consciousness misses.Farrer i s ultimately arguing (as does Dr. 
Ryle from whom Dr.Farrer i s not,in many instances,as we have noted,all 
tl i a t d i s t a n t ) against the kind of dualism which finds i t s classic 
expression i n Descartes and he i s arguing f o r the "single history" 
of a person being p a r t i a l l y determined by physical factors,partly 
by mental,where we can do without neither one nor the other.While 
he maintains that "the i n t e l l i g i b l e coincidence of mind and nerve 
i s found not i n the brain but i n the hand; not i n abstract t h o u ^ t 
but i n bodily conduct"(FW p.23),Dr.Farrer argues against the Berkeleian 
line,and says that "we must i n s i s t . . . . t h a t no sensations,whether of 
movement or anything else,are d i r e c t l y produced.They are produced," 
he argues, " i n d i r e c t l y by executive actions making changes i n the 
body,and i t i s these changes that are reported by sensation.Never-
theless,our power to give ourselves sensations within certain ranges 
often appears f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes absolute; and so provide a 
full-blooded analog to the ^ o s t l y experience of imagination,where 
also w i t h i n limits,we can imagine what we w i l l "(FW.p.35),'^^ile we 
must regard the laws of nature as, "generalisations about the working 
unifarmity of e x i s t i n g things."(FW p.76). Internal action i s then, 
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concerned not with the brain but with acts carried by action patterns 
rooted i n the brain.The crucial thing is,however,that freedom always 
involves transcendence and on t h i s Farrer,like Ramsey with his i n s i s t -
ence on the "and more" fact o r , remained,as we have seen,unmoved. 
Thus we can see that the importance of the w i l l i n r a t i o n a l 
theology displays i t s e l f as a dominant,if not the dominant, theme 
i n the philosophical writings of Austin Ferrer. I t constituted,for 
him,both the prime analogy betweai f i n i t e and i n f i n i t e and i s the 
focus i n The Freedom of the Will,of the paradoxical r e l a t i o n which 
exists between primary and secondary causality.On the broader per-
spective ,Th£j^;eedom__of^^ a furthOT outworking of 
the problem of divine providence which runs throu^out Dr.Farrer's 
work (as i t did t h r o u ^ the works of St .Thomas), the problem of the 
co-operation of the human w i l l w i t h the divine.Clearly not a l l of 
God's purposes are realised here and now; i t i s axiomatic to Dr. 
Farcer's position,hoviever,that no gap in s c i e n t i f i c explanation 
w i l l ever be found,but i t remains equally axiomatic that the fabric 
of nature i s p l a s t i c t o the divine moulding,both in general and i n 
pa r t i c u l a r , w i t h i n , that i s , the framework of the necessary conditions 
of the physical universe. 
Ultimately,Farrer woixld recognise,eternal l i f e must be postul-
ated as the only f i n a l theodicy.(cf.J.Pieper, Death and Immortality, 
Bums and Oates,l969 and J.R.Lucas, "The Soul".chap.V.F^ith and Logic 
ed.B.Mitchell,Allen and Unwin,l957 )• I t was Farrer's b e l i e f that the 
Boul i s i t s e l f naturally immortal and this,too, finds i t s expression 
i n The Freedom of the Will.The phrase "naturally immortal" is one 
which may lend i t s e l f a l l too easily t o misinterpretation.What i t 
does not mean i s "immortal independently of God",to suggest such i s 
to d e i f y the s o u l . I t i s possible t o consider "the soul i s naturally 
immortal" as analogous to "Granite i s naturally durable" (an example 
suggested by Farrer himself(FW p.102).) - "In the system in which we 
have our present being,the destruction of granite can be seen to be 
d i f f i c u l t and the perishing of the soul (we should be taken to hold) 
impossible."(FW p.l02). Here "n a t u r a l l y " means " i n accordance with 
the laws of nature". A t h i r d p o s s i b i l i t y i s t o take naturally as im-
pl y i n g that the naturalness of the soul l i e s in. i t s r e l a t i o n t o i t s 
creator and not i n i t s r e l a t i o n to/with the rest of the created world. 
(cf.FW p.102). I t i s the l a t t e r of these two, (already having dismissed 
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" n a t u r a l l y " as implying independence of God), t o which Farrer declares 
his allegiance,since he feels that the former leaves no hope f o r the 
soul's sur v i v a l except as part of the "natural" world. I f we say,for 
whatever reason,that the human person i s continued i n another form 
a f t e r death,Dr.Farrer recognises that i t i s incumbent- upon us to ind-
icate what i s continued (since the body evidently i s n o t ) . Farrer 
writes: 
"To speak of immortality i s to make a d i s t i n c t i o n between 
something vdiich undergoes a transformation and circum-
stance i n the a l t e r a t i o n of which that transformation 
consists.A complete account should specify (a) what 
abides, (b) what circumstances are removed,(c) what c i r -
cumstances take t h e i r place.It has to be conceded that 
we cannot give a proper account of (c) t h i s side of the 
gmve.But unless we can distinguish (a) from (b) we can-
not t a l k about immortality." (FW p.lOif). 
We must distinguish,therefore,what survives from what i t survives. 
Farrer distinguishes f i r s t l y , f o r m from matter. "The form,pattern or 
rhythm of our l i v e s operates a matter of minute physical energies, 
but i t i s not (as we have argued) reducible t o them,"(FW p.105). 
To make such a d i s t i n c t i o n Farrer attends t o what he c a l l s "the 
purposes". "The soul",he says, " i n t h i s l i f e i s not the single mis-
tress of her matter but enslaved by her dependence on it."(FW p.105). 
What he i s saying i s that the acts of the soul have a material pur-
pose; they are directed t o maintain the position of the soul i n the 
material f i e l d , a position of which i t i s relieved by death.Whatever 
the medium of the new post mortem pesition,Farrer believes that fund-
amentally i t w i l l allow f o r a s i m p l i f i c a t i o n of piirpose. 
Ferrer then returns, i n The Freedom of the W i l l , to the consider-
ati o n of the w i l l and we f i n d the r e i t e r a t i o n of the Thomist maxim 
of esse est operari which we found to be so fundamental t o the e a r l i e r 
F i n i t e and I n f i n i t e . In The Freedom of the Will,he writes "We c a l l 
nothing an exercise of w i l l which does not constitute an a c t , t h o u ^ 
the act may be i n v i s i b l e and internal,say the r e g i s t r a t i o n of a dec-
i s i o n f o r my guidance tomorrow." (FW p.109). Farrer's language here 
i s reminiscent of J.L.Austin's notion of the performative utterence, 
a notion which we considered e a r l i e r as taken up by I.T.Ramsey i n 
hi s discussion of such planning i n Freedom and Immortality (promising 
today to buy my son a toy tomorrow ), 
He contends that acts of w i l l do not cause events but rather 
take t h e i r shape i n them. "There i s one thing called 'action' i n 
v i r t u e of perfcrraance," he writes, "and ' v o l i t i o n ' i n v i r t u e of being 
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willed.An action i s what a personal agent does,or i n which he acts, 
t h a t i s the special way i t i s b r o u ^ t about.To be able t o recognise 
an. act i s t o see t h i s . " (FW p.112). Further, "to understand action 
would be t o understand i t s voluntariness ,and to understand how i t 
is voluntary would be to understand how i t i s free.'Free* and 'vol-
untary' seem to be nothing more than two formal aspects of a complex 
reality,personal action."(FW p.11^). 
As one progresses t h r o u ^ The Freedom of the W i l l .one finds 
more and more that i s reminiscent of Ian Ramsey and i t becomes inc-
reeisingly obvious that they are faced with what are,fundamentally, 
the same problems,primarily the problem of apologetic i n the face 
of an alienated s c i e n t i f i c a l l y minded in t e l l e c t x i a l class whose t h -
ought patterns were fashioned i n the forge of l i n g u i s t i c philosophy 
and shaped' by the i n t e l l e c t u a l s t r i c t u r e s of Logical Positivism. 
T h o u ^ , s u p e r f i c i a l l y a t least,representing almost diametrically 
opposed schools of thought within Christian apologetic,on a philo-
sophical level,both i n f a c t coped with the.subsequent progressive 
secularisation of t h o u ^ t by a fundamental appeal to the same grounds 
which f i n d t h e i r focus i n the philosophical vrritings of the thirteenth 
century Thomas Aquinas.Both i n dealing with the mind-body d i s t i n c t i o n , 
I 
both i n the form i n whichit was presented by Descartes and particu-
l a r l y i n the form i n which i t was presented i n Gilbert Ryle's The 
BcHi 
Concept of Hind ^ produce an alternative way of thinking which lays 
great stress on the notion of the s e l f . Ramsey as we have seen,for 
example i n "The Systematic Elusiveness of 'I' ".presents the self 
as the sum of the empirical parts plus more and t h i s i s drawn out 
as we have seen i n h i s debate on the r e l a t i o n of biology and person-
a l i t y . Much the same kind of t h i n g i s t o be found i n The Freedom of 
the W i l l ; the natural s c i e n t i s t , t h o u ^ able to give account of the 
many physical aspects which enter into our being,is ultimately i n -
capable of any f u l l and f i n a l description which can give an adequate 
account of the person/self.B^rrer writes: 
"You may seem t o reduce, the gap between 'body' and 
•mind' by i n t e r p r e t i n g the workings of the 'mind' 
in. a body-like manner.But only at a price - You . 
open a hiatus i n your t h o u ^ t about the mind i t s e l f . 
There i s an area v/hich the paraphysical story cannot 
be stretched to cover; that intimate province of the 
person which each of us is,going about i t s own bus-
iness according to i t s proper manner of proceeding. 
The paraphysical account proves t o be a t best a diag-
ram we make of mind-at-a-distance;it can never close 
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•in upon i t s object,or coalesce with the mind's own 
way of thinking i t s e l f . " (FW p.l75)« 
Furthermore,having rejected the A r i s t o t e l i a n theory of nature on 
the ground t h a t i t projected mental or l i n g u i s t i c form upon the 
inanimate world, he adds » 
"There i s no getting away from the s i g n i f i c a n t tauto-
logies that I am myself,and that no other thing i s I . 
The person ' I ' i s never a bunch of electrons,but the 
person 'I' i s often a hungry creature; he may therefore 
reasonably claim a d i r e c t perception of hunger a t work, 
independently of any subsequent r e f l e c t i v e attempt to 
formulate or diagrammatise the working of himger (Flif p.206). 
I n an a r t i c l e on. "Predestination" i n C h r i s t i a n i t y according to 
Saint Paul, we f i n d Farrer further engaged i n the struggle to 
re l a t e the notion of f r e e - w i l l to that of the divine providence.In 
i t he affirms h i s b e l i e f that the thought of God and divine care 
f i t our every action l i k e a glove,yet without constraint since "what 
he designs f o r us i s t h a t we should f r e e l y act; what he creates i s 
liberty."(Predest. p,99). To enter i n t o God's plan is,he believes* 
t o be most sovereignly ourselves since i t i s t h r o u ^ giving us both 
the power and courage t o be ourselves that he f u l f i l s his purposes 
i n us. Any positive act i n which we engage,therefore»gives effect 
to everlasting love.He lays stress on the inescapability of t h i s 
love which i s God.He writes j 
"We cannot escape from God,any more than we can escape 
from the atmosphere; but then we dp not want t o ; f o r 
why? we shouM cease to breathe.V/e can never draw a 
l i n e and say 'God on that side,I on this'.God i s on 
a l l sides; he has beset us behind and before,and l a i d 
h i s hands upon us; such knowledge i s too v/onderful we 
cannot overtake it."(Predest.p.99). 
In such a l i g h t , t o t a l k of divine predestination i s t o do no more 
than t o t a l k about the God who-is the object of fa i t h , t h e God,that 
is,who saves,Nevertheless,it remains an incontrovertible fact that 
free beings have abused t h e i r freedom and i t i s t h i s which,for Farrer, 
provides the ground of God's acting through his predestinating grace, 
both entering i n and working t h r o u ^ our freedom.In e f f e c t , f o r Ferrer, 
God loves us into loving him; our freedom consists i n "a sharing i n 
the freedom of that son,who i s d i v i n e l y free t o be a l l that his Father 
begets i n him,and wholly himself i n being the home and vessel of the 
Holy Giost."(Predest. p.101). 
The theme of the divine predestination reoccurs i n an arrangement 
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of homily and verse e n t i t l e d Said or Sung which appeared i n 
1960. I n the chapter on "Craggy Doctrine" (SS c h a p . I l l ) Ftorer r e -
futes any clSiim that divine predestination might be linked t o the 
notion of physical determinism.While determinism may discuss whether 
men. r e a l l y act by choice as they think they do or whether they are 
worked by t h e i r nerves as puppets are worked by strings or whether 
men may be fooled i n t o acting by what Farrer c a l l s "a sort of Guy 
Ffeiwkes conspiracy"(SS p.17), the question of divine predestination 
taJces i t f o r granted that we do make r e a l free choices.How then do 
we r e l a t e the making of free choices to such predestinating grace? 
I t i s clear that i f we believe i n God at a l l , then we must believe 
i n both h i s wisdom and his f o r e s i ^ t - "God does not push his creat-
ures in t o existence l i k e ducklings i n t o a pond,to sink or swim and 
to fend f o r themselves.He has a plan f o r them."( ibid.p.lS. ).Comparison 
with plans of human contrivance i s ultimately a f u t i l e operation 
since a l l such plans are imperfect because they,by v i r t u e of t h e i r 
human origin,leave out a l l manner of factors - God on the other hand 
"....leaves no factors out of h i s reckoning,nor does he plan f o r an 
imaginary v i r t u e we haven't got,he plans f o r the very men we are." 
(ibidj).l9). He continues: 
"His plans f o r us are vrtiat perfect wisdom suggests 
t o i n f i n i t e love; his plans f o r us are his love^ 
they are a l l the good that his love can see f o r us, 
as a parent's plans f o r his c h i l d would ideally be 
- he looks at the c h i l d and loves it,and i n loving 
i t sees what opens out before i t . " (ibid.p.19 ), 
The same volume contains a chapter e n t i t l e d , "Ikying to l i v e " i n 
which Tyr.Faxrer suggests that t o have immortal l i f e i s t o " l i v e by 
the only imperishable principle there is,and that i s the w i l l of 
God."(SS p.156). To a t t a i n t o immortal l i f e , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t l i f e of 
which Christ speaks, one must enter i n t o the state whereby the eternal 
or divine w i l l takes the place of the perishable or human will.The 
most perfect example of the achievment cf such a state is,of course, 
to be found i n the u t t e r surrender of Jesus to the w i l l of the Father 
on the cross.Our attempts t o give,so often end i n the f a i l u r e of the 
re t r a c t i o n of what we have given t o God but "....the death of the 
cross-was a s e l f - g i v i n g f i n a l and Absolute; and i t was also enti r e l y 
f r e e , i t gave to the Father a, soul u n s u l l i e d , i t was the gate of immortal 
l i f e . " (ibid.p.156 ) 
On the cross,Christ suffers w i l l i n g l y so long as our sin i s 
mor t i f i e d by his death. I n Lord I Believe we f i n d how 
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t h i s b e l i e f i s related to Farrer's conception of heaven and h e l l . 
"V/hen we meet him and see i n his hands the impress of the force 
with which we have hammered the n a i l s we s h a l l be i n h e l l , " he 
wrote,but he continues, "but he w i l l draw our eyes to his,and then 
we s h a l l be i n heaven."(M.I Believe p.68). This bears an i n t e r -
esting corapeorison to the very Maurician concept of the heaven-hell-
God r e l a t i o n which we found i n the work of Ian Ramsey f o r many of 
the ideas are fundamentally the same,(Cf. "Hell" i n Talk of God). 
In Love Almighty and I l l s Unlimited Farrer postulates that the 
primary d i s t i n c t i o n between man and the beasts l i e s i n man's capacity 
t o think r a t i o n a l l y and t o give subsequent expression -to that t h o u ^ t 
i n speech.Through t h i s "reason" he shares,however f a i n t l y , i n that 
t r u t h , which i s the mind of God,and becomes a co^y or r e f l e c t i o n of 
the divine likeness - i n s h o r t , i t i s through t h i s that he i s a person 
(c f . P.Til l i c h , Theology of Culture, chap. 11, "The Two Types of Philosophy 
of Religion",pp.10-30,(XJP 1964). As he was l a t e r t o write i n Saving 
B e l i e f } 
.God' i s not the animal that we are,nor an animal 
at all.We do not share an i d e n t i t y of nature with him, 
but are the remote o f f p r i n t s 01 his likeness.To acknow-
ledge the i n f i n i t e Creator i n the faicts of f i n i t e e x i s t -
ence requires therefore a positive attitude,an incipient 
faith,from the very start."(SB p.24), 
We f i n d i n Love A l m i ^ t y anff I l l s Unlimited a fundamental s h i f t i n 
position concerning Farrer's account of the iamortal nature of man. 
In The Freedom of the W i l l we read that "Immortality i s not a g i f t 
of grace; the soul i s naturally immortal"(FW p.102) and decided,if 
we agree with Dr.Farrer, that "natural" here aeant the r e l a t i o n of the 
soul i n i t s nature with the divine nature. In Love Almighty and I l l s 
Unlimited, J'arrer categorically states that man i s not f i r s t an imm-
o r t a l soul,but "an animal on whom the capacity f o r everlasting l i f e 
has been conferred." (op.cit.p . l 07)This does not seem to accord well 
with the f a c t t h a t man as fundamentally a reasoning animal i s thus 
by nature a reflection,however poor»of the divine and i s thus by 
Farrer's own reckoning to some degree,however small,naturally imm-
o r t a l . In Love Almighty and I l l s Unlimited i t i s suggested that the 
capacity f o r everlasting l i f e i s conferred by the fact that man has 
been enabled t o teilk and i n acquiring speech he has required the 
rudiments of reason (see M I L p.107). Speech,indeed,Dr.Farrer suggests. 
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"opens a path t o knowledge, j u s t i c e and love and even to the notion 
of God Himself ."(LAIL p.110). While yet transformed by the capacity 
f o r speech man remains an animal and as such a physical Jhing.As a 
speaker and thus as a reasoning person he i s capable of an immortal 
destiny; as a thing and as an animal he i s open to destruction and 
certain t o die,The r e l a t i o n of our present being t o our future imm-
o r t a l i t y i s as of seed to plant or c a t e r p i l l e r to b u t t e r f l y ( although, 
these examples,thou^ unable to be bettered,remain wide of the mark). 
"What,ultimately,God does f o r us and s h a l l do f o r us i s God's secret; 
that he w i l l da i t i s our f a i t h . " ( i b i d . p . 110-111). This f a i t h finds 
i t s expression throu^out the work of Dr.Farrer.Elsewhere i t finds 
expression i n such phrases as, "....there 3s another l i f e ; God raises 
the dead"(ibid.p. 176) or, " I f there was ever a speaking and loving 
person,there i s a creature f o r God to immortalize."(ibid-.P«190)« 
Farrer is,however,ready to recognize that such a d i s t i n c t i o n , 
that while men suffer and perish as animals,they are redeemed and 
saved as r a t i o n a l per sons, cannot so easily be drawn since as he per-
ceives, " S p i r i t u a l redemption may be offered a person who lacks the 
bodily mea-ns t o p r o f i t by i t . " ( i b i d . p . 113) - I f nian i s damned as a 
body,how s h a l l he be saved as a soul? Farrer writes, " I t is a common 
t h o u ^ not always acknowledged, observation that the gospel i s preached 
t o multitudes with whom i t s acceptance i s not a l i v e option or psych-
ological p o s s i b i l i t y . " ( i b i d , p . 11^). Such an observation enables Dr. 
Farrer t o b r i n g i n once again the question of divine providence .The 
believer's standing i n f a i t h must be seen as the work of God - God 
has made us capable of receiving his Gospel by his whole way of work-
ing the i n f i n i t e complexities of the bodily world and thus we are 
recipients not only of s p i r i t u a l grace but of a physical providence 
as w e l l . ' 
In the chapter e n t i t l e d "Adam and Lucifer" Farrer expresses his 
b e l i e f t h a t "the power,or shall.we rather say,the l i a b i l i t y , t o sin 
i s inherent i n a f i n i t e free w i l l ; inherent therefore ju s t as much 
i n angels as i n men."(ibid.p.1^3)» The scope of our freedom he bel-
ieves i s to be found within t h i s world,so constituted as i t island, 
as a result,he says, "Our voluntary acts,whether virtuous,blameworthy, 
or i n d i f f e r e n t can only realize natural p o s s i b i l i t i e s and carry nat-
u r a l consequences."(ibid.p.158)* 
"The Descent i n t o H e l l and the Ascent i n t o J,ife" i n The Gospel 
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of the Resurrection published i n I962 raises the question, "I'/hat 
i s i t t o have died and t o be dead?"(GofH p.97). "What",asks Dr. 
Ferrer,, " i s the tenuous thread which spans the abyss of not being, 
t o j o i n our being what we were with our being what we s h a l l become?" 
(ibid.p.97). While Flarrer expresses his b e l i e f that resurrection 
w i l l be our refashioning i n the s t u f f of glory he admits that (being 
t h i s side of the grave) he does not know i t s mode "but Christ knows 1 
f o r he descended i n t o f e l l . " (ibid.p.9 7 ) . 
The following quotation i s a f i n e example both of Austin Farrer's 
views and of the b r i l l i a n c e and l u c i d i t y of his s t y l e . In The Gospel 
of the Resurrection he wrote, 
"Christ became progressively a man by everything he 
did or suffered up to the peak of his maturity.Then, 
i n the flower of his age,he died.When he died his making 
was not finished j f o r what sort of a man was he to 
remain? Not the sort of man we are,nor the sort of 
maji any of us here have seen,but the sort of man we 
must each of us be one day by God's grace; not the 
man i n fl e s h and blood,but the man i n glory.And how 
was he t o reach that state? How i s anyone to reach i t , 
anyhow while t h i s world lasts? He must pass the dead 
point of Hades.The p a r a l l e l rays of the sun,passing 
the lens of a burning glass,are so deflected that t h ^ 
slope together and cross a l l i n a single point,a point 
i d e a l l y speaking,.with no magnitude? which point being 
passed,they fan out again i n t o a fresh cone.The cone 
spreads to light,and,were i t unbroken by any obstacle, 
should expand to a l l infinity.Death,the a n i h i l a t i o n 
of a l l we were,is the point of no magnitude into which 
our being must contract i f i t i s to expand into the 
flower of glory.This is the pinpoint^this i s the needle's 
eye,which we must pass to enter the Kingdom of Heaven. -
Here the r i c h unloads his wealth,and the proud his state, 
Yes,and the poor his skin and bones,to s l i p t h r o u ^ into 
a better world." ( ibid.p.98). 
To be i n such a state i s to be,in heaven and heaven, f o r Farrer, i s 
nothing but Jesus Christ,and those i n union with him. 
1964 saw the publication of one of AustinFarrer's most popular 
works,a l i t t l e book of about one hundred and f i f t y pages e n t i t l e d . 
Saving Belief - A discussion of essentials (SB). I t s subject matter 
ranges,as the t i t l e suggests,over a l l the major topics of the Christ-
ian f aith,from proofs of God's existence to be l i e f i n heaven and h e l l . 
Within the book,Farrer fu r t h e r explores his belie f s on freedom and what 
i t i s t o be a free-thinker .To be such i s t o submit to the facts, "Free-
dom can only be freedom to embrace and explore the world," he wrote, 
"not even the humanist can create his universe; l^ e must respond to 
r e a l i t i e s according t o the demands they make on him; and i t cannot 
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surprise him that,, i n the eyes of a "believer,the supreme freedom 
should be freedom t o know God and t o respond t o him."(SB p.33). 
Indeed "....God does not l i m i t us by being l i m i t e d ; he only l i m i t s 
us by being true."(ibid ,p34) . and here,as elsewhere,Farrer maintains 
hi s p r i n c i p l e that nothing should be asserted about the divine which 
contradicts or undermines what we know about the natural and the human. 
Here again we f i n d raised the question of providential care. Though 
the world i s made t o run i t s e l f and God by s e t t i n g the world outside 
his own being assures h i s freedom of action i n respect of the world, 
nevertheless every creature contained i n i t i s confronted by the 
omnipotence which made i t i 
"The Sim i n the height of a clear noon,radiates on every 
earthly t h i n g that l i e s open, to his l i ^ t ; and so a trans-
cendent Godhead must radiate on every creature subject to 
his w i l l . A l l things are external to his being; nothing i s 
outside the sphere of his action.And i t i s the present 
r e l a t i o n of every creature to a l m i ^ t y Goodness that makes 
the core of the b e l i e f i n Providence." (ibid,p.^ 3 ) . 
(Both editions of Saving Belief, published by Hodder and Stou^ton, 
though published at a three.year i n t e r v a l , read,in the paragraph 
quoted above, "moon" i n the f i r s t l i n e ( l i n e 21 SB). English usage 
makes such a reading d i f f i c u l t - what i s meant by "the sun i n the 
height of a clear moon"? I t would accord well with the context and 
f a c i l i t a t e a better idiomatic rendering of the text to a l t e r the 
reading,aB we have done,from "moon" t o read, "the sun i n the height 
of a clear noon". Then,the meaning of the passage i s obvious,the sun 
stands i n d i r e c t r e l a t i o n t o the earth and,while t h e i r beings remain 
q u i t e d i s t i n c t from one another,the earth remains bathed i n the sun's 
l i g h t . I f .however,the reading i n the text' i s allowed to stand as pub-
lish e d and the reading "moon" i s correct then there i s a fundamental 
s h i f t i n meaning and the r e l a t i o n between sun and earth,and consequ-
ently of God and world,to read back the analogy,becomes indirect 
rather than direct,and the earth i s bathed only,in t h i s context, 
i n the re f l e c t e d l i ^ t of the sun. A possible,though nonetheless 
hypothetical, explanation of such a use of the image of the moon 
would be t o say that the creator God does not stand i n dir e c t r e l -
a t i o n t o the created world,in that he acts i n a d i r e c t providential 
way within the natural complex of systems,but acts rather only through 
the person and work of Christ (here represented by the image of the 
moon) thus making his r e l a t i o n to the world i n Effect,indirect.Such 
an explanation i s well w i t h i n the bounds of c r e d i b i l i t y and entails 
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no a l t e r a t i o n of the text.The context of the passage, however,accords 
better with the variant reading which we have suggested,since Feirrer 
i s not engaged at t h i s point i n any form of s p e c i f i c a l l y Christolog-
i c a l debate but i s considering rather the pure r e l a t i o n of God t 6 
the world.If we state the problem thus; either God stands i n d i r e c t 
r e l a t i o n to the world ra^ God stands i n i n d i r e c t r e l a t i o n t o the world, 
therefore,either God stands i n d i r e c t r e l a t i o n t o the world God 
does not stand i n d i r e c t r e l a t i o n to the world (ie because that r e l -
a t i o n i s i n d i r e c t ) then the extent of the antithesis of meaning i s 
clear and i t makes a tremendous ammount of difference to the notion 
of. the r e l a t i o n between divine,providential (and indeed predestin-
a t i n g ) grace and the freedom of the world,within the parameters of 
the physical laws of the universe and of those creatux'es endowed 
t h r o u ^ speech with the germ of r a t i o n a l i t y to operate within such 
a sphere,whether such a r e l a t i o n i s posited as direct (God-world) 
or i n d i r e c t (God-Christ-world) even though the Godhead i s essentially 
one,) 
The f a c t remains,however, that "God i s God; he can and does give an 
entire,an adequate and an undivided attention to every single creature 
and every single circumstance." (SB.p.45). The world i n which God thus 
acts i s an unimaginable complex of multiple planes; atomic,molecular, 
c e l l u l a r ; vegetable,animal and social.God's acting,however,does not 
e n t a i l the curtailment of the natural running of the created order at 
any level,the constituent elements run themselves and by their mutual 
int e r a c t i o n run the world. "God not only makes the world,he makes i t 
make i t s e l f or rather,he causes the innumerable constituents t o make 
it."(SB p.51). 
In Saving Belief,as elsewhere,Farrer considers i t absurd to a t t -
empt to defend God's providence or t o j u s t i f y the tolerance of the e v i l s 
he permits without some reference t o the idea of resurrection,the sup-
reme act of providential caring and love.In Christ we f i n d the Godhead 
clothed i n flesh.To argue f o r divine providence without the notion of 
resurrection i s , f o r Farrer t o " agree to box with my hands tied."(SB p.55). 
"How am I t o s t r i k e the balance of God's dealings'^wrote Dr.Farrer, 
" i f I leave out that single weight outweighing a l l . which he has f l u n g 
i n t o the scales,his own Godbead clothed with flesh,drawing us i n t o the 
fellowship of immortal being?" (SB p.55). 
I n 1959 i n the Introduction to The Easter Enigma; An Essay on the 
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Resurrection with special reference to the data of Psychical Research 
he wrote of Christ's resurrection that ,as f a i t h conceives i t , i t " i s 
unique i n kind" and that "Christians w i l l always r e s i s t the reduction 
of i t t o a l e v e l with any class of facts what so ever. What Christ did i n 
r i s i n g from the dead i s what no other man has done,"(Easter Enigma p.11). 
The resurrection constitutes a miracle unlike any other.(cf. T.A.Roberts, 
The Gospels and the Resurrection,Ssii'^Jiiii^-''"^•i p^-^^^'J*.^^^^^  represents a 
unique manifestation w i t h i n t h i s world of t r a n s i t i o n which God makes 
f o r us out of t h i s way of being i n t o another,though at no point i n the 
story are the natures of such beings forced or violated i n being thus 
f u l f i l l e d and transformed. 
In what way i s the immortalisatipn of such a creature meaningful, 
the creature which,unlike a l l . others,bears the stamp of the divine image? 
I t i s Parrer's contention that God would never l e t perish a mind capable 
of abstracting i t s e l f from the mere concerns of i t s body,except of course 
i f the creature b r o u ^ t i t upon i t s e l f by i t s invincible perversity and 
so he concludes that . "we s h a l l not dream of j u s t i f y i n g God's way with 
men,if we are obliged t o leave out of view the very highroad of his good-
ness, immortal hope." (SB p .56)» 
I n shaping us thus for immortality, God sets a path along which 
we may walk and endows us with the grace to walk along i t it.Such divine 
action i s seen primarily,Farrer would argue,in the l i f e and death and 
resurrection of Jesus i since t h a t i s precisely what God does about the 
salvation of the world .Thus i n the common case of a good man,a good human 
life,humanity supplies the pe^ttem and God the grace.In the case of Jesus 
on the other hand,divine redemptive action supplies the pattern and man-
hood the medium or instrumenti 
"A good man helped by grace may do things divinely, 
Christ did divine things humanly .V/herever the eye 
of f a i t h looks i n the created world i t perceives 
tvio levels of action.There is the creature making 
i t s e l f and there i s God making i t make itself."(SB p.75). 
This God does by making thea make themselves by t h e i r own principle of 
action. 
In The Triple Victory (I965) Farrer expresses the matter thus : 
"The two-sidedness of Christ's action i s perfectly 
expressed i n the text of St,John, ' I am the Res-
urrection' .What does t h i s mean,'I give resurrection' 
or ' I r i s e from the dead'? I t means both,and i t 
means more.It means * I achieve resurrection i n my-
self,and so I win i t f o r others'.It means more s t i l l ; 
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i t means ' I do this,because of what I am.This i s what 
div i n e sonship,taking hold of mortal flesh does to i t ' . " 
(TV p.25). 
Here too, i n Saving B e l i e f , we f i n d the principle of esse est operari. 
"The w i l l of God",writes Farrer, " i s God himself i n action,and God i s 
always i n action."(SB; p.97) and we see,too, the r e l a t i o n of such a 
p r i n c i p l e t o the idea of man's freedom of w i l l (and therefore of 
choice) I 
" I t i s indeed the supreme paradox of our condition, 
t h a t an A l m i ^ t y power respects our f r e e - w i l l ; but 
h i s respecting of i t does not mean that he s i t s ba^k 
and watches it.He works upon free creatures t h r o u ^ 
a l l the i n f i n i t e operations of his providence."(SB p.97). 
Thus the process i s i n no way forced,and the divine cannot be said 
to act by incursion on the physical laws of the created order but 
only by h i s movement within and through them. 
Flarrer i s concerned to avoid a two-decker system of heaven and 
earth.He contends that the d i v i s i o n of angels and men i s no more than 
a '^parish boundary" and that between men who are l i v i n g and those who 
are departed,"a hedge between two f i e l d s " (SB p.l30). The great divide 
i s that which separates the Godhead from a l l and every created being. 
In the chapter on "Heaven and Hell",Farrer admits the lack of poss-
i b i l i t y i n knowing,this side of the grave at least ,by vhut sort of 
j o i n t the new immortal l i f e thus f a r postulated w i l l f i t onto the old 
life.V/e cannot know what the new l i f e i s going to be like,but i n what 
ever else i t may consist,heaven i s certainly not,for Dr,Parrer,an op-
t i o n a l extra but a fundamental tenet of our faith.To use one of Austin 
F&,rrer's most well known phrases, "Heaven i s not a cash payment f o r 
walking with God,it's where the road goes"(SB p.1^0). Cur immortality 
i s the new g i f t of God; heaven i s the presence of God only insofar as 
the presence of God i s what makes heaven heavenly sin3e i t i s nonsense 
i f i t i s taken to define a geographical region (or even a condition) 
i n which those who have died f i n d themselves.One does not enter the 
presence of God,therefore,merely by exchanging l i f e f o r death.Hell, 
on the other hand,is,for Farrer,not to be seen as anything which gives 
shape to the Chnstian's experience but i s simply rather something t o 
be shuddered from.It i s here that we f i n d expressed^Austin Farrer's 
renunciation of the t r a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f in. the Devil,for while "Christians 
profess a credal b e l i e f i n God and resurrection to eternal l i f e , t h e y 
do not profess such b e l i e f i n the d e v i l or everlasting torment."(SB p.l50). 
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"The doctrine of h e l l , " he continues, "has certainly found a place 
i n a u t h o r i t a t i v e statements of Christian teaching; i t has never 
formed part of a creed properly so called."(SB p.l^O). What Dr. 
Farrer means by the acceptance of a credal formula i s the laying 
open of ourselves t o be l a i d hold of by i t .Hence the Christian may 
believe that there i s a h e l l , but he does not believe i n i t or i n 
the Devil i n the same way i n which he might belive in heaven and 
i n God',for he does not put his f a i t h i n i t (cf,R.H.Price,"Belief 
•In' and Belief 'That'",chap.VIII of B.Mitchell ed.The Philosophy 
of Religion.Oxford readings i n Philosophy,0UP,1971,PP.168-79). 
For the temper of Austin Farrer's traditionalism,however, i t i s i n t -
eresting t o compare Saving Belief with contributions to the same 
discussion by other,Cambridge,men.(cf.for eg. Soundings.ed.Vidler; 
Honest t o God,J.A.T.Robinsont Objections to Christian Belief,D.M. 
JilacKinnon.) 
In A Science of God? Farrer reiterates his b e l i e f that 
man's freedom l i e s i n the f a c t that while God thinks things as they 
are, and designs them t o go the way they go,he does not impose an 
order against the grain of things but makes them follow -Uieir own 
bent and work out the world by being themselves.The world i s j u s t 
what God designed i t t o be,a f r e e - f o r - a l l of s e l f moving forces each 
being i t s e l f and yet by free interaction creating,with a l l the r e s t , 
the balanced system which we know with a l l the complexities whereby 
we e x i s t . 
Farrer's language about the person is here remarkably akin,at 
times,to the language which we found i n the p h i l o s o i i i i c a l writings 
of Professor Ramsey.While he would not have us forget the physical 
side of our nature,he reminds us that , "We are physical plus 
and of course i t i s the plus t l i a t specially interests us,,.." (SofG p.l02). 
Again ,.this kind of t a l k i s exactly p a r a l l e l t o the "....and more" 
theology of I.T.Ramsey which we explored i n our discussion of Ram-
sey's Freedom and Immortality./ Farrer's view implies that God w i l l s 
the brain etc, to function harmoniously as the seat of man's thought 
and action but that he creates them i n d i r e c t l y , i n and t h r o u ^ his 
positing of the atomic,molecular and organic processes which const-
i t u t e them, (cf .Hebblethwaite p.232 and I.T.Ramsey's Biology and Per? 
sonality debate ). 
These same factorsi because God has created them as free and 
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capable of following t h e i r own bent,because he never forces the 
story, sometimes cause great damage.What we are facing,therefore , 
i s the problem of the primary-secondary causality relation.Farrer's 
contention i s that God's, action i n the world occurs i n and t h r o u ^ 
the whole matrix of secondary causality both p a r t i c u l a r l y - the 
cooperation of ind i v i d u a l s p i r i t s with God - and generally - i n 
the processes of evolution. God does not overide the natural causal 
sequence and yet nevertheless every s i t u a t i o n i n l i f e i s a f i e l d f o r 
divine operation. 
I n the following year,only a year before his death i n I968, 
Austin Marsden Farrer published h i s l a s t major work. Faith and Spec-
ulation,which contained the Deem's lectures of 196^ .^ In t h i s book 
Farrer takes occasion to purge out "the old Ar i s t o t e l i a n leaven from 
the v o l u n t a r i s t metaphysics I sketched so many years ago i n F i n i t e 
and I n f i n i t e . " ( F S p.v ). Here too,Farrer's two level approach to the 
God-world r e l a t i o n - God making the creature make i t s e l f - vrtiich we 
found i n the f i n a l chapters of The Freedom of the W i l l , finds i t s 
re-expression as the subject matter of the f i n a l chapters of Faith 
-and Speculation. Here Farrer acknowledges e x p l i c i t l y that there i s 
no way of i d e n t i f y i n g the hidden action of God's grace except from 
the standpoint of experience.Here we can see a feature of Austin 
CIO 4 o i a ^ 
Farrer's l a t e r writings,the attempt to map.out vAiat may^not l e g i t -
imately be said about how God acts i n the world. In his a r t i c l e on 
"Austin Farrer's Concept of Divine Providence"^ Brian 
Hebblethwaite divides the main features of Farrer's characterisation 
of the problem of primary and secondary causality into i t s positive 
and negative aspects,On the negative side,Farrer both rejects those 
theories which assimilate God's mode of action to that of the creatures, 
making Hira,aj5 i t were, an agent among agents - since divine action,as 
we have seen,takes place i n Farrer's estimation without the forcing 
of the natural order and the consequent competing with creaturely 
agencies on the side of the divine and he rejects those theories of 
nature which do not allow room for divine action; that i s t o say, 
where the g r i d of causal uniformity i s made to f i t toa t i g h t l y . 
P o s i t i v e l y i n these lectures,Farrer stresses the experiential value 
of co-operation with the divine w i l l which,incidentally,represents 
Farter's fundamental understanding of prayer (cf.Hebblethwaite p.5^9). 
Faith and Speculation provides,too, an interesting example of 
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the respective approaches of Ian Ramsey and Austin J ^ r e r t o the 
problem of the r e l a t i o n between t h e i s t i c b e l i e f and the philosoph-
i c a l empiricism which marked the middle years of t h i s century.Farrer 
begins by postulating his b e l i e f that "however long the believer i s 
given t o explain himself,and a t whatever point the test i s applied, 
a s t r i c t empirical c r i t e r i a f o r t r u t h of fa c t must condemn t h e i s t i c 
b e l i e f " (FS p.l6) and that so much i s evident a p r i o r i and i n advance 
of any experiments being made.Two conditions must therefore be f u l f i l l e d 
before serious consideration of t h e i s t i c b e l i e f can take place.Both 
the structure of believing thought must be allowed free operation and 
the question must be raised, "What refinement of the empirical p r i n -
c i p l e could conceivably square with the v a l i d i t y of the thought struc-
ture thus deployed?" (FS p.l6). We may r e c a l l Bishop Ramsey's concern 
t o consider the tenets of contemporary empiricism and to explore i n 
what ways the basis of empirical t h o u ^ t m i ^ t best be broadened and 
extended t o encompass the propositions of t h e i s t i c belief.Here we f i n d 
both Ramsey and Farrer engaged i n the same way i n facing the problem 
of the a l i e n a t i o n of the s c i e n t i f i c a l l y minded i n t e l l e c t u a l classes 
which we have e a r l i e r discussed.Both are asking the question, (here 
postulated by Farrer) " I s the empirical principle so stretched as to 
cover the theological genre, s t i l l of any substance? And w i l l it,even 
so,allow t h i s or that theological assertion?"(FS p.16). 
In Faith and Speculation Farrer actually goes so f a r as to use 
the term model (and especially the notion of the Personal Model) t o 
describe the analogous r e l a t i o n which exists between man and the d i v -
ine ( c f . r a esp.chap.Ill) i n much the same way as Ramsey employs the 
model and q u a l i f i e r technique which he developed i n his Reli^ous 
Language (cf ,RL chap,II) and which i s so much the d i s t i n c t i v e mark 
of h i s work.Here ite can see how both authors are appealing,ultimately, 
t o the Thomist doctrine of analogy to provide the base f o r t h e i r t h o u ^ t 
t h o u ^ t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Thomas i s so radi c a l l y different.B^rrer 
i s , of the two, the most obviously Ihomist i n his thougl^it i n adopting i n 
pa r t i c u l a r St.Thomas' maxim of esse est operari, t h o u ^ both r e f l e c t 
St.Thomas' s k i l l i n speaking persuasively to protagonists of another 
view - always with the hope of a r r i v i n g at mutual understanding. 
Farrer,in particular,displays an appreciation of Thomas' dialogicgd 
method while Ramsey displays greater appreciation of his sense 
that mentalrapportjcommon ground,was the prerequisite of any dialogue 
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that hopes t o a r r i v e at consensus. 
Parrer makes i t clear i n Faith and Speculation that he believes 
that i t i s "the object of r e l i g i o n t o establish a positive r e l a t i o n 
between men and t h e i r Creator"(FS p . 5 3 ) . He makes use of many forms 
of the model,the foremost amount which i s the use of the personal 
model which he takes up,as we have noted,in the text of Faith and 
Speculation i n the special form of the happy r e l a t i o n between friends. 
As by actions directed at our friends we draw respcxises from them and 
i n the process of free mutuality,thereby come t o know them; so too 
the r e l a t i o n between a man and h i s creator establishes a positive 
rapport between a c t i v i t y on both sides. In so f a r as the r e l a t i o n of 
t h e i s t i c b e l i e f to empiricism raises the fundamental question of 
whether there i s any empirical v e r i f i c a t i o n of our engagement with 
the actual w i l l , of an actual God,we are forced to admit that any such 
v e r i f i c a t i o n i s only of a general kind,that i s t o say,it consists 
only i n so f a r as we f i n d " l i f e " and blessing i n the process,through 
God u n i t i n g us with h i s w i l l and therefore with himself here and now. 
Ultimately,we cannot d i r e c t l y experience i n the present,the mainten-
ance or restoration of the relationship beyond t h i s l i f e and thus 
the f i n a l v e r i f i c a t i o n ( i n empirical terms) of divine f i d e l i t y escapes 
us and i n the end "we can i n the only possible way,experience the 
active r e l a t i o n of a created energy to the Creator's action by emb-
racing the divine will,"(FS p . 6 6 ) . Grace,in t h i s context,ic seen a;s 
the action of the Creator i n the creature j "He acts i n the creriture 
everywhere; when he acts i n the r a t i o n a l creature he i s pleased to 
act i n that creature's mental and volimtary l i f e .bringing them in t o 
his own.For of such a conformity or union with the divine,mind and 
w i l l can be made capable.Physical or animal energies cannot."(FS p.67). 
Such action takes place,as we have seen, t h r o u ^ creaturely agencies 
without f o r c i n g them or competing with them. In the f i n a l analysis, 
f o r Farrer,there i s only one p r a c t i c a l r e l a t i o n of the human person 
t o the divine and that i s "the voluntary r e l a t i o n of which faith,ob-
edience, love and t h e i r contraries are the modalities." (FS p.99). 
Indeed, "at any given moment a nan w i l l be called upon to make some 
voluntaiy reaction.Because i t i s what he i s called t o do he must view 
i t as his own. Any thing preceding i t may be taken as signi f y i n g the 
divine w i l l which c a l l s f o r it."(FS p.93-9). 
At the end of Faith and Speculation, i n the Deems lectures,we 
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f i n d Farrer's r e f u t a t i o n of the Aristotelianism which i s to be found 
i n h i s e a r l i e r works. There he writes: 
"Freedom of choice finds i t s place i n Aristotle's system, 
.but not at the l e v e l of divine existence.lt i s the disc-
retionary adaptation of means t o ends on the part of a 
changeable being i n pursuit of i t s own fulfilment.The 
supreme Being doubtless has supreme freedom,since he 
immediately and timelessly does a l l that a r a t i o n a l mind 
can wish to achieve .But his fresiom i s not expressed in 
decision,nor i s i t creative.Aristotelianism accommodates 
a c t i v i t y within a framework of essence,Essence gives 
a c t i v i t y aim,and the Supreme A c t i v i t y i s supremely 
expressive of the essence which i t perpetually actualizes." 
(FS p.139). 
He concludes » 
"....the ^ o s t of an A r i s t o t e l i a n theology continued to 
haunt a Newtonian universe.Kant was s t i l l struggling 
with i t i n his Critique of Pure Reason and (to descend 
from the sublime to the ridiculous) so was the author 
of F i n i t e and I n f i n i t e . " ( F S p.l^O). 
Thus was completed the reform of Parrer's theology already begun i n 
Love A l m i ^ t y and I l l s Unlimited and A Science of God? and e x p l i c i t l y 
undertaken i n f U i t h and Speculation. Shortly before h i s death i n the 
Autumn of I968,Austin Farrer wrote an a r t i c l e i n the Dictionary of the 
History of Ideas (Diet.of Hist,of Ideas) on the subject of "Freewill 
i n Theology". In i t he reviews i n b r i e f the conclusions reached over a 
l i f e t i m e of reflection,a r e f l e c t i o n subjected constantly to review 
and i n t e l l e c t u a l testing,V/e f i n d here his b e l i e f i n f r e e - w i l l as un-
i n h i b i t e d .intentional action and the assertion of f r e e - w i l l as the 
negation of constraint and he provides the reader with an incisive 
account of the history of the notions of f r e e w i l l from the early Greek 
sophists t o the l i n g u i s t i c philosophers of the twentieth centurj'. 
A short vfhile l a t e r Austin Marsden Farrer died leaving behind 
him a lifetime's work,a major contribution to philosophical theology 
i n t h i s century but i n which, above a l l else, he had s o u ^ t to do what 
he most desired, "to crumble the bread of t r u t h f o r the people",to 
use h i s own phrase, and the humility of the man and of the priest 
never f a i l s t o shine from the pages of his work which always sparkles 
with the ingenuity and b r i l l a n c e of a f i r s t class mind. 
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Our examination of the philosophical, writings of Ian Thomas Ramsey 
and Austin Marsden Farrer end especially those which touch on the 
topics of freedom and immortality has served to illuminate f o r us 
some of the major problems faced by contemporary apologetic.We have 
examined the way i n vhich two men have,from d i f f e r e n t standpoints, 
approached a common problem,a problem which,incidentally,the lihurch 
s t i l l faces,the problem of apologetic i n the face of the.radical 
secularisation of modern society.Both were forced to face squarely 
the Empiricist challenge as i t presented i t s e l f i n the middle years 
of t h i s century i n the writings of Ayer,Flew,Braithwaite and others 
i n whom the challenge of David Hume,two hundred years e a r l i e r , t o 
theology and metaphysics found i t s modem expression.The propositions 
of theology and metaphysics were contemptuously dismissed by such 
as meaningless nonsense and so,in a sense,the b a t t l e was doubly 
d i f f i c u l t . N o t only had the Christian apologist to argue f o r the 
v e r i t y of theological propositions but he had f i r s t to defend them 
against the charge that they were in. f a c t not propositions at a l l 
but meaningless combinations of words.To t h i s b a t t l e came Ian Ramsey 
and Austin Farrer,employing i n the task a l l the resourcefulness, of 
f i r s t - c l a s s minds,fully aware of the problems which faced them. Ian 
Ramsey,at the end of his Freedom and Immortality,wrotet 
"None of these convictions i s , i n i t s e l f , v e r y s t a r t l i n g 
or novel,but at least they register a protest against 
two popular misconceptions:that those with an intense 
a f f e c t i o n f o r ordinary language must necessarily deny 
metaphysics,or that those who defend metaphysics must 
necessarily trade i n occult realms and shadowy worlds. 
Which means that the book has been f i t t i n g on two 
ba t t l e - f r o n t s at once;and i t i s a sobering r e f l e c t i o n 
that not many wars have been won under such a necessity." 
(F&IP.I52.). 
The same m i ^ t be said,too,of the philosofdiical writings of Dr.Farrer. 
They faced,also,the challege of neo-orthodoxy which i n the years 
j u s t preceding and during the second World War exerted i t s greatest 
influence i n Anglican ci r c l e s and which found i t s clearest expression 
i n t h i s country i n Dr.Karl Barth's Gifiord Lectures of I938 on The 
Knowledge of God and the Service of God. Farrer's Finite and I n f i n i t e 
anticipated,as we have seen,much of the post-war discussion which 
arose around t h i s turning away of theological pursuit from natural 
theology .appearing a t a time when, too, l o g i c a l positivism occupied a 
confident position on the English philosophical scene,"the f i r s t 
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delivemnce of r a t i o n a l theology to be on the one hand rigorous and 
f u l l y aware of the d i f f i c u l t i e s of t a l k i n g about God and on the other 
hand to t a l k about God who was the God. of Christian tradition,and not 
a modified I d e a l i s t hangover."(Curtis p.250.). 
Both thinkers drew on sources,both ancient and modem whose 
ideas can be seen i n varying degree throughout t h e i r work,from the 
Greek and Roman poets t o the E x i s t e n t i a l i s t s of modern-day Europe. 
Of p a r t i c u l a r note amongst such influences was the thirteenth century 
Dominican master,Thomas Aquinas.The climate i n which Thomas liv e d and 
worked was to a large degree similar t o the climate and the conditions 
t o which both Ramsey and Farrer directed t h e i r work. In Aquinas' time 
the Moors,despite t h e i r defeat by the crusaders,still, l a i d siege t o 
the e h r i s t i a n world and further a f i e l d the Tartars were making the 
Western world aware of the power and the human resources of the Asiatic 
continent.The founding of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem served t o 
make more acutely f e l t what has been called: "the haunting shadows of 
Islam," M-D,Chenu,in his book Toward Understanding St,Ihomas,wrote 
of t h i s situations "Now Christians were becoming conscious of the 
facts that f a i t h had touched only a part of the human race and that 
there existed a whole world containing tremendous secular resources." 
( o p , c i t , p , l l , ) 
Thus Thomas Aquinas wrote i n a si t u a t i o n of changing social, 
economic and p o l i t i c a l conditions which swept across the face of 
the Western world. Feudal society was crumbling under the wheels, 
of an advancing technology which,linked with the specialisation of 
craftsmen and a rapid growth of population led to the gradual develop-
ment of urban centres.Here the new class of matured persons had won 
f o r i t s e l f a whole series of new freedoms. 
In the twentieth century Europe of Ramsey and Farrer we see a 
s i m i l a r rapid change i n the social and economic climate.Like that 
through which Aquinas l i v e d , i t was marked by an increased technoloar 
and the subsequent secularisation of society.Developments i n comm-
unication and t r a v e l f a c i l i t a t e d the rapid social changes which were 
t o take place under the influence of the r i s e of the Marxist d i a l e c t i c 
on a population of Europe,tired,and discontented a f t e r years of war. 
Thus social change,an increased technology and the secularisation 
of the Western world played t h e i r part i n influencing the philosophical 
climate to which both Aquinas,in the thirteenth century,and Ian Ramsey 
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and Austin Farrer i n the twentieth,directed t h e i r attention. 
Of the two twentieth century authors,Austin Farrer is,of the 
two,as we have observed,the most obviously Thomist i n his outlook, 
though not necessarily i n himself a Thomist in the f u l l sense;though 
each adopted from Aquinas,whether consciously or not,different t r a i t s 
and ideas whether erroneous or valid.Their primary appeal i s to the 
Thomist doctrine of analogy .though they also share with Thomas i n 
gi v i n g a large degree of importance to the notion of the active s e l f 
and i t s place within the ontological schema of the universe. 
Both Ramsey and Farrer demonstrate an abiding concern with the 
"more" of existence; man i s to be seen as the sum of his empirical 
parts "plus" or "and more",and i t i s to map out,though not to t i y t o 
explain away.this "more" which has been one of the major purposes of 
t h i s work.Their concern with the techniques employed by,and the results 
achieved by,the specialised sciences displays an open-mindedness 
becoming of those who would seek to do f u l l j u stice to the whole 
spectrum of facts,rather than l i m i t i n g themselves,as has been the 
f a u l t of some contemporary schools of t h o u ^ t , t o a narrower and more 
li m i t e d world view which does not take account of a l l there is.Whether 
or not they proved successful i n t h e i r apologetic task,their i n t e l l e c -
t u a l honesty remains both a noteworthy and a praiseworthy feature 
of t h e i r work .Both display, too, with St. Thomas, a concern to mp out 
the common ground as a prerequisite t o dialogue,always with the hope 
of a r r i v i n g at a mutual understanding.They were,of course,able to 
say things which Aquinas could not say i n his work just as he had 
sought to say things which A r i s t o t l e did not,and could not,say.There 
are, of - course,too,areas touched by either Ramsey or Farrer .touched by 
one and not by the other.The doctrines of grace and divine providence, 
which feature i n the writings of Dr.Farrer are,as we have seen,largely 
absent from those of Professor Ramsey. 
For both Ramsey and Farrer,hovjever,the doctrines of freedom and 
of Immortality occupied an important place i n the cosmological schema. 
Their intimate r e l a t i o n to the all-important doctrine of the person 
reveals f o r us the immense depth of metaphysical insight employed by 
these two men. 
There are many who would say that,despite t h e i r efforts,both 
Ramsey and Parrer f a i l e d , i n the l a s t analysis,in t h e i r task.To some 
degree at l e a s t , t h i s must be true and i t i s easy f o r us to c r i t i c i s e 
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i n retrospect and with the wisdom of hindsight the work of either 
of these scholars.Yet,they must equally re t a i n the important posit-
ion which they xindoubtedly hold i n a continuing and,let us hope, 
expanding debate.The s t r i c t u r e s of early positivism having been 
l i f t e d - i n no small part due to the work and the e f f o r t s of Ian 
Ramsey and Austin Farrer - the f i e l d has become clear f o r a more 
Open and honest dialogue. 
I t i s an unfortunate,though periiaps inevitable, fact that at 
certain points,differences i n t h e i r respective approaches and views 
have served t o h i ^ l i g h t the drawbacks i n the works of the other, 
and have therefore in. some way tended to mute the apologetic force 
or effectiveness of t h e i r writings,rather than presenting a united 
f r o n t f o r contemporary Christian apologetic i n the face of a secular, 
and often a h o s t i l e and unsympathetic,scientific and technological 
world. 
The importance of t h e i r contribution must not,however,be under-
estimated. Their un s t i n t i n g e f f o r t s gave a new c r e d i b i l i t y t o theology 
and to metaphysics which has enabled the dialogue of the l a t e r years 
of t h i s century t o take place .The process i s by no means complete and 
t o look f o r an end at t h i s point would be to deny the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
f u r t h e r progress and i n t e l l e c t u a l advancement.We can,and must,however, 
learn both from the insigjhts and from the mistakes of such men and of 
t h e i r predecessors,both ancient and more recent as they applied the 
resources available t o them at the time,to the task.Only i f we can 
thus learn to apply what they have to offer to the ongoing situation 
can there be a hope f o r a renewed apologetic and a future f o r reason-
able dialogue which may take account of the transcendent and the i n -
v i s i b l e as part of the structure of the cosmos and thus learn more 
about ourselves and about God i n a way which w i l l better enable us 
t o do f u l l j u s t i c e to both our freedom and our dependence and our 
creatureliness and our immortal selves. 
The insights of Drs.. Ramsey and Farrer i n t o the use of the cat-
egory of models,both as a r a d i c a l reinterpretation of the work of 
St.Thomas and as,in some cases,a wholly novel contribution to the 
debate,and t h e i r work on the use of analogical methodology which 
played such a part i n the formulation of t h e i r thought must surely 
play a great part i n any future work to be undertaken i n t h i s f i e l d . 
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Reflection from a distance w i l l inevitably h i g h l i ^ t those places 
where Ramsey ajid Farrer failed,as well as where they were successful 
and they would be the f i r s t t o press that we should bring to bear the 
f u l l force and vigour of our c r i t i c a l f a c u l t i e s i n the examination of 
t h e i r r o l e i n the history of Christian apologetics and philosophical 
endeavour.Their shunning of the arrogance which has marked much of 
modern t h o u ^ t has surely, too,much to teach us about the way i n which 
futu r e endeavours are to be approached.Their work,while honest and 
f o r t h r i ^ t , a l w a y s s o u ^ t to do'justice to that i n which they believed 
and they were,while open,uncompromising. 
What we may f i n d i n the work of Dr.Farrer and Professor Ramsey 
are not f i n a l answers but pointers along a continuing and exciting path. 
What we have been provided with i s not the finished building but a f i r m 
foundation on which we may b u i l d and i f by t h e i r work we are enabled to 
continue,in honest dialogue,to press the claims of Christian apologetic, 
which takes account of both the discoveries and the work of the natural 
s c i e n t i s t and of the transcendent dimension of a l l existence and the 
tenets of the Christian faith.then they w i l l not have laboured i n vain. 
Appendix (A) 
In a ,set of hand wr i t t e n (lecture ? ) notes e n t i t l e d "Freedom and 
Miracle" he begins by asking a question remarkably similar i n form 
to the words which opened the published form of the Forwood Lectures 
over a decade l a t e r (and i t was even then,in I960,described as being 
"well ahead of i t s time").The notes begin by asking, "What i s my pur-
pose i n u n i t i n g these not obviously similar themes?" while the i n t r o -
duction to Freedom and Immortality begins with the words, " I t may 
seem very surprising to some readers that these not obviously similar 
themes of freedom and i-nmortality should be b r o u ^ t together i n one 
b r i e f book."(F&I pj.1). 
The notes continue,'*VJell,what I hope to show i s that each makes 
a similar sort of claim about the universe and each appeals to a s i t -
uation s i m i l a r to the other i n some very importajit respects.Further 
I believe i t i s i n such a s i t u a t i o n that we my f i n d an empirical 
basis f o r metaphysics and QQG theology a l i k e . " 
Behind a l l his. discussions i s the hope that his hearers m i ^ t be 
able to see the sort of defence that might he given to certain t r a d i t -
ional concepts by one who "nevertheless wishes to give f u l l credit to 
the approach and techniques of contemporary empiricism".His f i r s t move 
i s t o discuss "what i s commonly called 'free w i l l ' " and his intention 
i s to see " j u s t Vfhat i s being claimed about what", ( i t i s interesting 
to note that next to t h i s Ian Ramsey tes written an aside -'What i s a l l 
the fuss-being made about?'). He sees the problem,as comrnonly set out, 
as being one of science versus morality .He notes that "free w i l l i s a 
threat to the universality of causation" because, " i t challenges the 
claim of science to be completely adequate" though he does indeed qu-
estion whether science does i n fact demand completely determined pa t t -
erns (and indeed goes so fer as to maintain that the "claim of science 
i s not so much f o r universal causation as that going on, 
contains, more than spatio-temporal factors".) 
He sees the claim of "freedom" as "a si t u a t i o n of'willing'not 
wholly netted by observational language" (M57/l)« 
Paper clipped t o a l e t t e r dated January 22nd.19^5.headed Magdalene 
College Cambridge and signed by a John Knaresborough, i n v i t i n g Ian Ramsey 
to lecture to a course of chaplains on the 7th. ,8th. .and 9th. of Febru-
ary that year are a small set of b r i e f notes,again handwritten,obviously 
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intended as the substance of (at least one of) those talks or lectures. 
These are,for the most part,unintelligible,unreadable or both but which 
on the t h i r d page have Freedom (and the importance of the individual) 
and Immortality (and l i f e ) linked closely together.These notes,it may 
be remembered,predate Freedom and Immortality by at least a dozen years. 
There are also several typed sheets,undated but probably of the ^me 
period,one of which i s headed,"Immortality".The paper i s typed but con-' 
tains a number of pencilled alterations,though these are,for the most 
part, s t y l i s t i c .In t h i s paper,under the s u b - t i t l e ofmoral considerations", 
Ramsey notes that i t i s said that certain duties,our own moral develop-
ment f o r example, imply imjnortality but he questions whether we know of 
any,or are capable of specifying any such unconditional and universally 
recognised "duty".Some moral improvement,for example,may be very s e l f -
centered, though he does not i n f a c t develop how t h i s mi^.t be so.He 
further questions whether we may know any such duties without having to 
know f i r s t that we are immortal .He goes on i n th i s section to draw^his 
(reader's or) hearer's attention that i t has been held that f r u s t r a t i o n s , 
unrewarded goodness etc.,demand future existence.We cannot believe that 
i n j u s t i c e w i l l prevail.Of course t h i s proposal depends upon the assumption 
that the universe is,on the whole,good.This i n turn raises the whole qu-
estion of a prior b e l i e f i n God as the Christian t r a d i t i o n has held him 
to be.Finally,our acting on the assumption that our e f f o r t s give results 
of permanent value,raises the d i f f i c u l t y that "permanent value" may be 
secured f o r someone vrithout personal immortality f o r the agent. Under 
"empirical considerations" he postulates that i n fact popularity of b e l i e f 
i s important because we cannot think of our entire cessation but rather we 
think of death i n terms of sleep and look tovard the future i n terms of 
Spring a f t e r Winter as well as abnornal psychical facts - a rather weak 
point on which he does not elaborate.V/hile he readily admits that none of 
these features of moral and empirical experience prove immortality,never-
theless he does suggest that they are features which are coherent with 
such a b e l i e f .Nor,he says,are theare positive arguments against i t , births 
and deaths are "haphazard" only i n r e l a t i o n to one of many cause-factors. 
From a metaphysical point of view he maintains that an adequate account 
of s e l f and ownership ("to account f o r the fact that we speak of events 
being more*) demands,"non-spatio-temporal self constituents as a further 
abstractive fromjthe subjective side of the active unity".One phrase which 
he sees as needing to be unpacked i n t h i s context i s the phrase "Personal 
A c t i v i t y " (not only in t o observational sentences and what he c a l l s 'prim-
i i i 
i t i v e ' sentences but also in t o sentences which use a word l i k e 'soul'). 
"The subjective aspect of the active unity",he says,"is never adequately 
described i n spatio temporal events." In support of this he argues that 
t h i s i s the point behind Berkeley's "notions" and i s involved in the spec-
i a l place which Descartes gives to the "cogito" - In being aware of our 
own a c t i v i t y we are aware of our "eternal self".Because of the non-spatio-
temporal soul (or because of the inadequacies of language.relating to 
spatio-temporal facts only) no subject can ever be adequately described 
i n temporal terms or be said to cease to exist without misusing language, 
ie.without supposing incomplete language to be complete.P'rom this,Ramsey 
concludes that i n t h i s sense we then "persist","both temporally and more 
concretely ".To a l l of t h i s he adds several comments, noting f i r s t l y that i f 
t h i s means survival (= temporal persistence)(= v o l i t i o n a l harmony with God) 
f o r a l l , i t need not necessitate immortality and he also sees and admits 
the dilemma of universalism which leads either to a situation which i s 
morally compromising or involves some l i m i t a t i o n of God,thou^ again he 
does not explicate how,and he adds that i f we accept the moral d i f f i c u l t i e s , 
then probably the best comment i s to remember the construct character of 
time.The comments here are underdeveloped and may be intended to be used 
i n conjunction with other material,either lectures or some other form of 
teaching.This opinion may also hold f o r a comment that the appeal of the 
Christian to Christ i s not f o r propositions nor as an analogy but f o r a 
demonstration of the power of God.(cf.the a r t i c l e in Theology,May 1957, 
p.191 which we have discussed earlier.There we read that,"Christ i s no 
term i n an argument f o r immortality from analogy,but rather a focus f o r 
resurrection-vision and devotion Can Christians argue that we are 
immortal because Jesus i s immortal,when what i s so obvious i s that Jesus' 
i s u t t e r l y d i f f e r e n t from us? How easy to get o f f on the wrong l o g i c a l 
foot " (Log"^charac^ of Resurrec'^ b e l i e f p . l 9 l ) ) . 
As Ramsey said i n the early 'forties,any apnroach l i k e t h i s which 
closely linked a c t i v i t y and im:aortality could readily provide a thoug^:it 
background i n which to express the gospel.Here i s the germ of the idea 
which was l a t e r to bring together the "not obviously similar themes of 
freedom and immortality .in one b r i e f book" (F&I p . l l ).Ramsey f u r -
ther thinks that resurrection of a "body" (which he interprets as meaning 
the "permanence of some ' f i l l i n g ' " ) i s demanded i f vre are to avoid the 
"f a l l a c y of misplaced concretion"; i t is,he says,"an expression of the 
point that 'personal acti v i t y " * would not be exhausted by the logic of 
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spatio-temporal events,but i s nevertheless i n part worked according 
to i t . " 
In another paper of the same period entitled,"The Quest for a 
Christian Philosophy" he discussed his concept of metaphysics and 
i t s role as well, as o u t l i n i n g several, theories of the s e l f . I n a sec-
t i o n e n t i t l e d "the relevance to free w i l l discussions" he wrote that, 
"'acts of w i l l ' are not spatio-temporal events,(whose uniqueness i s 
to be analysed in terms of non causation)" yet he adds,"neither does 
the uniqueness and personally responsible character of an act of w i l l 
arise from some mysterious r e l a t i o n between soul and empirical self 
as t h o u ^ of two independent e n t i t i e s and against a background of a 
Pure Ego theory of the Self." In such a theory,he says,adequate acc-
ounts of tine s e l f demand that the subjective side of the active unity 
should be specified t o t a l l y i n terms of the empirical ''data," of "minds* 
and 'bodies' but also i n terms of a "timeless s e l f - c o n s t i t u e n t a soul 
or s p i r i t which i s i t s e l f an abstractive,yet d i f f e r e n t altogether from 
any and a l l of the abstractions of the s e r i a l theories,in being non-
spatio-temporal. Rejecting a l l the presuppositions of theories of self 
he here claims to off e r "a new interpretation of free will".declaring 
that the 'ultimacy',the ontological uniqueness,of the w i l l i s to be 
understood i n terms of the metaphysical givenness of the concrete 
active unity.The.individuality,the responsibility of the w i l l i s to 
be refered t o t h i s active unity which not only requires a 'soul* f o r . 
i t s most comprehensive description,but f o r which we would claim that 
i t i s only i n virtue of t h i s "soul" that any adequate analysis of own-
ership can be made. 
The f i n a l part of the paper i s given over to a very b r i e f discus-
sion of God and the world,of Time,creation and Immortality .On the sub-
j e c t of the l a t t e r he has t h i s to say; "because of i t s non-spatio-temporal 
soul,no 'subject' can properly be said t o cease to exist,nor f o r that 
matter can i t ever be described as a whole i n temporal terms.But i f we 
distinguish between survival (mere "going on") and immortality ( i n v o l -
ving the w i l l ) t h i s has no need to raise d i f f i c u l t i e s . I m m o r t a l i t y would 
be 'permanent' v o l i t i o n a l harmony with God,hell,'permanent" re b e l l i o n . . . . " 
(Ramsey's development of the concept of"Hell" has been refered to elsewhere). 
We can see here clearly the close connection that i s already being 
forged between freedom and inmiortality via the notion of vj i l l , b o t h of 
which Ramsey establishes as involving the w i l l i n a very important way. 
An i n t e r e s t i n g section occurs i n a set of lecture (?) notes in which 
Ramsey discusses notions of Duty and moral responsibility i n relatio n 
t o the notions of the Eternal and Immortality .where once again he arg- , 
ues strongly f o r the concept of Person as the s t a r t i n g point f o r disc-
ussion, f o r example he writes, " Not altogether unlike Spinoza,I 
think that once sempitemity is given up,we must seek f o r our Eternity 
i n the concept of Person " Here too,he'argues f o r the existence of 
some sort of timeless constituent to be included in the d e f i n i t i o n of 
the concept " I would suggest then that each self,besides having a 
body and mind,has also a timeless constituent - in virtue of which bod-
i l y events and mental events belong to the same person." This timeless 
constituent i s seen then as a unif y i n g f a c t o r j 
"This Timeless Self i s that i n virtue of which a l l my actions 
are "mine'.A touch of timelessness,so to say,makes my whole 
world akin" (and he continues)'"Eternalthen,I would define 
as that characteristic which belongs to "myself": m^  v o l i t -
ional unity when we have abstracted the spatio-temporal e l -
ements.We are Persons and qua Persons,Eternal.There I suggest 
our concept of Immortality must s t a r t . " 
Here then,in bold and d i r e c t terms from the early 19^0's is the se t t i n g 
f o r t h of the p o s s i b i l i t y of connections existing between the concepts of 
immortality,the person,the w i l l and ultimately,freedom which i s i t s f u l l -
est exercise when acting i n love.Ramsey asks, ".....with what character-
i s t i c can an Eternity constructed of Timeless Persons be best character-
ised?" and he answers, "Let me say immediately that I believe that the 
v o l i t i o n a l unity w i l l have as i t s ultimate constituent,feelings least 
adequately described as 'Love'." He here supports his thesis by refer-
ence t o Bradley's Ethical Studies vfhere Bradley says: "Here our morality 
i s consummated i n oneness with God,and everywhere we f i n d 'immortal love'" 
and MacTaggert's exposition of love i n his chapter on "Emotion" in The 
Nature of Existence.This love which i s immortal is,he says,that emotion 
which springs essentially from a sense of union with another s e l f . 
Freedom too,for Ramsey consists i n a v o l i t i o n a l unity with God,here the 
strands of thought meet in one; i n t h i s freedom and immortality stand i n -
separably together. 
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I a n Ramsey was one of the founders of the C h r i s t i a n 
P h i l o s o p h e r s ' Group and a t t e n d e d i t s meetings f o r as l o n g as 
he c o u l d . I n d i v i d u a l members o f the Group have k i n d l y con-
t r i b u t e d towards the c o s t of the p r i n t i n g , as have o t h e r 
people i n t e r e s t e d i n I a n Ramsey's work. John Habgood, the 
p r e s e n t Bishop of Durham donated money from the L i g h t f o o t 
Fund, and the Dean and Chapter of Durham C a t h e d r a l a l s o 
supported u s , as d i d Dr. W i l l i a m s ' s T r u s t . We a r e most 
g r a t e f u l t o everyone f o r t h e i r h e l p . 
A copy of t h e b i b l i o g r a p h y i s d e p o s i t e d w i t h I a n Ramsey's 
pa p e r s i n the c a r e of the L i b r a r y of Durham C a t h e d r a l , t o g e t h e r 
w i t h a copy of t h e m a t e r i a l of t h e b i b l i o g r a p h y r e a r r a n g e d as 
f o l l o w s : t i t l e s i n a l p h a b e t i c a l o r d e r ; r e v i e w s and a r t i c l e s 
under a l p h a b e t i c a l o r d e r of j o u r n a l ; books (and p a r t s of books) 
under a l p h a b e t i c a l o r d e r of p u b l i s h e r . 
We would l i k e t o e x p r e s s our t h a n k s to Margaret G i l l e y f o r 
t y p i n g the b i b l i o g r a p h y so b e a u t i f u l l y ; t o Durham U n i v e r s i t y 
P r i n t i n g U n i t f o r i t s p r o d u c t i o n ; and t o Roger N o r r i s of 
Durham U n i v e r s i t y L i b r a r y who gave us v a l u a b l e a d v i c e . 
F u r t h e r c o p i e s of the p r i n t e d b i b l i o g r a p h y a t £1.25 • 
( p o s t f r e e i n t h e U.K.) may be o b t a i n e d from Ann Loades, 
Department o f Theology, Abbey House, P a l a c e Green, Durham DHl 3RS. 
P h o t o - c o p i e s of the b i b l i o g r a p h y r e - a r r a n g e d as i n d i c a t e d 
above, a r e o b t a i n a b l e from the same a d d r e s s a t the c u r r e n t 
p r i c e f o r each p h o t o - c o p i e d page. 
Ann Loades 
E d i t o r 
I t i s t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h i s work t o p r o v i d e not o n l y 
a c o mprehensive b i h l i o g r a p h y o f t h e works o f 
I a n Thomas Ramsey hut a l s o t o g i v e some i n d i c a t i o n 
o f t h e tremendous scope and v a r i e t y o f i s s u e s on 
which he had something t o s a y . H i s c o n t r i b u t i o n 
a s a p h i l o s o p h e r and a s a b i s h o p t o contemporary 
s o c i e t y was immense; t h e p r i c e which he p a i d f o r 
su c h c o n c e r n , t h e h i g h e s t . 
J o n a t h a n H. Pye 
19'*3 
The World of Books: A Contemporary Q u e r i s t , Review o f 
Jacq u e s M a r i t a i n , Redeeming the Time 
The Record, F r i 2 1 Dec 191*3, p hjU. 
Review o f M, F a r b e r , The Foundation of Phenomenology: 
Edmund Huaaerl and the Queet for a Rigorous Science of 
Philosophy 
. Cambridge Review, v o l L X V I I , no 1 6 3 2 , 17 Nov 191*5, P 1 1 0 . 
Review of D. M. Emmett, The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking 
Cambridge Review, v o l L X V I I , no 1633, 21* Nov 1 9 U 5 , p 132. 
191*6 
Review o f T. D. Weldon, Introduction to Kant's Critique of 
Pure Reason 
Cambridge Review, v o l L X V I I , no 1 6 U 0 , 23 Feb 19 l*6 , p 2 7 3 . 
Review o f W. A. S i n c l a i r , An Introduction to Philosophy 
Cambridge Review, v o l L X V I I , no 161*3, 27 Apr 19 l*6 , p 3 3 0 . 
B a p t i s m and C o n f i r m a t i o n : T h e i r H i s t o r i c a l Development and 
R e l a t i o n s h i p , i n Confirmation Today (The b o o k l e t o f t h e 
Di o c e s a n Synod - L e i c e s t e r C a t h e d r a l , 22 Oct 19l*6) 
L e i c e s t e r D i o c e s a n P r e s s , 19 l*6 , pp 2 - 1 0 . 
191*8 
sermon, BBC Home S e r v i c e , from C h r i s t ' s C o l l e g e , Cambridge 
D u p l i c a t e d S h e e t s , 2 Hay 19 l*8 . 
Review o f J . S. Lawton, Conflict in Christology 
Theology, v o l L I . no 3 3 5 , May 1 9 U 8 , pp 1 8 9 - 9 1 . 
Sermon, BBC Home S e r v i c e , from C h r i s t ' s C o l l e g e , Cambridge 
D u p l i c a t e d S h e e t s , 2 1 Hov 1 9 l » 8 . 
191*9 
Some R e f l e c t i o n s on a Contemporary Problem r a i s e d by S c i e n c e 
and R e l i g i o n 
Cambridge Journal, v o l I I , no 5 . Feb 19 l*9 , PP 288-300. 
U n i v e r s i t y Sermon on C o n v e r s i o n 
Cambridge Review, v o l LXX, no 1 7 1 1 , 26 Feb 19 l*9 , pp 1*37-39. 
Review o f C. Dawson, Religion and Culture, 
Cambridge Journal, v o l I I , no 1 1 , Aug 191*9, PP 6 9 l * - 9 6 . 
Man and R e l i g i o n : I n d i v i d u a l and Community 
Proceedings of the Xth International Congress of Philosophy, 
Aug 1948 , Amsterdam, 1 9 l « 9 , PP 3 0 8 - 1 0 . 
1950 
H u l s e a n Sermon 
Cambridge Review, v o l L X X I I , no 1 7 5 1 . 25 Nov 1 9 5 0 , pp 19l» t. 
1 9 5 1 
Review of J . Murphy, The Origina and Hietory of Religione 
Cambridge Journal, v o l I V , no k, J a n 1 9 5 1 , PP h23-kj. 
S c i e n c e and R e l i g i o n 
Churah Pastoral Aid Society Pellowahip Paper, v o l X I I I , 
no l l » 9 , May-June 1 9 5 1 , PP 1-15 
Review o f E , C a s s i r e r , The Problem of Knowledge 
Theology, v o l L I V , no 3 7 7 , Nov 1 9 5 1 , PP USS-BS. 
1952 
Miraolea: An Exeraiae in Logical Mapwork ( I n a u g u r a l l e c t u r e , 
O x f o r d , 7 Dec 1 9 5 1 ) 
C l a r e n d o n , O x f o r d , 1 9 5 2 . 
Review o f C. Dawson, Religion and the Rise of Weatern 
Culture 
Cambridge Journal, v o l V, no 7 • Apr 1 9 5 2 . PP UU1»-U7. 
The C h a l l e n g e of Contemporary P h i l o s o p h y t o C h r i s t i a n i t y 
Modern Churchman, v o l X L I I , no 3 , Sept 1 9 5 2 , pp 2 5 2 - 6 9 . 
J o s e p h B u t l e r ( 1 7 5 2 - I 9 5 2 ) 
Oxford Magasine, v o l LXX, no 2 l t , 19 J a n 1 9 5 2 . pp 3 9 U - 9 7 . 
Review o f D. S. B a i l l i e . The Hyatery of Love and Marriage, and 
The Theology of Sex and Marriage 
Review o f F. F. B i g b y , Problema of Personal Relationahipa 
Student Movement, Oct 1 9 5 2 , pp 3 1 - 2 . 
1953 
Notions and I d e a s i n B e r k e l e y ' s P h i l o s o p h y 
Prooeedinga of the Xlth International Congreaa of Philoaophy, 
Amsterdam and L o u v a i n , 1 9 5 3 , v o l X I I I , pp 6 6 - 7 I . 
Review of J . Wisdom, Philoaophy and Payohoanalyeia 
Oxford Magasine, v o l L X X I I , no 3 , 29 Oct 1 9 5 3 . pp 52-U. 
Sermon p r e a c h e d a t t h e F e s t i v a l S e r v i c e o f T r i n i t y C o l l e g e , 
D u b l i n 
Bermathena, no L X X X I I . Nov 1 9 5 3 . pp 1 1 3 - 2 7 . 
Review o f C. E . Raven, natural Religion and Christian Theology 
Cambridge Journal, v o l V I I , no 3 , Dec 1 9 5 3 , pp 1 8 9 - 9 0 . 
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195k 
Discussion: C h r i s t i a n i t y and Language 
PhiloBophiaal Quarterly, T O I h, no 17, Oct 195U, pp 332-39. 
Review o f H. H. Farmer, Revelation and Religion 
Cambridge Review, v o l LXXVI, no I6h6, 13 MOT 195k, p 175. 
1955 
Review o f P. H. Heinemenn, ExiBtentialiem and the Modern 
Predicament 
Hibbert Journal, v o l L I I I , Jan 1955, PP 198-200. 
Review o f W. T. Stace, Religion and the Modern Mind, and 
Time and Eternity, and Myetioiem and Philosophy 
Mind, v o l LXIV, NS, no 253, Jan 1955, PP 110-12. 
The Systematic Elusiveness o f ' I ' 
PhiloBophioal Quarterly, v o l 5, no 20, J u l y 1955, PP 193-20U. 
1956 
The U n i v e r s i t y Sermon 
Oxford Magazine, v o l LXXIV, no 1 1 , 2 Feb 1956, pp 232-23U. 
Review o f H. J. Paton, The Modern Predioament 
Oxford Magazine, v o l LXIV, no 12, 9 Feb 1956, pp 260-1. 
R e l i g i o n and Empiricism: I I I 
Cambridge Review, v o l LXXVII, no 1879, 3 Mar 1956, 
pp l(0U-5. 
A Report and Reoommendation for the Royal Commiaaion on 
Medical Education prepared by a Joint Committee of the 
Churoh'a Council of Healing, the Institute of Religion and 
Medicine and the Guild of Catholic Doctors 
Apr 1956 
Review o f B. K i m p b e l l , The Symbols of Religious Faith 
Philosophical Quarterly, v o l 6, no 23, Apr 1956, p 189-
Spiritual Healing 
C e n t r a l Society o f Sacred Study, L e a f l e t 215, Apr 1956, 
pp 15-26. 
The Paradox o f Omnipotence 
Mind, v o l LXV, HS, no 258, Apr 1956, pp'263-66. 
-Cambridge by B i r t h , Oxford by Adoption 
Cambridge Review, v o l LXXVII, no 1885, 19 May 1956, 
PP 583-7. 
Empiricism and R e l i g i o n : A C r i t i q u e o f Ryle's Concept o f Mind 
The Christian Scholar, B l o o m f i e l d HJ, v o l XXXIX, no 2, 
June 1956, pp 159-63. 
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Persons and Funerals: What do Person Words Mean? 
aibbert Journal, v o l LIV, no h, J l y 1956, pp 330-38. 
Review o f R. Niebuhr, Religious, Social and Political Thought 
Oxford Magazine, v o l LXXV, no 5, 15 Nov 1956, p 125. 
195T 
Religious Language: An Empirical Placing of Theological 
Phrases 
L i b r a r y o f Philosophy and Theology, SCM Press, London, 1957 
(Also p u b l i s h e d by Maomillan, NY, 1963). 
Brovne, 2. S i r Thomas 
Die Religion in Gesohichte und Gegenwart, v o l 1 , c o l s l l t 2 3 - ' t , 
3rd edn, TUbingen, 195T. 
Review of E. E. Evana P r i t c h a r d , Nuer Religion 
Oxford Magazine,yol LXXV, no 10, 31 Jan 1957, p 2l*U. 
E t h i c s and Reason 
Church Quarterly Review, v o l 158, no 2, Apr 1957, pp 153-60. 
Review o f Sew Essays in Philosophical Theology, ed A. Flew 
and A. Maclntyre 
Philosophical Quarterly, v o l 7, no 27, Apr 1957, pp I85-87. 
The L o g i c a l Character o f R e s u r r e c t i o n B e l i e f 
Theology, v o l LX, no Ult3, May 1957. PP 186-92. 
Review o f B a s i l M i t c h e l l , ed. Faith and Logic 
Review of M. B. Fo s t e r , Mystery and Philosophy 
Hibbert Journal, v o l LV, no k, J l y 1957, PP hlk-6. 
Review of J. M. Todd, The Springs of Morality 
Church Quarterly Review, v o l 158, no 328, Jly-Sept 1957, 
PP 36U-66. 
Review o f Max Ruber, Jeeus Christus als ErlOser in der 
Liberalen Theologie 
Journal of Theological Studies, HS, v o l V I I I , no 2, 
Oct 1957, PP 378-80. 
Review o f R. H o s t i e , Religion and the Psychology of Jung 
Journal of Theological Studies, BS, v o l V I I I , no 2, 
Oct 1957, PP 380-1. 
Review o f J. Pieper, Justice and The Silence of St. Thomas 
Journal of Theological Studies, HS, v o l V I I I , no 2, 
Oct 1957. pp l t l 3 - l U . 
C h r i s t : L i f e , Teaching, Conception o f - as Son o f God; 
E v i l , Problem o f ; Sin and S a l v a t i o n ( a r t i c l e s ) 
Telugu Encyclopaedia, Oct 1957. 
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Review of E. Cahn, The Moral Decision: Right and Wrong in 
the Light of American Law x 
Church Quarterly Review, v o l C L V I I I , no 328, Jly-Sept 1957, 
pp 366-7. 
Review o f D. M. MacKinnon, A Study in Ethical Theory 
View Review, Dec 1957. 
1958 
Review o f R. Bultmann, Primitive Christianity in its 
Contemporary Setting 
Philosophy, vol X X X I I I , no 12U, Jan 1958, pp 83-I*. 
Review o f F. C. Happold, Adventure in Search of a Creed 
Modern Churchman, NS, v o l 1 , no 3, Jan 1958, pp 201-2. 
Two M o r a l i t i e s 
Journal of the William Temple Association, Spring 1958, 
pp 1»-11. 
Review of K. E a r t h , Church Dogmatics II ( D o c t r i n e o f God Part I ) 
Modern Churchman, BS, v o l 1 , no k, Apr 1958, pp 2 5'•-6. 
Review o f J. Pieper, Justice and The Silence of St. Thomas 
Modern Churchman, HS, v o l 1 , no k, Apr 1958, pp 258-9. 
Review of H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church 
Fathers 
Philosophical Quarterly, v o l 8, no 32, Apr 1 9 5 8 , 
pp 186-8. 
Review o f C. A. Campbell, On Selfhood and Godhood 
Oxford Magazine, v o l L X X V I , no 18, 8 May 1958, p U29. 
Review of R. L. C o l i e , Light and Enlightenment 
Oxford Magazine, v o l LXXVI, no 16, 8 May 1958, p U29. 
Review o f D. E. Roberts, Existentialism and Religious 
Belief, ed R. Hazelton 
Church Quarterly Review, v o l 1 5 9 , no 331, Apr-June 1 9 5 8 , 
pp 277-79. 
Review of H. F. H a l l e t t , Benedict de Spinoza 
Church Quarterly Review, v o l 1 5 9 , Oct-Dec 1 9 5 8 , pp 580-82 
E d i t o r - John Locke^ The Reasonableness of Christianity 
with a Diecourse on Miracles and Part of a Third Letter 
concerning Toleration 
A t e Black, London, 1958 
(Also p u b l i s h e d by Stanf o r d OP, C a l i f o r n i a , 1 9 5 8 ) 
Deismus I I : B e g r i f f l i o h ; England I I I R e l i g i o n s p h i l o s o p h i e 
im 19 und 20 Jahrhunderten 
Die Religion in Geeahiohte und Gegenwart, v o l 2, cols 
58-9, 3rd edn, pp 1(86-91, Tttbingen, 1958. 
- 5 -
I a n Ramsey played a major p a r t i n the group which produced 
the Report The Family in Contemporary Society (1958), one 
of the p r e p a r a t o r y r e p o r t s f o r the 1958 Lambeth Conference. 
This working p a r t y was o f f i c i a l l y sponsored by the Church 
of England Moral Welfare Council which was at t h a t time i n 
the process of i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o the Board o f S o c i a l 
R e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
1959 
Review of H. D. MacDonald, Ideas of Revelation 
View Review, 1959. 
Review o f J. S. Lawton, Miracles and Revelation 
View Review, 1959 
Paradox i n R e l i g i o n 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary 
v o l X X X I I I , pp 195-218, H a r r i s o n and Sons, London, 1959. 
Review o f E. A. S i l l e m , George Berkeley and the Proofs for 
the Existence of God 
Philosophical Quarterly, v o l 9, no 3U, Jan 1959> P 8 5 . 
Review o f J. B. Wilson, The Truth of Religion and Language 
and Christian Belief 
Hibbert Journal, v o l L V I I , no 2, Jan 1959, PP 201-3. 
U n i v e r s i t y Sermon - The Feast o f Meeting (preached be f o r e 
the U n i v e r s i t y o f Oxford, 2 Feb 1958) 
Church Quarterly Review, v o l l 6 0 , Jan-Mar 1959, PP 11-20. 
Review of W. M. Watt, The Reality of God 
Philosophical Quarterly, v o l 9. no 35, Apr 1959, P 192. 
Review o f A. G. Wernham, Benedict de Spinoza: the Political 
Works 
Journal of Theological Studies, BS, v o l X, no 1 , Apr 1959, 
p 229. 
Review o f I . L e c l e r c , Whitehead's Metaphysics 
Review o f W. B u r n e t t , This is my Philosophy 
Review o f E. V. S i n n o t , Matter, Mind and Man 
Church Quarterly Review, v o l l 6 0 , Jly- S e p t 1959, pp 399-'i01. 
Review o f G. F. Woods, Theological Explanation 
Hibbert Journal, v o l L V I I I , no 1 , Oct 1959, pp 85-6. 
Review o f P. Ramsey, ed. The Works of Jonathan Edwards: The 
Freedom of the Will 
Philosophical Quarterly, v o l 9, no 37, Oct 1959, pp 377-8. 
Review o f A. M. F a r r e r , The Freedom of the Will 
Journal of Theological Studies, HS, v o l X, no 2, Oct 1959, 
pp 1*56-9. 
Review o f M. A r g y l e , Religious Behaviour 
Frontier, v o l 2, no 3, Autumn 1959, pp 219-20. 
Ought Suicide to be a Crime? 
General Synod Board o f S o c i a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y , 1959 
1960 
Freedom and Immortality ( t h e Forwood Lectures i n the U n i v e r s i t y 
o f L i v e r p o o l , d e l i v e r e d i n 1957) 
SCM Press, London I96O. 
Review o f G. S. Hendry, The Gospel of the Incarnation 
Modern Churchman, HS, v o l V I I I , no 3, 196O, pp 20U-6. 
Review o f N i n i a n Smart, Reasons and Faiths, 
Philosophy, v o l 35, no 321, Jan 1960,. pp 86-8. 
Review o f W. F. Zuurdeeg, An Analytical Philosophy of 
Religion 
Bibbert Journal, v o l L V I I I , no 2, Jan I9 6 0 , pp 192-3. 
Charles Darwin: The O r i g i n o f Species 
Leicester Cathedral Quarterly,vol 1 , nos 1, 2, Jan-Apr I96O. 
Review o f A Symposium: Essays in Unitarian Theology 
The Unitarian, March 196O, pp 21-22. 
Review o f J. Wach, The Comparative Study of Religions 
Journal of Theological Studies, HS, v o l X I , no 1 , 
Apr 1960, p 2U2. 
Review of H. D. Lewis, Our Experience of God 
Hibbert Journal, v o l L V I I I , no 3, Apr I960, pp 307-9. 
Review o f G. W. H. Lampe, I Believe 
Bibbert Journal, v o l L V I I I , no U, J l y 1960, pp 1*18-9. 
Review o f F. H. Cleobury, Christian Rationalism and 
Philosophical Analysis 
Church Quarterly Review, v o l 1 6 I , Jly-Sept 1960, 
PP 355-57. 
Review o f W. F. Zuurdeeg, An Analytical Philosophy of 
Religion 
Church Quarterly Review, v o l I 6 I , J l y - S e p t , I960, 
PP 355-57. 
Contemporary Empiricism, i t s Development and The o l o g i c a l 
I m p l i c a t i o n s 
The Christian Scholar, B l o o m f i e l d HJ, v o l X L I I I , no 3, 
F a l l 1960, pp 17lt-81». 
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Review of E. Coreth, 0. Muck and J. Schasching, Aufgaben 
der Philoeophie 
Review o f C. Cirne-Lima,Der Peraonale Glaube 
Journal of Theological Studies, NS, v o l X I , no 2, 
Oct 1960, pp it36-7. 
Review o f J. Heywood Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox: A 
Study of Kierkegaard 
Philosophy, v o l 35, no 135, Oct 196O, pp 366-7. 
Review o f J. Wilson, Language and Christian Belief and The 
Truth of Religion 
Philosophical Quarterly, v o l 10, no U l , Oct I 9 6 0 , pp 382-3. 
Atheism; C h r i s t i a n E t h i c s ; Deism; Immanence; Pantheism; 
Theism ( a r t i c l e s ) 
Colliers Encyclopaedia, C o l l i e r s , HY, 1960. 
1961 
Review o f K. B a r t h , Church Dogmatics IV ( D o c t r i n e o f 
R e c o n c i l i a t i o n , p a r t I I ) 
Modern Churchman, NS, v o l I V , no 2, Jan I 9 6 1 , pp 13U-8. 
R e l i g i o n and Science: A Philosopher's Approach (based on a 
l e c t u r e g iven at Sion C o l l e g e , London, 30 Nov 1 9 5 9 ) 
Church Quarterly Review, v o l I 6 2 , Jan-Mar I961, pp 77-91. 
Review o f L. Monden, Le Miracle, Signe de Salut 
Review o f C. S. Lewis, Miracles 
Theology, v o l LXIV, no hhB, Feb I 9 6 1 , pp 73-1*. 
Review o f G. Harland, The Thought of Reinhold Hiebuhr 
Oxford Magazine, NS, v o l 1 , no 1 9 , 11 May 1961, pp 31*2-3. 
Review o f J. Hartland-Swann, An Analysis of Morals 
Church Quarterly Review, v o l I 6 2 , Apr-June I 9 6 1 , pp 228 - 9 . 
Some Fu r t h e r R e f l e c t i o n s on Freedom and I m m o r t a l i t y 
Hibbert Journal, v o l LIX, no U, J l y 1 9 6 I , pp 3 ' t 8 - 5 5 . 
Review o f J. C o l l i n s , God in Modern Philosophy 
Hibbert Journal, v o l LIX, no k, J l y I 9 6 I , pp 379 - 8 0 . 
The Challenge o f the Philosophy o f Language 
London Quarterly and Holborn Review, v o l CLXXXVI, Oct 1 9 6 I , 
pp 2U2-9. 
Review o f A. C. B r i d g e , Images of God 
Frontier, v o l U, no 3, Autumn 1961, pp 216-I7. 
F r o n t i e r s o f C h r i s t i a n Thought I I : The F r o n t i e r o f Philosophy 
Learning for Living, v o l 1 , no 2, Nov 1 9 6 I , pp 1 3 - 1 5 . 
Review o f 0. C. Thomas, William Temple's Philoaophy of 
Religion 
View Review, 1961. 
On Communicating R e l i g i o n , Problems in Christian Education 
So S, ( t h e substance o f a l e c t u r e given under the auspices 
of the I n s t i t u t e of Education i n the U n i v e r s i t y o f London) 
The N a t i o n a l S o c i e t y , 1961 
E d i t o r - Prospect for Metaphysics: Essays in Metaphysical 
Exploration, I n t r o d u c t i o n pp 7-11, On the P o s s i b i l i t y and 
Purpose o f a Metaphysical Theology pp 153-77 
George A l l e n and Unwin, I 9 6 1 
(Also p u b l i s h e d by The P h i l o s o p h i c a l L i b r a r y , NY, I 9 6 I ) . 
1962 
Review o f J. L. Moreau, Language and Religious Language 
Church Quarterly Review, v o l 163, Jan-Mar I962, pp 10U-5. 
Review o f 0. C. Thomas, William Temple's Philosophy of 
Religion 
Oxford Magazine, HS, v o l 2, no 16, 15 Mar I962, 
pp 262-3. 
C h r i s t i a n Education i n the l i g h t o f Contemporary Empiricism 
Religious Education, v o l L V I I (NY), no 2, Mar-Apr 1962, 
pp 95-97. 
Review o f L. A. Reid, Ways of Knowledge and Experience 
Journal of Theological Studies, HS, v o l X I I I , no 1 , 
Apr 1962, pp 231-2. 
Understanding your F a i t h : Ho. 1 , Tru t h and R e l i g i o n 
London Churchman, v o l 13, no 10, Oct 1962, pp 9-12. 
Review o f D. J. Eiwood, The Philosophical Theology of 
Jonathan Edwards 
Journal of Theological Studies, NS, v o l X I I I , no 2, 
Oct 1962, pp 1»82-Ii. 
Review o f J. Wilson, Philosophy and Religion: The Logic of 
Religious Belief 
Frontier, v o l 5, no 3, Autumn 1962, pp 528-9. 
Deism; I m m o r t a l i t y ( a r t i c l e s ) 
Colliers Encyclopaedia, C o l l i e r s , NY, 1962. 
L o g i c a l Empiriciam and P a t r i s t i c s ( d e l i v e r e d at the 3rd 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conference on P a t r i s t i c S t u d i e s , Oxford, 
Sept 1959) 
Sonderdruck aue Studia Patristica, v o l 5, pt I I I , B e r l i n , 
ed F. L. Cross, I962, pp 5'*l-7, Texte und Untersuchungen 
zur Geschichte der A l t c h r i s t l i c h e n L i t e r a t u r Band 80. 
Sterilisation 
General Synod Board o f S o c i a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y , 1962. 
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1963 
Review o f W. G. Maclagen, The Theological Frontier of 
Ethics 
Mind, v o l LX X I I , NS, no 286, Apr 1963, pp 29't-8. 
The Alden T u t h i l l Lectures 1963 on T h e o l o g i c a l L i t e r a c y : 
1. On Understanding Mystery, 2. On Being A r t i c u l a t e about 
the Gospel, 3. A L o g i c a l E x p l o r a t i o n o f some C h r i s t i a n 
Doctrines 
Chicago Theological Seminary Register, v o l L I I I , no 5, 
May 1963 
Review of G. E. Myers, Self, Religion and Metaphysics 
Philosophical Quarterly, v o l 13, no 52, J l y 1963, 
pp 273-li. 
Review o f A. V i d l e r , ed. Soundings 
Frontier, v o l 6, no 2, Summer 1963, pp 150-1. 
Bi o l o g y and P e r s o n a l i t y : Some P h i l o s o p h i c a l R e f l e c t i o n s 
Philosophical Forum, v o l XXI, 1963-lt. 
On Being Sure in Religion (F, D. Maurice Lectures f o r I961) 
Athlone Press, London, I963. 
Punishment 
General Synod Board o f S o c i a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y I963. 
I96U 
Review o f K. B a r t h , Church Dogmatics III (Doctrine o f 
Cr e a t i o n p a r t s "i, k) 
Modern Churchman, NS, v o l V I I , no 3, Apr 196U, pp 187-92. 
Good Stewards o f the M a n i f o l d Grace o f God 
Christian Education, J l y 196U, pp 2-5. 
Review o f K. B a r t h , Church Dogmatics IV ( D o c t r i n e o f 
R e c o n c i l i a t i o n p a r t 3) 
Modern Churchman, NS, v o l V I I , no It, J l y 1961t, pp 2lt3-7. 
Review o f J. E. Smith, The Spirit of American Philosophy 
Religious Education, v o l LIX (NY), no 1*, Jly-Aug 196U, 
P 31*8. 
Review o f T. S. Kepler, The Meaning and Mystery of the 
Resurrection 
Religious Education, v o l LIX (NY), no 5, Sept-Oct 196U, 
pp 1»30-1. 
Towards the Relevant i n T h e o l o g i c a l Language 
Modern Churchman, NS, v o l V I I I , no 1 , Oct 1961*, pp U6-58. 
A New Prospect i n T h e o l o g i c a l Studies 
Theology, v o l L X V I I , no 53U, Deo 196U, pp 527-33. 
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H i s t o r y and the Gospels, Some P h i l o s o p h i c a l R e f l e c t i o n s 
( d e l i v e r e d a t the 2nd I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conference on New 
Testament St u d i e s , Oxford, Sept I 9 6 I ) 
Studia Evangelica, v o l I I I , ed F. L. Cross, (Texte und 
Untersuchungen 88) Akademie-Verlag, B e r l i n , LXXXVIII, 
I96U, pp 201-19. 
M i r a c l e s : An Exercise i n L o g i c a l Mapwork, i n The Miracles 
and the Resurrection 
SPCK T h e o l o g i c a l C o l l e c t i o n s , No 3, 196U, pp I-30 
Religion and Science: Conflict and Synthesis ( f i r s t given 
i n 1960 as the f o u r t h i n the s e r i e s of Annual Theological 
Lectures arranged by the Church of I r e l a n d i n the Queen's 
U n i v e r s i t y , B e l f a s t ) 
SPCK, London, 1961*. 
Models and Mystery (Whidden Lectures f o r I963) 
OUP, London, I96I*. 
1965 
Charles Earle Raven 1885-196I* 
Proceedings of the British Academy, v o l 51, 1965, 
pp 1*67-81*. 
I n Memoriam - Charles Earle Raven (1885-I96I*) 
Modern Churchman, NS, v o l - V I I I , no 2, Jan I965, PP 132-5. 
Discernment, Commitment and Cosmic Disclosure 
Religious Education, Chicago, v o l LX, no 1 , Jan-Feb 1965, 
pp 10-15. 
L e t t e r : The I n t e l l e c t u a l C r i s i s o f B r i t i s h C h r i s t i a n i t y 
Theology, v o l L X V I I I , no 536, Feb I965, PP I O 9 - I I . 
Capping t he Fool 
Foolscap, v o l 2, no 3, Apr 1965, p 7-
Review o f A. A. Luce, The Dialectic of Immaterialism 
Journal of Theological Studies, HS, v o l XVI, no 1 , 
Apr 1965, pp 267-70. 
Review o f H. Meynell, Sense, Soneense and Christianity 
Journal of Theological Studies,SS, v o l XVI, no 1, Apr I965, 
pp 270-71. 
C o n t r o v e r s i a l Broadcasting and the Dialogue w i t h Humanism 
The Christian Broadcaster, v o l X I I , no 2, J l y I965, 
pp 22-25. 
Het empirisme en de t h e o l o g i e 
Wending, Jly-Aug 1965, PP 31*9-361*. 
Contemporary Philosophy and the C h r i s t i a n F a i t h 
Religious Studies, v o l 1 , no 1 , Oct 1965, PP 1*7-61. 
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Reactions: Jesus Today 
Breakthrough, no 12, Autumn 1965. PP 21-2. 
The A u t h o r i t y o f the Church Today, i n Authority and the 
Church, ed R. R. W i l l i a m s 
SPCK, London I965 
Christian Discourse: Some Logical Explorations ( R i d d e l l 
Memorial L e c t u r e s , 35th s e r i e s , 5, 6, 7, Nov I963) 
OUP, London, I965 
E d i t o r - Biology and Personality, I n t r o d u c t i o n pp 1-8, 
Biology and P e r s o n a l i t y : Some P h i l o s o p h i c a l R e f l e c t i o n s 
pp 17lt-206 
B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , Oxford, I965 
A b o r t i o n 
Decisions about Life and Death 
General Synod Board o f S o c i a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y , I965. 
1966 
R e l i g i o n and Science, C o n f l i c t and Synthesis 
Adult Teacher ( t h e monthly magazine o f the Methodist 
Church, Tennessee) v o l 19, no 10, June 1966, pp 2-1*. 
Review o f H. P. Owen, The Moral Argument for Christian 
Theism 
Theology, v o l LXIX, no 556, Oct 1966, pp 1*57-9. 
Review of G. W. H. Lampe and D. M. MacKinnon, The Resurrection 
Mowbray's Journal, no'81*, Autumn 1966, pp 6-8. 
A Symposium o f C h r i s t i a n i t y and Buddhism 
Japanese Religions, v o l 1*, no 2, 1966 (magazine issued by 
the NCC centre f o r the study o f Japanese R e l i g i o n s , ed 
Doi Masatoshi) 
T a l k i n g about God: Models Ancient and Modern, i n Myth and 
Symbol, F. W. D i l l i s t o n e , ( f i r s t g i v en as a paper f o r t he 
Modern Churchman's Union 1961*) 
SPCK T h e o l o g i c a l C o l l e c t i o n s , no 7, 1966, pp 76-97. 
A Personal God, i n Prospect for Theology, Essays in honour 
of H. H, Farmer, ed F. G. Healey, pp 53-71 
Welwyn, Nisbet I966. 
E d i t o r - Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy 
( L i b r a r y o f Philosophy and Theology) Discussion o f 
R. B r a i t h w a i t e , An E m p i r i c i s t ' s .View o f the Nature o f 
R e l i g i o u s B e l i e f pp 8U-88;;Moral Judgements and God's 
Commands pp 152-71; Towards a R e h a b i l i t a t i o n of N a t u r a l 
Law pp 382-96 
SCM Press, London, I966. 
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Berkeley and the P o s s i b i l i t y of an E m p i r i c a l Metaphysics, 
i n Sew Studies in Berkeley 's Philosophy, ed W. E. Steinkrauss 
H o l t , Rinehart and Winston, 1966. 
Address at the Ded i c a t i o n Service 
U n i v e r s i t y o f Oxford I n s t i t u t e of Education, I966. 
Bishop's Letter, Dec 1966. 
1967 
Inthronement Sermon 
The Bishoprick, v o l 1*2, no 2, Feb I967, pp 21-28. 
Review of W. I . Matson, The Existence of God 
Journal of Philosophy, (HY), v o l 61*, no U, 2 Mar 1967, 
pp 128-33. 
Growing Edges 
The Bishoprick, v o l 1*2, no 3, May I967, pp 1*5-1*7. 
The Plowden Report 
Learning for Living, v o l 6, no 5, May 1967, PP 22-25. 
P r e s i d e n t i a l Address t o the Diocesan Conference, Sat 27 June I967 
and note 
The Bishoprick, v o l 1*2, no 1*, Aug 1967, pp 65-70, 70. 
Review o f M. E. Marty, Varieties of Unbelief, asii Religion 
and Humanism (Broadcast t a l k by R. Hepburn and o t h e r s ) 
Frontier, v o l 10, no 3, Autumn I967, PP 229-30. 
Some R e f l e c t i o n s on Current L i t u r g i c a l Experiment: Holy 
Communion - Series I I 
The Biehopriak, v o l 1*3, no 1 , Nov 1967, pp 2-6. 
Review o f J. A. T. Robinson, Exploration into God 
Sew Christian, no 55, 2 Nov I9 6 7 , p 19. 
Models and Mystery ( r e p l y by Ian Ramsey t o a d i s c u s s i o n by 
R. B. B r a i t h w a i t e , J. M i l l a r and T. Bas t i n ) 
Theoria to Theory, v o l 1 , 1967, pp 263-69. 
E t h i c a l Language ( a r t i c l e ) , ed J. Macquarrie, Dictionary of 
Christian Ethics 
SCM Press, London, 1967. 
Bishop's Letter, Jan-Dec 1967-
- 1968 
Review of J. MacQuarrie, God Talk: An Examination of the 
Language and Logic of Theology 
ChurcA Quarterly Review, v o l 169, Jan-Mar 1968, p 111. 
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Theology Today and S p i r i t u a l i t y Today 
The Bishopriak, v o l 1*3, no 2, Feb 1968, pp 26-33. 
The Church and the Secular C i t y 
The Placement and Movement o f A s s i s t a n t Curates 
The Bishopriak, v o l 1*3, no 2, May I 9 6 8 , pp 1*3-53, 56-7 . 
Review of T. McPherson, The Philosophy of Religion 
Trivium, v o l I I I , Hay I 9 6 8 , pp 109-12. 
Subscription and Assent to the Thirty nine Articles 
J l y 1968. 
The Wftv Ahead f o r C h r i s t i a n T h i n k i n g 
Point, no 3, Summer 1968, pp 57-63. 
Reply t o Notes and Queries by W. S. T. Wright 
Anglican T h i n k i n g and E x p l o r a t i o n s i n t o U n i t y (an address 
given i n Newcastle a t a meeting d u r i n g the week o f prayer 
f o r C h r i s t i a n U n i t y I 9 6 8 ) 
The Bishoprick, v o l 1*3, no It, Aug I 9 6 8 , pp 76-9, 68-73. 
Review o f P. Baelz, Christian Theolony and Metaphysics, and 
Prayer and Providence, The Hulsean Lecture f o r 1966. 
Church Quarterly, v o l 1 , no 2, Oct 1968, pp 1 7 0 - 1 . 
Making a T r a d i t i o n 
Frontier, v o l 1 1 , no 3, Autumn I 9 6 8 , pp 218-222. 
Anglican/Methodist Proposals 
The Bishopriak, v o l UU, no 1 , .Nov 1968, pp 2-17. 
Survey o f Ethics:. The General Concept o f T h e o l o g i c a l 
M o r a l i t y I 9 6 0 - I 9 6 6 
Theological Book List, ( T h e o l o g i c a l Education Fund o f 
the WCC) 1968, pp 56-63. 
Faith Alert, ed I . T. Ramsey and M. Perry (prepared f o r 
the Lambeth Conference 1968) 
SPCK, London, 1 9 6 8 . 
P o l a n y i and J. L. A u s t i n , i n Intellect and Hope, Essays in 
the Thought of Michael Polanyi, ed T. A. Langford and 
W. H. Poteat 
Duke U n i v e r s i t y Press, Durham NC, 1968. 
Theology Today and S p i r i t u a l i t y Today, i n Spirituality 
for Today, ed E. James, pp 7't-86 (A r e p o r t o f the P a r i s h 
and People Conference, Bede College, Durhom, 28 Aug-1 Sept 1967) 
SCM Press, London, I 9 6 8 . 
Pastoral Care and the Training of Ministers ( c h a i r e d by 
I . T. Ramsey) 
1968 
Bishop's Letter, Jan-Dec 1968. 
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1 9 6 9 
Palm Sunday: The Sunday before Easter ( t h i s a r t i c l e l a r g e l y 
reproduces a sermon broadcast by the BBC on Palm Sunday 1968) 
The Bishoprick, v o l 1*1*, no 2, Feb 1969, pp 26-30. 
Violence i n Contemporary Society 
Anglican-Methodist Proposals - The Service o f R e c o n c i l i a t i o n 
The Bishopriak, v o l 1*1*, no 3, May 1969, pp 1*6-50, 50-52. 
Sermon preached at Durham Cathedral t o mark the 150th 
Anniversary of the I n s t i t u t i o n of C i v i l Engineers 
Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, v o l 1*3, 
June 1969, pp H9-H12. 
I n t r o d u c t i o n 
The Bishopriok, v o l 1*1*, no 1*, Aug I969, pp 6U-66. 
Our A t t i t u d e t o Heart T r a n s p l a n t a t i o n 
Burrswood Herald, v o l 3, no 3, Autumn 1969, pp 9 - I I . 
Opening Sermon at the Conference o f Modern Churchman 
Modern Churchman, NS, v o l X I I I , no 1 , Oct I9 6 9 , pp 7-15. 
W i l l i a m Temple: Some Aspects o f His L i f e and Thought (2nd 
W i l l i a m Temple Lec t u r e , d e l i v e r e d at W i l l i a m Temple College, 
Rugby, 22 June I968) 
The Bishoprick, v o l 1*5. no 1 , Nov I969, pp 2 - l l * . 
Review o f H. M o n t e f i o r e , The Question Mark 
View Review, v o l 20, no 1*. Nov I969. 
Review of T. F. Torrance, Theological Science 
Times Literary Supplement, 25 Dec I969, p 11*77. 
Joseph Butler 1692-17S2, Some Features of his Life and Thought 
(Friends o f the Dr. Williams' L i b r a r y Lectures 23) 
Dr Williams' T r u s t , London 1969-
Pop and R e v e l a t i o n 
Sew Directions, v o l 1, no 1 , 1969. 
Reasonableness of Faith Today 
Rochester Cathedral Lectures ( d u p l i c a t e d ) I969. 
H e l l , i n Talk of God (Royal I n s t i t u t e of Philosophy Lectures I I , 
1968-9) ( f i r s t g i v en as a Durham U n i v e r s i t y L i g h t f o o t Society 
Lecture) 
Macmillan, London, 1 9 6 9 , pp 207-25-
Theology of S a l v a t i o n , i n Medicine, Morals and Man, ed E. Claxton 
and H. A. C. McKay ( t h i s paper i s e s s e n t i a l l y a m o d i f i e d 
v e r s i o n o f p a r t o f a paper already published i n a symposium 
e n t i t l e d The Whole Man, ed Dr J. McGilvey) 
B l a n f o r d , I969 
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Bishop's Letter, Jan-Dec 1969-
1970 
Processions and Witness ( p a r t o f an address given t o the 
Convocation of York on 13 Jan 1970 and s l i g h t l y ammended 
f o r p u b l i c a t i o n here) 
The Bishoprick, v o l 1*5, no 2, Feb 1970, pp 2lt-8. 
On Not Being Judgemental ( t h e 3rd Margaret A l l a n Memorial 
Lecture d e l i v e r e d i n Edinburgh t o the S c o t t i s h P a s t o r a l 
A s s o c i a t i o n , Nov 1969) 
Contact ( t h e magazine o f the I n s t i t u t e o f R e l i g i o n and 
M e d i c i n e ) , no 30, Mar 1970, pp l - l 6 . 
Bookshelf 2 
Learning for Living, v o l 9, no k. Mar 1970, pp 31-2. 
Note 
The C h r i s t i a n R e l i g i o n and A r t - Towards a D o c t r i n e o f 
the P r o c r e a t o r s h i p o f Man 
The Biahoprick, v o l US, no 3, May 1970, pp lt5, lt5-55. 
On Not Being Judgemental ( t h e 3rd Margaret A l l a n Memorial 
L e c t u r e , d e l i v e r e d i n Edinburgh t o the S c o t t i s h P a s t o r a l 
A s s o c i a t i o n i n Nov I969) 
Review o f H. C u n l i f f e - J o n e s , Christian Theology since 1600 
A Manual o f Prayer and Readings w i t h t h e Sick - a 
Recommendation o f H. Autton's A Manual of Prayer and 
Readings with the Sick 
The Bishoprick, v o l 1*5, no 1*, Aug 1970, pp Ult-56, 56-7, 57. 
Review o f W. Moberly, The Ethics of Punishment 
Journal of Theological Studies, NS, v o l XXI, no 2, Oct 1970, 
pp 530-32. 
Condemnation and Acceptance I 
Burrswood Herald, v o l 3, no 7, Autumn 1970. 
E c c l e s i a s t i c u s 1*3.32, Science and R e l i g i o n , Past and Future 
(sermon preached by the bishop o f Durham t o the B r i t i s h 
A s s o c i a t i o n i n Durham Cathedral on Sept 6, 1970) 
The Placement and Movement o f A s s i s t a n t Curates 
The Bishopriak, v o l 1*6, no 1 , Nov 1970, pp 2-7, 7-8. 
I n Search o f Absolute Moral Values (Review of P. Roubiczek, 
Ethical Values in the Age of Science) 
The Times, 21 Nov 1970, p l U . 
Review o f Irish Anglicanism, ed M. Hurley SJ 
New Divinity ( D u b l i n ) , v o l 1 , no 2, Nov 1970, pp 55-6. 
Review o f R. C. M i l l e r , The Language Gap and God: Religious 
Language and Christian Education 
Religious Education, v o l LXV (Chicago), no 6, Nov-Dec 1970, 
pp 52U-8. 
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Condemnation and Acceptance I I 
Burrswood Herald, v o l 3, no 8, Christmas 1970. 
Review o f P. Geach, God and the Soul 
University of Leeds Review, v o l 13, no 2, 1970. 
Concept of the E t e r n a l , i n The Christian Hope ( f i r s t given 
as the P r e s i d e n t i a l Address t o the Societ y f o r t he Study 
of Theology 1969) 
SPCK T h e o l o g i c a l C o l l e c t i o n s , no 13, 1970, pp 35-1*8. 
The Fourth R: Commission on Religious Education in Schools 
London, N a t i o n a l S o c i e t y , 1970. 
Bishop's Letter, Jan-Dec 1970. 
1971 
Review o f Readings for Holy Communion (NEB) 
Prayers f o r Embertide 
The Bishopriok, v o l 1*6, no 2, Feb 1971, p 2l*, 25. 
Review of T. F. Torrance, God and Rationality 
The Spectator, 10 Apr 1971. 
Review o f I . Trethowan, Absolute Values 
Review o f J. MacQuarrie, Three Issues in Ethics 
Review o f K. Ward, Ethics and Christianity 
Church Quarterly, v o l 3, no 1», Apr 1971, pp 333-6. 
The I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s B i l l ( t h i s a r t i c l e reproduces the 
substance-of a speech i n the House o f Lords on Tues 6 Apr 1971) 
Review o f R. L. H e t t l i n g e r , Growing up with Sex 
Review o f the Crockford Preface, Crockford's Clerical 
Directory 1969-70 
The Bishoprick, v o l 1*6, no 3, May 1971, pp 39-1*6, 1*7-8, 
1*8. 
R e l i g i o n and Broadcasting 
The Brigade ( t h e magazine o f the Church Lad's Briga d e ) , 
v o l LXXIX, no 2, J l y 1971, PP 6-7. 
The Miners' Gala 1971 (copy o f the speech made by I . T. Ramsey 
at the Miners' Gala, Durham, 17 J l y 1971) 
The BiBhoprick,rol 1*6, no 1*, Aug 1971, pp 52-60. 
The I n f l u e n c e o f Technology on the S o c i a l S t r u c t u r e 
(Trueman Wood Lecture) 
Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, v o l CXIX, no 5 l 8 l , 
Aug 1971. 
L e t t e r s t o the E d i t o r 
Theology, v o l LXXIV, no 609, 1971. 
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The I n f l u e n c e o f Technology on the S o c i a l S t r u c t u r e 
(Trueman Wood Lec t u r e ) 
Teilhard Review, v o l 6, no 2, Winter 1971. 
Our Understanding of Prayer (Archbishop's Commission on 
C h r i s t i a n D o c t r i n e , Occasional Papers no l ) 
(based on one of I . T. Ramsey's addresses i n the Oxford 
Mission of I969) 
SPCK, London, 1971 
Prayer and the Departed (A Report o f the Archbishop's 
Commission on C h r i s t i a n D o c t r i n e ) 
SPCK, London, 1971. 
Bishop of Durham's Commission on the Church in Sunderland 
1971 
Words about God: The Philoaophy of Religion 
Forum Books, SCM Press, London, 1971 
( a l s o p u b l i s h e d by Harper and Row, NY, 1971) 
Language and Religion 
SCM, Harper Torch, 1971. 
I n t r o d u c t i o n , Epilogue, and Human P e r s o n a l i t y , i n Personality 
and Science, ed I . T. Ramsey and R. P o r t e r , Ciba Foundation 
B l u e p r i n t 
C h u r c h i l l L i v i n g s t o n e , London, 1971. 
The Theology o f Wholeness, i n From Fear to Faith, Studies 
of Suffering and Wholeness, ed N. Autto n 
SPCK, London 1971. 
Bishop's Letter Jan-Dec 1971-
1972 
The Bishop - one a r t i c l e i n a s e r i e s on the l i f e and work 
of our Clergy from Curate t o Archbishop 
St. Nicholas's Magazine, Durham, Feb 1972, pp 1*-10. 
Review o f J. Morton, Man, Science and God 
Review o f A. R. Peacocke, Science and the Christian 
Experiment 
The Guardian, 17 Feb 1972. 
Moral Problems Facing t h e Medical P r o f e s s i o n at the present 
Time 
I n a u g u r a l Lecture at the 15th Annual Meeting o f the 
B r i t i s h Medical A s s o c i a t i o n , N i c o s i a , Cyprus, 12 Apr 1972. 
Comment on the Archbishop o f York's C a l l t o the North L e t t e r 
The Bishopriak, v o l 1*7, no 3, May 1972, pp 1*2-3. 
Theology i n England: I t s Changing Face 
Escape, v o l I * , no 6, May 1972, pp 2ll*-222. 
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Moral Problems Facing t he Medical Profession a t the Present 
Time ( I n a u g u r a l l e c t u r e f o r the BMA Conference i n Cyprus, 
Apr 1972) 
The Biehopriok, v o l 1*7, no k, Aug 1972, pp 48-61. 
C r i s i s o f F a i t h (an address t o the Church Leader's Conference 
i n Birmingham, Sept 1972) 
Theoria to Theory, v o l V I , 1972, pp 23-38. 
Epilogue t o T. F. Sowler's The Bietory of the Town and 
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